In an environment of citizen contestation and internal party divisions, an in/out referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU offers a mechanism for bypassing intra-party factionalism. However, referenda do not come without their complications
External observers are left with a sense of bemusement when contemplating how the country that historically cherishes the sovereignty of parliament most (meaning that parliament cannot be constrained by any external body, including citizens, except for at elections) 1) held a referendum tore-confirm its EU membership; 2) has speculated in a number of occasions about holding a referendum for ratifying EU reform treaties (from Maastricht to Lisbon), 3) has introduced an Act that forces governments in future to seek approval for any treaty changes via referendum and 4) hasfinally committed itself to holding a referendum on EU membership.
One explanation is that the EU is a source of deep disagreement among British citizens and remains an unsettled issue. Moreover, it could be argued that referenda respond to the lack of alignment between the UK’s citizens and its politicians on the topic of the EU, a misalignment which is greater than in any other Member State.
That being said, however, this ‘misalignment’ explanation ignores the fact that a voters/elites mismatch also exists in other EU Member States, as evinced by the results of previous referenda - such as in Denmark for example - and that the current crisis has also activated a strong feeling of alienation from Europe, even among traditional supporters of the EU. Hence, although British citizens are perhaps more eurosceptic than their own politicians, this is not a British peculiarity and , as such, the question is why the UK has evolved so differently to other traditionally eurosceptic states to the point of triggering the “exit” option. The explanation for the UK’s peculiarity may lie in the nature of British party politics:
The nature of the UK’s first past the post system with its single-seat constituencies diminishes the ability of party leadership to impose a central line and consequently magnifies dissent when it occurs – and the EU has proven to be one of the issues that can simultaneously provoke views for which there is both electoral support and opposition.
This problem may be particularly true, for the Conservative Party because, since even before the time of Margaret Thatcher, the Conservatives have had difficulty in building consensus on European policy. Different currents within the party have opposed, to a larger or lessor degree, the EU and/or its policies.
As such, party politics and electoral institutions help to explain why referenda have become a central and constant commitment in the UK’s European policy. In an environment of citizen contestation and internal party divisions, referenda offer a mechanism for bypassing intra-party factionalism by transferring the battle to the electoral arena via the (supposedly) neutral use of a plebiscite. To be sure, this is a cross-party issue: Tony Blair’s decision to convene a referendum on the EU Constitution reflects perfectly the same divisions within the Labour Party.
Further, while the process of public consultation may produce a clear response to the question of membership, it does not provide a conclusive path-way for the aftermath of the referendum decision. Regardless of whether the UK remains a member of the EU or not, it seems that the terms will have to be negotiated. However, it seems also that sectors of the British political class and press assume that what will follow from an unilateral referendum on withdrawal (which is possible and lawful) is a unilateral set of conditions to be accepted by EU partners (which is impossible and unlawful).
For sure, referenda on EU Treaties have, in the past, created powerful domestic locks that trigger the so-called paradox of weakness. The paradox of weakness is where, rather than restricting a government’s scope of action, governments that have strong domestic opposition (and hence have their margin for manoeuvre constrained) may paradoxically benefit from this internal division because, knowing the difficulties for obtaining domestic approval, their negotiating partners may be more willing to make concessions in order to obtain final approval of the deal. However, this happens under a very clear assumption that all other member states prefer to change the status quo. Herein lies the potential flaw in the weakness paradox approach, for, the negotiating partners may equally be content with the status quo and in no mood for change. In that regard, calling for a referendum on membership has compromised the UK’s paradoxically strong position because whilst Member States are happy with the status quo, it is the withdrawing state which is the one that wants change. Hence, its negotiating position is weaker.
Let us, then, examine the two possible outcomes of a referendum:
The exit-the-EU option
Withdrawal from the EU is possible under the Treaty on European Union (Article 50) which requires the negotiation of a bilateral agreement that will have to be unanimously accepted. Under unanimity, it seems highly improbable that any UK government can pick and choose without granting compensations and pay-offs. Paradoxically, the UK’s strong domestic anti-membership constituency will diminish its margin of manoeuvre. Since the final commitment will be leaving the Union, the UK may arrive at a take-it-or-leave situation. Naturally, the UK’s friends within the Union may push for a better deal but, notice the irony of depending on ones friends when sovereignly negotiating ones own withdrawal.
The remain-in-the-EU option
If unconditional withdrawal were agreed, no further issues would arise. However, it is highly unlikely that such would be the case. Current or future UK governments may assume as part of this option the need to re-negotiate terms of membership. In this situation, it would again be the UK which is the one aiming to change the status quo and, if this change implies Treaty revision, then it can only proceed under unanimity. Again, the chances that the UK government may unilaterally impose its will as stemming from referendum commitments seem slim. Moreover, once the treaties are opened for revision, actors will have an opportunity to include pending issues (for instance, the adoption of the Fiscal Compact into the EU Treaties) and this will not only complicate the negotiation but also diminish the margin for agreement, making it more likely that other Member States may aim at extra EU Treaties agreement.
Thus, even before either of the two options has been chosen, it seems that activating the “exit” option has already affected the alternative mechanism of “voice” and “loyalty” that Albert O. Hirschmann identified to deal with growing dissatisfaction with firms and associations. The UK voice (either as a formal or informal influence) has weakened sharply within the EU in recent years and so has its loyalty to the EU (by loyalty is not meant any feeling of affection but rather an implicit understanding that EU and its policies are not an existential threat to British sovereignty and independence). Whether the UK will regain its voice and reconsider its loyalty, remains to be seen.
Carlos Closa is Research Professor at The CSIC Institute of Public Goods and Policies (IPP)
External observers are left with a sense of bemusement when contemplating how the country that historically cherishes the sovereignty of parliament most (meaning that parliament cannot be constrained by any external body, including citizens, except for at elections) 1) held a referendum tore-confirm its EU membership; 2) has speculated in a number of occasions about holding a referendum for ratifying EU reform treaties (from Maastricht to Lisbon), 3) has introduced an Act that forces governments in future to seek approval for any treaty changes via referendum and 4) hasfinally committed itself to holding a referendum on EU membership.
One explanation is that the EU is a source of deep disagreement among British citizens and remains an unsettled issue. Moreover, it could be argued that referenda respond to the lack of alignment between the UK’s citizens and its politicians on the topic of the EU, a misalignment which is greater than in any other Member State.
That being said, however, this ‘misalignment’ explanation ignores the fact that a voters/elites mismatch also exists in other EU Member States, as evinced by the results of previous referenda - such as in Denmark for example - and that the current crisis has also activated a strong feeling of alienation from Europe, even among traditional supporters of the EU. Hence, although British citizens are perhaps more eurosceptic than their own politicians, this is not a British peculiarity and , as such, the question is why the UK has evolved so differently to other traditionally eurosceptic states to the point of triggering the “exit” option. The explanation for the UK’s peculiarity may lie in the nature of British party politics:
The nature of the UK’s first past the post system with its single-seat constituencies diminishes the ability of party leadership to impose a central line and consequently magnifies dissent when it occurs – and the EU has proven to be one of the issues that can simultaneously provoke views for which there is both electoral support and opposition.
This problem may be particularly true, for the Conservative Party because, since even before the time of Margaret Thatcher, the Conservatives have had difficulty in building consensus on European policy. Different currents within the party have opposed, to a larger or lessor degree, the EU and/or its policies.
As such, party politics and electoral institutions help to explain why referenda have become a central and constant commitment in the UK’s European policy. In an environment of citizen contestation and internal party divisions, referenda offer a mechanism for bypassing intra-party factionalism by transferring the battle to the electoral arena via the (supposedly) neutral use of a plebiscite. To be sure, this is a cross-party issue: Tony Blair’s decision to convene a referendum on the EU Constitution reflects perfectly the same divisions within the Labour Party.
Further, while the process of public consultation may produce a clear response to the question of membership, it does not provide a conclusive path-way for the aftermath of the referendum decision. Regardless of whether the UK remains a member of the EU or not, it seems that the terms will have to be negotiated. However, it seems also that sectors of the British political class and press assume that what will follow from an unilateral referendum on withdrawal (which is possible and lawful) is a unilateral set of conditions to be accepted by EU partners (which is impossible and unlawful).
For sure, referenda on EU Treaties have, in the past, created powerful domestic locks that trigger the so-called paradox of weakness. The paradox of weakness is where, rather than restricting a government’s scope of action, governments that have strong domestic opposition (and hence have their margin for manoeuvre constrained) may paradoxically benefit from this internal division because, knowing the difficulties for obtaining domestic approval, their negotiating partners may be more willing to make concessions in order to obtain final approval of the deal. However, this happens under a very clear assumption that all other member states prefer to change the status quo. Herein lies the potential flaw in the weakness paradox approach, for, the negotiating partners may equally be content with the status quo and in no mood for change. In that regard, calling for a referendum on membership has compromised the UK’s paradoxically strong position because whilst Member States are happy with the status quo, it is the withdrawing state which is the one that wants change. Hence, its negotiating position is weaker.
Let us, then, examine the two possible outcomes of a referendum:
The exit-the-EU option
Withdrawal from the EU is possible under the Treaty on European Union (Article 50) which requires the negotiation of a bilateral agreement that will have to be unanimously accepted. Under unanimity, it seems highly improbable that any UK government can pick and choose without granting compensations and pay-offs. Paradoxically, the UK’s strong domestic anti-membership constituency will diminish its margin of manoeuvre. Since the final commitment will be leaving the Union, the UK may arrive at a take-it-or-leave situation. Naturally, the UK’s friends within the Union may push for a better deal but, notice the irony of depending on ones friends when sovereignly negotiating ones own withdrawal.
The remain-in-the-EU option
If unconditional withdrawal were agreed, no further issues would arise. However, it is highly unlikely that such would be the case. Current or future UK governments may assume as part of this option the need to re-negotiate terms of membership. In this situation, it would again be the UK which is the one aiming to change the status quo and, if this change implies Treaty revision, then it can only proceed under unanimity. Again, the chances that the UK government may unilaterally impose its will as stemming from referendum commitments seem slim. Moreover, once the treaties are opened for revision, actors will have an opportunity to include pending issues (for instance, the adoption of the Fiscal Compact into the EU Treaties) and this will not only complicate the negotiation but also diminish the margin for agreement, making it more likely that other Member States may aim at extra EU Treaties agreement.
Thus, even before either of the two options has been chosen, it seems that activating the “exit” option has already affected the alternative mechanism of “voice” and “loyalty” that Albert O. Hirschmann identified to deal with growing dissatisfaction with firms and associations. The UK voice (either as a formal or informal influence) has weakened sharply within the EU in recent years and so has its loyalty to the EU (by loyalty is not meant any feeling of affection but rather an implicit understanding that EU and its policies are not an existential threat to British sovereignty and independence). Whether the UK will regain its voice and reconsider its loyalty, remains to be seen.
Carlos Closa is Research Professor at The CSIC Institute of Public Goods and Policies (IPP)
Tags: Carlos Closa , Carlos Juan Closa Montero , Opinion , EU , European Union , Euro , Eurozone , EZ , € , Crisis , Fincncial ,Economic , Banking , Sovereign Debt , Fincncial Crisis , Economic Crisis , Banking Crisis , Sovereign Debt Crisis , Referendum ,UK , United Kingdom , Britain , David Cameron , Conservative Party , Conservatives , Cons , Tory , Tories , Lab , Labour Party ,Labour , Denmark , Margaret Thatcher , John Major , Harold Wilson , Tony Blair , Euroscepticism , Eurosceptics , Eurosceptic ,Fiscal Compact , Treaty on Stability , Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union , TSCG , Fiscal Stability Treaty , Albert O. Hirschmann ,
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