Britannia Radio

The possibility of a current "Islamic Bomb" scenario, triggered by the
loss of Pakistani control over its nuclear weapons arsenal and the fall of
such weapons into the hands of extremist Islamic elements, should not be
ignored.

The Pakistani Nuclear Threat

Not just Iran: Pakistan has been building up its nuclear weapons arsenal at 
an accelerated rate - weapons that could fall into the wrong hands. A 
special analysis by Dr. Rafael Ofek

Dr. Rafael Ofek  19/7/2013

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=2268

The Pakistani Nuclear Threat All eyes are looking to the direction of Iran, 
but in the meantime, Pakistan has accelerated the build-up of its nuclear 
weapons arsenal, and has been hard at work fitting these weapons onto 
short-range ballistic missiles. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal already amounts 
to more than a hundred bombs.

In the past, the world tended to accept the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, 
treating it as a merely regional issue of the Indian subcontinent. However, 
during the first few years of the new millennium, reality struck 
policymakers in the face when the immediate dangers became clear: the 
proliferation of sensitive technologies to other countries aspiring for 
nuclear weapons, and the seizure of Pakistani nuclear weapons by extremist 
Islamic elements.

Although Pakistan does not directly threaten it, the US is not interested in 
the eruption of a war between India and Pakistan in general, and is not 
interested in such a war escalating to nuclear warfare in particular. 
Furthermore, the US will not tolerate the possibility of terrorist 
organizations taking possession of nuclear weapons. Despite denials by 
official Pakistani authorities of having any foreknowledge as to the 
whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden's hiding place inside Pakistan, severe 
criticism was leveled against Pakistan around the world, and suspicions were 
raised that it had actually assisted in the master terrorist's hiding.

Apparently, Al-Qaeda had struck roots into the Pakistani establishment, and 
especially within the Pakistani intelligence community, which is currently 
as perforated as a termite-ridden tree. Admittedly, the Pakistani government 
is sensitive to the US apprehension of an extremist policy on Islamabad's 
part, especially with regard to nuclear weapons. However, decision-making on 
national security issues in the country is dictated, first and foremost, by 
the military, which is incapable of (and probably not interested in) 
operating forcefully against terrorism.

"The Islamic Bomb"

Pakistan turned toward nuclear weapons in India's footsteps. The architect 
of its nuclear program was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who stated in 1965, as 
foreign secretary: "…If India builds the bomb… (Pakistan) will eat grass… 
even go hungry, but we will get one of our own." The realization of Bhutto's 
vision only began after about 6 years, when he was elected president, 
against the background of the Pakistani Army's defeat in the war against the 
Indian Army.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is regarded as "the father of the Pakistani nuclear 
bomb" from the technical point of view. In the mid-1970s, he was engaged in 
the development of centrifuges in the Netherlands, and later smuggled this 
technology to Pakistan.

Upon his return to Pakistan, he was granted autonomy in the advancement of 
the centrifuge project, and proved his abilities when the uranium enrichment 
plant materialized and began enriching uranium to a military grade level in 
1986. The jewel in the crown of the Pakistani nuclear program was the series 
of nuclear tests conducted in May 1998, in response to the Indian tests. In 
those tests, Pakistan demonstrated that it had mastered the technology of 
nuclear weapons.

During the 1970s, Bhutto presented his country's nuclear weapons project as 
the development of an "Islamic Bomb". This slogan was aimed at the rich Arab 
countries, with the intention of obtaining financing for the program. 
Indeed, Libya, followed by Saudi Arabia, both of whom were very hostile to 
Israel in those days, assisted in the financing of this program, owing to 
their aspirations to reap some of the fruit of the Pakistani effort, once it 
materialized.

In those days, Israel also regarded Pakistan's nuclear ambitions as intended 
to produce an "Islamic Bomb", and the issue was conceived by the Western 
world as follows: Pakistan would physically deliver several nuclear bombs to 
its allies, or at least provide them with a "nuclear umbrella". In 
retrospect, it turned out that regarding the Pakistani nuclear bomb as an 
"Islamic Bomb" was a false alarm.

Falling to the Hands of Islamic Countries

The above notwithstanding, the threat of nuclear weapon technologies from 
Pakistan falling into the hands of other Islamic countries was a more 
realistic danger. Dr. Khan was exposed in 2003 as the head of an 
international network that sold nuclear weapon technology to other 
countries. This became known to the Western intelligence agencies only in 
the early 2000s, when the containers of a ship seized by US authorities in 
October 2003, en route from Dubai to Libya, were found to contain about 
1,000 centrifuge components, manufactured by a plant in Malaysia according 
to blueprints provided by Dr. Khan.

Owing to their fear of the response of the US and with the toppling of the 
Saddam Hussein regime in the background, Libya was forced to reveal the 
elements of its own nuclear program to the US and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). US intelligence investigators even found blueprints of 
a nuclear explosive device in Libya, provided to Libya by Dr. Khan's 
network. The findings compelled Muammar Al-Gaddafi to cooperate with the US 
and the IAEA – not just in the dismantling of Libya's nuclear 
infrastructure, but in exposing Dr. Khan's activity as well.

The revelations of the Libyan aspect of Dr. Khan's network acted as a 
'domino effect' and led to the exposure of Khan's close relations with Iran. 
Pakistan had been suspected in the past of having passed the centrifuge 
technology to Iran, but solid proof was only found when Dr. Khan's network 
had been exposed.

The Bomb and Jihad

Pursuant to the atrocities of September 11, 2001, scientists who had led 
Pakistan's military nuclear program in the past and maintained connections 
with Al-Qaeda were spotted. Apparently, they aspired to aid Al-Qaeda in 
developing nuclear weapons, under the guise of the 'charitable society' UTN 
(Ummah Tameer-e-Nau) that had been established in 2000.

One of the most prominent activists among those scientists was Sultan 
Bashiruddin Mahmoud, who had headed Pakistan's plutonium producing heavy 
water reactor. He was an Islamic fanatic who resigned his senior position in 
1999 in protest of the Pakistani government's signing of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that banned nuclear weapon tests.

Mahmoud's close colleague was Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, the first director of 
Pakistan's plutonium separation laboratories. But the professional
credentials and past senior positions of these gentlemen notwithstanding, it 
is doubtful whether they possessed the technical know-how required in order 
to develop a nuclear explosive device specifically, and whether they could 
actually contribute to Al-Qaeda by doing so. Moreover, George Tenet, former 
head of the CIA, claimed that the people of UTN established contact with the 
Libyan authorities with the intent of providing Libya with weapons of mass 
destruction.

Admittedly, pursuant to the exposure of Dr. Khan's network, the probability 
of the "Islamic Bomb" scenario, of the leakage of nuclear technology from 
Pakistan to other Arab of Islamic countries, diminished. Western 
intelligence agencies drew numerous lessons since the First Gulf War, from 
the exposure of Iraq's efforts to develop unconventional weapons to the 
exposure of Dr. Khan's activities. Apparently, they have learnt how to cope 
more effectively with the dangers associated with the proliferation of 
technologies of weapons of mass destruction. However, Western intelligence 
agencies still encounter difficulties in coming to collect intelligence 
about extremist Islamic organizations around the globe.

Israel and in the West are now intensively addressing the issue of Iranian 
nuclear weapons. However, the possibility of a current "Islamic Bomb" 
scenario, triggered by the loss of Pakistani control over its nuclear 
weapons arsenal and the fall of such weapons into the hands of extremist 
Islamic elements, should not be ignored.

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Lt. Col. (Res.) Dr. Rafael Ofek is an expert in the physics and technology 
of nuclear power. He had served in the Israeli intelligence community as a 
senior researcher and analyst.

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