Italy subsequently turned down Turkey's extradition request on the basis that the Kurdish leader could face the death penalty - then still incorporated in the Turkish penal code.
Turkish anger at the Italian government's decision included a strong rebuke from the parliament in Ankara and a boycott by many Turks of Italian products
After a few weeks Ocalan left Italy as a free person but was subsequently blocked in Kenya from where he was flown to Turkey in a Turkish intelligence operation.
The Öcalan Affair Revisited
The Italian government began consideration of Öcalan’s asylum request and announced that he would not be extradited to Turkey on the basis of Article 27.4 of the Italian Constitution, which does not allow for extradition to a country that practices capital punishment. But instead of using this provision to maintain a low and prudent profile and gain time, the government gave in to pressure from the left and broad pro-Kurdish public opinion urging it to take an active stance.
Pro-Kurdish sentiments are strong and widespread in the country. Only a few weeks prior to Öcalan’s arrival in Italy (28-30 September 1998), the Kurdish parliament in exile had met in the Sala del Cenacolo of the Italian Parliament building with the support of a large majority of parliamentarians.
Later, it was revealed that, Ramon Mantovani, the person in charge of international relations for Italy’s Communist Refoundation Party, which had recently left the government for the opposition,4 had been on the same plane as Öcalan during the flight from Moscow to Italy. It has been argued – without coming to any certain conclusions, however – that Öcalan’s arrival in Italy was prepared by supporters of the Kurdish cause in the belief that support in the country and the government was solid enough to allow Öcalan not only to receive asylum, but also and above all to implement his new political strategy effectively. A number of political circles in the country, especially on the left, felt that the PKK and the Kurdish nationalist movement were at the same kind of turning point as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the Palestinian nationalist movement at the end of the eighties.
Öcalan was compared to Yasser Arafat and it was felt that the opportunity had to be seized to encourage Turkish-Kurdish negotiations
On 17 November, D’Alema stated to the Italian Chamber of Deputies that “Italy wants it to be known that, if talks are to be sought, if a negotiated and peaceful solution to the conflict is to be sought, we are willing, as a country friendly to Turkey, and sensitive to the causes and the rights of the Kurdish people, to do our part, to play the role of a country that works for peace and for negotiated solutions to conflicts.”6
In these early days of the crisis, the government was encouraged in its conduct by its conviction that the European Union would take up or at least support the idea of mediating and bringing pressure on Turkey to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem.
But the international context soon turned out to be less favourable than expected.
On 18 November, the American government publicly asked Italy to extradite Öcalan
Italy overestimated European political cooperation
In the Western sphere, the political initiatives undertaken by the Rome government aimed at internationalising the Kurdish question and forcing the Turkish government to negotiate with what it considered terrorists, rendered Italy’s scrupulous application of the rules suspect and irritating
The debate raging in Italy about whether or not to grant Öcalan asylum split the government. The Minister of Justice, Oliviero Diliberto, a member of the Party of Italian Communists, following the explicitly pro-Kurd, anti-Turk and anti- American line of his party, was in favour. Prime Minister D’Alema did not share this stance, but felt that refugee status could be useful to the strategy of mediation which he advocated . Foreign Minister Dini emphasised that the PKK and Öcalan were accused of serious crimes, that granting asylum went against Italy’s international interests and that the request should therefore be thoroughly and attentively examined
On 23 December, D’Alema declared that the best solution would be for Öcalan to leave the country voluntarily.
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