Sunday, 4 November 2012



Preparing for the unexpected
JPost.com -11/01/2012 23:42

In an uncertain region, the IDF practices rapid deployment of ground forces to multiple fronts.

IDF soldier takes part in Golan maneuversPhoto: IDF Spokesman
 
The IDF is intensively drilling the speedy deployment of its forces from the West Bank and Jordan Valley to potential war fronts, as the region continues to be shaken by deep instability.

In every direction Israeli military planners look, new threats are emerging in varying degrees. On the Lebanese border, Hezbollah is constructing sophisticated subterranean rocket-launching sites and command and control centers. Ground forces will be required to take out these underground facilities in any future confrontation.

In the Sinai Peninsula and Syria, al-Qaida-inspired groups are mushrooming. In Gaza, Hamas together with Islamic Jihad and a host of smaller Palestinian jihadi organizations have built a heavily armed Islamist base which is on a long-term collision course with Israel.

Beyond the growing guerrilla-terrorist challenge, the IDF may yet have to quickly enter Syria to neutralize the threat of loose and mobile chemical weapons. And, of course, any strike on Iran’s nuclear weapons program will almost certainly set off a regional conflict.

These developments are what led Deputy Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen. Yair Naveh to warn in mid-October that for the first time in years, Israel must be ready for unexpected security developments on multiple fronts.

“We will have to be flexible and responsible in following the changes in the entire area,” Naveh told 375 new army officers during a ceremony held at Mitzpe Ramon.

These changing factors are also behind comments by the army’s head of Technology and Logistics Branch, Maj.-Gen. Kobi Barak, who said that the chances of a “narrow or wide” armed conflict involving the IDF have grown recently, Against this background, the IDF has stepped up drills involving mobilization of armored vehicles, ground troops, and all their logistical and communications support units from the center of the country to the north or south.

Few know the true size of Israel’s ground forces, but it is safe to say that the IDF is one of the largest modern armies around.

The goal now for IDF commanders is to ensure that the army’s devastating firepower and ability to seize territory quickly through overwhelming force can be directed to any front within hours.

To that end, the past weeks and months have seen a marked increase in IDF exercises aimed at the mobilization of military forces from the IDF’s Central Command to the south and north.

In recent weeks, for example, an IDF tank battalion in the Jordan Valley surprised its soldiers with an exercise aimed at getting the tanks to a war front within a day. Conscripted soldiers and reserve troops took part in the exercise – the first time this has happened.

Supporting infantry units were also called in to the rehearsal, as they would be crucial in any speedy land maneuver.

The “enemy” in this exercise was played by IDF soldiers pretending to be guerrillas armed with anti-tank missiles; just the sort of asymmetrical conflict that may develop unexpectedly.

The live-fire drill, held at a large base in the Jordan Valley, featured Israel’s Merkava 4 tank, which is one of the most technologically advanced and deadly tools available to the ground forces.

The Merkava 4’s capabilities have been bolstered further by a new anti-rocket shield installed in the tanks. Called Wind Jacket, the system provides 360- degree protection to the tank and intercepts incoming anti-tank missiles (of the type held by Hezbollah) in midair, thereby allowing the tank to proceed on the battlefield unhindered.

The commander of Battalion 9, which held the drill, said his force would be one of the first responders to a developing conflict.

A few days before that, the IDF’s largest communications battalion held a war drill in which it tested how long it would take it to get to a battle front. The drill was based on the understanding that achieving battlefield victory is not only about getting to the front and moving into enemy territory; ground forces must practice working with one another and coordinating their activities under fire. Hence, the communications battalion tested out a new command and control system called Digital Ground Army 600.

This system allows field commanders to track (in real time) all of the ground units on an interactive screen, communicate with the units, and issue instructions.

In September, artillery units were airlifted without warning from their regular patrols in the West Bank to the Golan Heights to practice their response time to a sudden Syrian conflict. The troops had to take up their firing positions and open fire at targets as quickly as possible.

Furthermore, field commanders have increased their exposure to intelligence on Israel’s enemies.

Recently, ground forces commanders traveled to an intelligence agency’s headquarters in Israel and received an in-depth briefing on Hezbollah, Hamas and other threats. The aim is to have the intelligence filter down to the lowest ranks, giving the whole of the ground forces access to an updated intelligence picture on who will be waiting for them in the next round.

Many of these preparations are the results of lessons learned during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The IDF’s senior echelons have vowed that the indecisive outcome of that conflict will not repeat itself.
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INSS’s war game simulates regional scenarios
JPost.com -11/04/2012 00:52

What would the first 48 hours after an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities be like?

IAF F-15s refueling midflight [file]Photo: Baz Ratner / Reuters
 
The Institute for National Security Studies held a war game recently in which players representing regional actors simulated the first 48 hours after an IDF strike on the Islamic Republic.
 
The simulation was based on the scenario of a unilateral Israeli strike without US participation, after midnight on November 9.
The Tel Aviv University-based institute began the game with the following “announcement”: “Al Jazeera reported that Israeli planes attacked nuclear sites in Iran in three assault waves. Following the reports, Israel officially announced it attacked nuclear sites in Iran, since it had no other choice.”
In this scenario, the strike successfully destroyed nuclear sites and set Iran’s nuclear weapons program back by three years.
 
As part of the exercise, Iran responded with full force, firing some 200 Shihab missiles at Israel in two waves, and calling on its proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas and other radical organizations, to attack Israel. At first, Iran refrained from striking US targets in the Persian Gulf region in the war game.
 
In the game, Israel, bolstered by a successful strike, attempted to absorb the attacks while trying to de-escalate the situation and reach an end to hostilities as soon as possible.
 
The international community remained paralyzed due to Russia’s attempts to exploit the situation to advance its strategic interests.
 
“After two days, the Iranians, and to a lesser extent, their allies, continue to attack Israel. The crisis did not appear to be approaching a solution,” the INSS concluded at the end of the war game.
 
Within the first 48 hours, Israel carried out a fourth air assault on Iran to complete the destruction of a main nuclear site.
 
“Israel’s strategic aim was to prevent a regional escalation and to strive to reach a level in which incidents were under control, in low intensity, as quickly as possible,” the INSS said.
 
Although the US was not notified in advance, Washington clearly sided with Israel and did not expose divisions, in order to show a united front and decrease the chances of a regional conflagration.
 
The US indicated its willingness to return to the negotiating table with Iran and to ease sanctions in exchange for Iranian restraint and an Iranian announcement that nuclear military activities had ceased.
 
The US stayed out of the fighting, based on a policy that it would only become involved if Iran were to shut off the globally important oil route of the Strait of Hormuz, or if Iran attacked US assets in the Gulf.
 
At first, Tehran shied away from a military confrontation with the US, but, the game’s participants found, “The more Iran was pushed into a corner and its options to act became limited, the more it understood that its principal card is to act against the US in the Gulf and to shut off the Strait of Hormuz,” the INSS said.
 
Iran’s Lebanese Shi’ite proxy Hezbollah found itself in a dilemma in the game. On the one hand, it was under heavy Iranian pressure to fire massive barrages of missiles and rockets at Israel. Tehran told Hezbollah that this was “judgement day” – the very reason Hezbollah had been provided with some 50,000 projectiles.
 
On the other hand, Hezbollah was deterred by the fear of once more causing widespread damage to Lebanon.
 
“Therefore, it chose to partially answer Iran’s demands, firing rockets and missiles at military targets in Israel, mainly airports and active defense systems,” the INSS said.
 
“Israel’s restrained response sharpened Hezbollah’s dilemma and strengthened its decision to fire relatively limited barrages, and to focus on military targets,” it added.
 
The player representing Hamas also chose a middle path in the game, displaying some commitment to Iran, but seeking to avoid giving Israel a reason to launch a large ground offensive in the Gaza Strip.
 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Gulf states and Turkey all acted in their own interests, while distancing themselves from the conflict and looking to prevent a regional escalation.
 
The game’s participants all acted “very rationally, activating policies that were driven by essential interests only, and ignored internal and outside constraints,” the INSS noted.
 
The player representing Israel concluded that the Israeli public would be able to absorb an extended conflict, due to the public’s belief that the strike on Iran was justified, and because operational goals were achieved.
 
The player representing the Islamic Republic found himself with limited tools with which to directly attack Israel, relying heavily on proxies.
 
Tehran had more tools to take action against US interests in the Gulf and spike oil prices, but realized that the price of involving the US in the fighting would be immensely high.
 
The INSS said that the game was planned earlier this year, when it seemed that this fall would be a decisive time in resolving the Iranian nuclear question.
 
“Since then, things have calmed down a little, but after the elections, towards the spring, the question of an attack will resurface. It is therefore vital to continue to examine the possible consequences,” it added.
 
Within the INSS, there are two competing schools of thought regarding the outcome of an Israeli strike on Iran. The first foresees a major regional war that could develop beyond the area. The second believes that, due to the presence of restraining mechanisms, Iran’s ability to set the Middle East alight is limited.