Israel and Azerbaijan: Geopolitical Reasons for Stronger Ties
by Dr. Anna Geifman July 15,2013
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 208
http://bit.ly/1912yEx
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel and Azerbaijan have developed strong strategic
ties. Israel benefits from having a Muslim ally on Iran’s border and
Azerbaijan has gained a serious partner in the political, military, and
technology spheres. Even so, the countries have much to gain from
strengthening their ties even further.
The South Caucasus region is of strategic value for Israel due to its
geopolitical position and proximity to Iran. Azerbaijan, a key player in the
region, is a Shiite Muslim country which maintains close working relations
with the Jewish state. Strained relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are an
equally critical factor. Aside from the fact that Israel is dealing with a
classic situation of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” it benefits from
selling the Azeris technical services, technologies, and security systems.
Moreover, Israel has always been on the lookout for a moderate Muslim
partner, a role previously filled by Turkey. Azerbaijan can fit that role.
It is hardly accidental that President Shimon Peres, accompanied by three
ministers and representatives of sixty Israeli industrial companies, visited
Baku in 2009. Then Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman made a trip to
Azerbaijan in April 2012. His counterpart, Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov, paid a return visit to Israel in April 2013. Presently, the
bilateral relationship is good, and there are prospects for even stronger
ties between the two countries.
Threats from Iran
Turmoil in the Middle East affects the Caspian Sea region and simultaneously
provides opportunities for Israel, whose mutual interest with Azerbaijan is
to confront an increasingly radical Islam. Though nominally Muslim,
Azerbaijan’s secular regime perceives both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists
as an alarming threat. The Sunni radicals connected to al-Qaeda are willing
to cooperate with neighboring Dagestan’s terrorist underground, which is
periodically activated in the northern parts of Azerbaijan. An even greater
reason for concern is the Shiite radicals; they are a tool for Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards and seek radical changes in Azerbaijan to turn it into
a pro-Iranian regime. Any contact with Israel therefore cause anxiety in
Tehran; for example, the 2009 Peres visit to Baku led to complications
between Baku and Teheran and the recalling of the Iranian ambassador “for
consultations.”
There is also strong evidence to believe that Iran is intent on undermining
domestic stability in Azerbaijan. In October 2011, the leader of pro-Iranian
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan Movsum Samadov and several of his comrades were
sentenced to 10-12 years in jail for attempting to overthrow the government
by terrorist means. In February 2012, dozens of militants were arrested in a
rural area near Baku. Iran also persistently threatens its northern
neighbor; shortly after Samadov’s arrest, Iranian Chief-of-Staff Maj. Gen.
Hassan Firouzabadi promised Azeri President Ilham Aliyev “a grim future.”
It is therefore not surprising that, according to foreign sources,
Azerbaijan is a strategic bridgehead of Western and Israeli anti-Iranian
military and intelligence efforts. Tehran is nervous about persistent, if
officially denied, rumors about Israeli military presence in Azerbaijan as a
forward base against Iran. Regardless of the validity of these rumors,
Israeli authorities appreciate the importance of cooperation with
Azerbaijan, which seeks to hold its own under the Iranian threat. In early
2012 this collaboration yielded valuable results: the prevention of
terrorist attacks against Israeli diplomats in Baku.
Threats from Russia
Aside from Iran, Russia is a reason that Baku and Jerusalem should
strengthen their strategic partnership. Israel is upset about Russia’s
subversive presence in the Middle East, namely its interactions with Iran,
acceptance of Hamas, and persistent backing of the Syrian rebels. Azerbaijan
is also unhappy with Moscow’s support for Armenia’s position in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet, Israel may be swayed into better relations
with Russia due to potential benefits from collaborative ventures in the
technological sphere, as well as joint fear of radical Islam; contrary to
what may look like a partnership, Russia’s relations with Iran are quite
strained.
In 2011, the “Center-2011” maneuvers took place in the Caspian Sea, the
largest such exercise since 2002. Some one thousand Russian servicemen and
dozens of vessels and boats participated. Despite attempts on the part of
some commentators to explain the maneuvers as necessitated by NATO’s
presence in Afghanistan and Turkey, it appears that the “alleged enemy” was
none other than Iran, or possibly its terror proxy, Hizballah. A similar
exercise in the Caspian Sea took place this April. Iran could react
aggressively towards Azerbaijan in the event of a Western attack on its
nuclear program. For its part, Baku is aware that Moscow is supportive of
its secular regime and is friendly towards the Azeri position with regards
to the Caspian Sea division.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Issue
There is also the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a connecting point
between Azerbaijan and Israel. For Azerbaijan, Armenia is a bitter enemy
with whom there are no serious chances for reconciliation in the foreseeable
future, especially after the Armenian defeat of the Azeri military in 1994.
As far as Israeli is concerned Armenia is one of Iran’s closest partners; it
is also probably a “loophole” for Iran’s acquisition of prohibited weapons
and technologies from several former Soviet republics.
Conclusion
Among the hurdles for Israeli-Azeri relations may be the “Turkish issue.” In
the past all appeared simple, as Turkey was Azerbaijan’s closest ally and
Israel’s strategic partner. In the last few years, however, the situation
has become significantly complicated by Turkish Islamization. Israel is
presently interested in Azerbaijan’s independence from any Turkish
influence.
Israel and Azerbaijan stand to benefit greatly from even stronger ties. From
the Israeli point of view there is serious potential for expanding economic
ties, if only because Baku sells oil to Israel and is already a client of
the Israeli hi-tech and military industries. Israel’s drone planes are
presently as much in demand in Azerbaijan as they are elsewhere. Israel also
sells its Azeri partner armored troop carriers, multiple rocket launchers,
Tavor rifles, and ammunition. However, since neither country has enough
friends beyond its borders, it should be clear that each partner may
contribute to much-required foreign lobbying for the sake of the other.
Azerbaijan could be a positive influence in Turkey, while Israel might prove
equally helpful in lobbying for the Azeris in the EU and the US. Though
further cooperation between Jerusalem and Baku will depend on geopolitical
developments, Israel would do well to capitalize on the opportunity.
Dr. Anna Geifman is a senior research fellow in the Department of Political
Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Professor Emerita at Boston University.
Dima Course is a PhD candidate in political studies at Bar-Ilan University.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
by Dr. Anna Geifman July 15,2013
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 208
http://bit.ly/1912yEx
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel and Azerbaijan have developed strong strategic
ties. Israel benefits from having a Muslim ally on Iran’s border and
Azerbaijan has gained a serious partner in the political, military, and
technology spheres. Even so, the countries have much to gain from
strengthening their ties even further.
The South Caucasus region is of strategic value for Israel due to its
geopolitical position and proximity to Iran. Azerbaijan, a key player in the
region, is a Shiite Muslim country which maintains close working relations
with the Jewish state. Strained relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are an
equally critical factor. Aside from the fact that Israel is dealing with a
classic situation of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” it benefits from
selling the Azeris technical services, technologies, and security systems.
Moreover, Israel has always been on the lookout for a moderate Muslim
partner, a role previously filled by Turkey. Azerbaijan can fit that role.
It is hardly accidental that President Shimon Peres, accompanied by three
ministers and representatives of sixty Israeli industrial companies, visited
Baku in 2009. Then Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman made a trip to
Azerbaijan in April 2012. His counterpart, Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar
Mammadyarov, paid a return visit to Israel in April 2013. Presently, the
bilateral relationship is good, and there are prospects for even stronger
ties between the two countries.
Threats from Iran
Turmoil in the Middle East affects the Caspian Sea region and simultaneously
provides opportunities for Israel, whose mutual interest with Azerbaijan is
to confront an increasingly radical Islam. Though nominally Muslim,
Azerbaijan’s secular regime perceives both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists
as an alarming threat. The Sunni radicals connected to al-Qaeda are willing
to cooperate with neighboring Dagestan’s terrorist underground, which is
periodically activated in the northern parts of Azerbaijan. An even greater
reason for concern is the Shiite radicals; they are a tool for Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards and seek radical changes in Azerbaijan to turn it into
a pro-Iranian regime. Any contact with Israel therefore cause anxiety in
Tehran; for example, the 2009 Peres visit to Baku led to complications
between Baku and Teheran and the recalling of the Iranian ambassador “for
consultations.”
There is also strong evidence to believe that Iran is intent on undermining
domestic stability in Azerbaijan. In October 2011, the leader of pro-Iranian
Islamic Party of Azerbaijan Movsum Samadov and several of his comrades were
sentenced to 10-12 years in jail for attempting to overthrow the government
by terrorist means. In February 2012, dozens of militants were arrested in a
rural area near Baku. Iran also persistently threatens its northern
neighbor; shortly after Samadov’s arrest, Iranian Chief-of-Staff Maj. Gen.
Hassan Firouzabadi promised Azeri President Ilham Aliyev “a grim future.”
It is therefore not surprising that, according to foreign sources,
Azerbaijan is a strategic bridgehead of Western and Israeli anti-Iranian
military and intelligence efforts. Tehran is nervous about persistent, if
officially denied, rumors about Israeli military presence in Azerbaijan as a
forward base against Iran. Regardless of the validity of these rumors,
Israeli authorities appreciate the importance of cooperation with
Azerbaijan, which seeks to hold its own under the Iranian threat. In early
2012 this collaboration yielded valuable results: the prevention of
terrorist attacks against Israeli diplomats in Baku.
Threats from Russia
Aside from Iran, Russia is a reason that Baku and Jerusalem should
strengthen their strategic partnership. Israel is upset about Russia’s
subversive presence in the Middle East, namely its interactions with Iran,
acceptance of Hamas, and persistent backing of the Syrian rebels. Azerbaijan
is also unhappy with Moscow’s support for Armenia’s position in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yet, Israel may be swayed into better relations
with Russia due to potential benefits from collaborative ventures in the
technological sphere, as well as joint fear of radical Islam; contrary to
what may look like a partnership, Russia’s relations with Iran are quite
strained.
In 2011, the “Center-2011” maneuvers took place in the Caspian Sea, the
largest such exercise since 2002. Some one thousand Russian servicemen and
dozens of vessels and boats participated. Despite attempts on the part of
some commentators to explain the maneuvers as necessitated by NATO’s
presence in Afghanistan and Turkey, it appears that the “alleged enemy” was
none other than Iran, or possibly its terror proxy, Hizballah. A similar
exercise in the Caspian Sea took place this April. Iran could react
aggressively towards Azerbaijan in the event of a Western attack on its
nuclear program. For its part, Baku is aware that Moscow is supportive of
its secular regime and is friendly towards the Azeri position with regards
to the Caspian Sea division.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Issue
There is also the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a connecting point
between Azerbaijan and Israel. For Azerbaijan, Armenia is a bitter enemy
with whom there are no serious chances for reconciliation in the foreseeable
future, especially after the Armenian defeat of the Azeri military in 1994.
As far as Israeli is concerned Armenia is one of Iran’s closest partners; it
is also probably a “loophole” for Iran’s acquisition of prohibited weapons
and technologies from several former Soviet republics.
Conclusion
Among the hurdles for Israeli-Azeri relations may be the “Turkish issue.” In
the past all appeared simple, as Turkey was Azerbaijan’s closest ally and
Israel’s strategic partner. In the last few years, however, the situation
has become significantly complicated by Turkish Islamization. Israel is
presently interested in Azerbaijan’s independence from any Turkish
influence.
Israel and Azerbaijan stand to benefit greatly from even stronger ties. From
the Israeli point of view there is serious potential for expanding economic
ties, if only because Baku sells oil to Israel and is already a client of
the Israeli hi-tech and military industries. Israel’s drone planes are
presently as much in demand in Azerbaijan as they are elsewhere. Israel also
sells its Azeri partner armored troop carriers, multiple rocket launchers,
Tavor rifles, and ammunition. However, since neither country has enough
friends beyond its borders, it should be clear that each partner may
contribute to much-required foreign lobbying for the sake of the other.
Azerbaijan could be a positive influence in Turkey, while Israel might prove
equally helpful in lobbying for the Azeris in the EU and the US. Though
further cooperation between Jerusalem and Baku will depend on geopolitical
developments, Israel would do well to capitalize on the opportunity.
Dr. Anna Geifman is a senior research fellow in the Department of Political
Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Professor Emerita at Boston University.
Dima Course is a PhD candidate in political studies at Bar-Ilan University.
BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the
Greg Rosshandler Family
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
Posts
