[Freeman Note:
Following the Six Day War in 1967, the need for havlagah decreased and the damage it caused began to become more evident. Israel became the preeminent power in the Middle East, yet failed to grasp the strategic opportunities that came with such dominance.
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Should Israel Wait for Obama?
Prof. Paul Eidelberg
In her article "Waiting for Obama," (Jerusalem Post, November 8, 20ll) Caroline Glick, a brilliant political analyst, would have the U.S. rather than Israel initiate an attack on Iran's nuclear development program. Although this seems eminently sensible—after all, from a military perspective, the U.S. is far more capable than Israel to launch a successful attack.
There are, however, a number of downsides in Glick's position which need to be considered by wise and far-seeing Israeli decision makers.
First, it's most unlikely that the U.S. under the Obama Administration will initiate an attack on Iran, especially in an election year. Hence, for Israel to stand still will only give Iran more time to develop ballistic-tipped nuclear missiles on the one hand, and to harden and disperse its nuclear facilities and missile sites on the other.
Second, one of the first principles of statecraft—articulated by the masters of military science— is this. A nation faced by a mortal enemy must rely as much as possible on its own resources in the initiation and self-defense in any war. Israel cannot afford to depend on the U.S. for its protection, which may or may not be forthcoming, let alone in a timely and effective way.
For example, the U.S. was a party to 1988 Wye Memorandum which requires the Palestinian Authority to inform the U.S. fully of the actions the PA has taken to outlaw all organizations or wings of organizations of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them from operating in areas under its jurisdiction.
The Netanyahu Government has turned a blind eye on this failure of the U.S. to prod the PA to fulfill the terms of the Wye Memorandum; and of course Netanyahu is in no position to do so. Meanwhile, the PA continues to accumulate arms, just as Iran's proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon illegally obtains arms from Iran, hardly waiting for the UN to stop that arms flow. Israel's political leaders are experts in waiting for others—especially the PA—to be "partners" in peace, while the Obama Administration continues to fund this gang of murderers.
Third, if, in the unlikely event the U.S. upstages Israel by initiating an attack on Iran, Israel will find itself more dependent on the U.S. diplomatically as well as strategically on the good graces of Washington, whose strategic interests—influenced by black gold —do not always coincide with those of Israel.
But there is another way of thinking about Glick's "Waiting for Obama." First, a successful Israeli attack on a nuclear-armed Iran would electrify the democratic world. It would arouse greater political and religious support for Israel. Seeing that Israel, instead of waiting, waiting, waiting, initiates a long-range preemptive attack on its most powerful enemy, would or could serve as a mighty deterrent against terrorist attacks from nearby Hamas and Hezbollah!
Moreover, such an initiative by minuscule Israel would prompt democratic nations to get off their strategic treadmills and join Israel in putting an end to a Jihadic and imperialistic regime, today the most dangerous patron of international terrorism and the greatest enemy of Western civilization. Nor is this all.
Consider the position of John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the UN, and an expert on nuclear proliferation. Mr. Bolton has repeatedly urged Israel to attack Iran. He did so because he knew that the U.S. is glued to Obama's apologetic or appeasement policy toward the Arab-Islamic world. This being the case, it would be sheer folly for Israel to wait for the U.S. to attack Iran. Besides, Bolton also understood that if Israel took the initiative, this would almost certainly compel the U.S.—as he urged—to enter the fray lest the Obama Administration appear as yellow dogs to the American people, who have always been overwhelmingly supportive of the Jewish state.
Finally, a word from Philip Bobbitt, Professor of Federal Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for National Security at Columbia University. Bobbitt served as a senior advisor at the White House, the Senate, and the State Department in both Democratic and Republican administrations, and has held senior posts at the National Security Council. Ponder what he says about a nation—say Israel—launching a preemptive attack on an enemy whose objective is nothing less than Israel's annihilation. Here is what Bobbitt says of the U.S.:
"[W]e will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting peremptorily against … terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country … We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends…. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the most compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains to the time and place of the enemy attack” (my emphasis).
Bearing in mind that Bobbitt is a professor of jurisprudence, his service on the U.S. National Security Council, made him a realist, not a simple legalist.
Of course, Israel must weigh the diverse consequences of a peremptory attack on Iran—above all, possible military retaliation. A preemptive attack will also have diverse effects on the various states in this region. Saudi Arabia and Iraq would probably breathe a sigh of relief, fearful as they and other Persian Gulf states are of Iran's regional and global ambitions.
And so, although the risks for Israel in a preemptive attack scenario are high, one thing is certain: a nuclear-armed Iran means—God forbid—the demise of the Jewish state.
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