beginning in 2010. 
Is this email not displaying correctly?
View it in your browser.
For the full article text, please visit: http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-mena-revolutions-then-and-now-4837/

The MENA Revolutions: Then and Now
By: Chris Mansur
July 15th, 2013

When spontaneous uprisings broke out in the Middle East and North Africa
 (MENA) in 2011, they seemed destined to usher in a new era of freedom,
economic prosperity, and democracy in the region. These protests came to be
known in the Western media as the ‘Arab Spring’ – an apparent misnomer
since the movement was neither exclusively ‘Arab’ in character nor simple
enough to serve as an analogy of the European ‘Springs’ of 1848, 1968 and
1989.

Over two and a half years later, these uprisings and revolutions are still
threatening to transform the political and social dynamics of several states;
 though not necessarily in the way that was originally intended by the
generation of tech-savvy youth who launched them.

This inevitably begs the question: What went wrong?

Tunisia

It all began in Tunisia, the birthplace of the movement, where a young
Mohamed Bouazizi set himself ablaze after his fruit cart was confiscated by
local Tunisian officials. His mistreatment and subsequent self-immolation on
December 17, 2010 triggered a series of spontaneous protests in Tunisia that
quickly spread to the rest of the Arab world. In reality, while Bouazizi’s
inadvertent spark of the Arab protest movement was invaluable to the changes
 in the region today, social tensions between state and citizen had simmered on
 the surface of many Arab states for years, waiting for an opportune time to
erupt.

Tunisia remains the most promising catalyst for democratic change in the Arab
 world. After all, the country prides itself on pioneering the wave of Arab uprisings
 that sprung up at the end of 2010 – uprisings that uprooted the old authoritarian
order of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. Tunisia has thus been perceived in the West as a potential liberal-democratic model that other Arab states might follow. Although
 the Islamist Ennahda party garnered the most votes in the 2011 Constituent
Assembly elections (37 percent vs. only 8 percent for the runner-up Al-Mottamar
party gaining), it was forced to form a coalition with opposition parties to govern
the country. Moreover, it pledged to retain Tunisia’s secular tradition by not
 making Sharia the principal source of law in the new constitution.

The assassination of Chokri Belaid, a leftist opposition leader and outspoken
critic of religious radicalism, dealt a major blow to Tunisia’s democratic
experiment. Divisions between Islamists and secular liberals multiplied following
the incident. Consequently, the prime minister announced the replacement of
his Islamist-led coalition by an interim cabinet composed of technocrats who will
 rule Tunisia until the next election (scheduled for late 2013). Today, democracy
 in Tunisia remains fragile. Poor economic conditions, the main spark of the
Tunisian Revolution, continue to plague the country’s development. Moreover,
internal struggles between ultra-conservative Salafists, moderate Islamists,
and secular liberals continue to complicate the process.

Egypt

Egyptians, influenced by the turmoil in Tunisia, launched their own
 demonstrations against poor living conditions and emergency rule in what
many Egyptian Arabs call the Thawrat al-Horeya (or ‘Freedom Revolution’).
Hundreds of demonstrators were killed before the popular uprising eventually
 ousted Washington’s compliant caretaker and ally, Hosni Mubarak. The Supreme
 Council of the Armed Forces declared an end to the Mubarak era, vowing to
protect
 the people’s interests from both foreign influence and internal despotism. But in
reality, the ruling generals would not relinquish their role in Egypt’s political
affairs, instead deciding to reserve power for years to come.

The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party,
and its strong performance in both the parliamentary and presidential elections was
 a shock to some and a gratification to others. Previously, the party had pledged
not to seek a parliamentary majority and to refrain from fielding its own presidential candidate, though it ended up competing and ultimately emerged victorious in both elections.

Egypt’s first truly democratic elections were a remarkable achievement, not for their outcome but for the relatively free and fair process in which they were conducted.  Initially, the Brotherhood’s electoral gains were challenged by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which ruled that the 2011-12 parliamentary elections were unconstitutional, leading to the dissolution of Parliament by a military decree.
Upon his election, Morsi challenged both the judiciary and the military leadership
by reinstating the dissolved Parliament and sacking high-ranking generals, and
 forcing others to retire. About a year into his presidency, millions of people took
to the streets to demand Morsi’s resignation. After issuing an ultimatum that went unheeded, the Egyptian Army ousted Morsi in a popular coup on July 3 and arrested several Muslim Brotherhood leaders for incitement, indicating a clear anti-Islamist clampdown by the state. By all estimates, Egypt’s democratic experiment has been plagued by deep ideological divisions, a politically activist army that seeks to
 vigorously maintain its independence, and increasingly dire economic conditions.

Libya

To the west of Egypt, Libya’s own rebellion had taken shape in the eastern city of Benghazi, where resentment toward Gaddafi’s rule had always existed at one time
 or another. On March 17, 2011, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians from Gaddafi’s wrath.
However, once it became clear that Libya’s opposition National Transitional Council
was unable to overthrow Gaddafi by its own efforts, NATO – in charge of enforcing
the no-fly zone – used the mandate offensively in order to push for regime change.
 The post-war transition has been difficult, as armed militias, tribal divisions and al-Qaeda-linked jihadists have consistently derailed the process and weakened state authority.

Syria

What began in early 2011 as protests against poor living conditions evolved into a
 full-fledged uprising against the Assad family’s 40-year rule. Events took a turn for
 the worse when the conflict became a low-level civil war with dangerous sectarian undertones. Unlike in Libya, prospects for a no-fly zone were complicated by Russian and Chinese vetoes at the U.N. Security Council. Moreover, throughout the years, the Assads have strategically positioned Alawites in key positions within the military-
security establishment to ensure loyalty.

The international response to the Syrian conflict is divided along typical political
 fault lines. On one side is a group of Western-allied states that seeks the overthrow
 of Assad, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. These countries have provided
both weapons and funding to the rebels. Balancing against these interests is the
pro-Assad camp of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Russia maintains a strategic
Soviet-era naval base in Tartus, which grants it crucial access to the Mediterranean.
 Its ties to the Ba’athist government in Damascus stretch back to the Cold War era.
 Iran and Syria became unlikely allies in 1979. At the time, both shared similar foreign policy objectives including the containment of Saddam Hussein’s regional ambitions
and the creation of a regional axis against Israel. For Hezbollah, Syria acts as a crucial transit hub for Iranian weapons being shipped to the Shia militant group. Hezbollah’s crucial assistance of roughly 15,000 troops to aid the Syrian Arab Army, along with the purported sale of S-300 missile defence system from Russia, have both helped tip the war’s strategic balance in favour of Assad.

However, both Assad and the rebel opposition seem poised to fight to a stalemate. Assad is incapable of completely crushing the rebellion and the rebels won’t be able
to secure victory without some sort of military intervention from abroad - something
the West currently has no appetite for. Under these circumstances, a political
settlement that involves all the major actors remains the most viable and realistic resolution to the crisis.

Arabian Peninsula

In Yemen, the poorest state in the Arab world, the long-serving President Ali Abdullah Saleh – unable to remain in power through a mixture of cooption and repression – eventually agreed to an agreement that paved the way for his resignation after
 22 years in power. Despite Saleh’s departure, the security apparatus and the old
 order remain intact. In addition, the state has been embroiled in a conflict against
 al-Qaeda-linked extremists in the south and a Shia insurgency in the north.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), through its larger political coalition
 Ansar al-Sharia, managed to fill a power vacuum in a few governorates left by retreating security forces that were redeployed to protect the capital Sana’a.
On March 31, 2011, the group declared that its main stronghold, the southern
 province of Abyan, was now an Islamic Emirate.

All of the Arab monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula have managed to remain in
power. Resiliently, they have either avoided an uprising by offering economic
incentives and introducing political reforms to appease the population (as in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait) or they have crushed the rebellion altogether. In Bahrain,
 the Shia majority grew disillusioned with the ruling Sunni King Hamad al bin Isa Al Khalifa, who hails from a dynasty that has ruled Bahrain for nearly 230 years. Saudi Arabia sent its troops to help crush the rebellion. Unlike in Libya and Syria,
Washington kept silent about the crackdown, mainly because Bahrain’s strategic importance as a base for the U.S. Fifth Fleet make it an indispensable ally whose misdeeds could be tolerated. The ruling Arab monarchs blamed the demonstrations
on Iranian agitation of Arab Shia protestors, giving them a pretext for their crack
down. Moreover, they have used these geopolitical rivalries to further consolidate
 their power at home. The U.S. in this case seems content with the preservation
of the regional status quo.

For the full article text, please visit:
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-mena-revolutions-then-and-now-4837/
Copyright © 2013 Geopoliticalmonitor.com, All rights reserved.
You are receiving this email because you opted in at our website.
Our mailing address is:
Geopoliticalmonitor.com
5700-100 King Street West
Toronto, On M5X1C7
Canada