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© 2013 IAI ISBN 978-88-98042-73-9
Istituto Affari Internazionali

The New Governance of the Economic and
Monetary Union: Adapted Institutions and
Innovative Instruments

Tobias Kunstein and Wolfgang Wessels

“The Political Future of the Union” Paper
Abstract

Reforms in response to the multiple crises affecting
the European Union (EU) and the euro area since
2008 have transformed European governance
considerably. This paper provides an overview of the
main effects stemming from the introduction of
innovative instruments over the past few years. It
concludes that the evolution of the EU’s architecture
towards “more Europe” rooted in power-sharing
between institutions at both European and national
levels is likely to be complemented by “less Europe”
in the sense of increasingly differentiated forms of
integration.
Keywords: European Union / Euro area / Financial
crisis / Economic governance / Institutional balance
IAI WORKING PAPERS 13 | 02 – January 2013
ISSN 2280-4331
© Istituto Affari Internazionali
IAI Working Papers 1302 The New Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union:
Adapted Institutions and Innovative Instruments
2
The New Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union:
Adapted Institutions and Innovative Instruments

by Tobias Kunstein and Wolfgang Wessels*
1. Introduction: Three overlapping effects of the crisis on governance
Reforms in response to the multiple crises affecting the European Union (EU) and the
euro area since 2008 have transformed European governance considerably. By tracing
the trend towards more differentiated forms of European integration back to a number
of innovative instruments introduced over the past years, this paper outlines some of
the major determinants of the future development of the EU polity.
Three - partly overlapping - effects of the crises on European governance can be
distinguished. The first two concern serious shifts in the institutional balance. The third
effect, of a more structural nature, points to more differentiated, multi-speed and multitier
integration within the European construction.
1) The European Council as the only “political” institution commanding the authority to
pledge huge amounts of money has increasingly extended its activities into the EU
legislative process.1 Consequentially, adherents to the “intergovernmentalist” school of
thought see their interpretation of the European Council as a dominant player in the
complex inter-institutional relationship at EU level confirmed. From this perspective, the
Heads of State or Government can be seen as the principals in relation to other actors
in the EU’s institutional structure along the lines of a “presidency model” (see Figure 1).
2) However, in parallel, the parliamentary dimension (the European Parliament and its
national counterparts), already strengthened through the Lisbon Treaty, has become
more relevant, although increasingly complex. On the one hand, when pressured by
the financial turmoil to pursue increasingly unorthodox emergency measures, EU
decision-makers sought to ensure that their response was backed by broad support
from all EU-level institutions, including the European Parliament. National legislatures,
on the other hand, played a major part in a number of cases in view of the historymaking
character of some measures and the high sums at stake. For example, votes
on the ratification of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the German Bundestag and
Paper prepared within the framework of the IAI project “The Political Future of the Union”, January 2013.
The project aims to examine the multifaceted responses given by the EU to the eurozone debt’s crisis and
the political and institutional issues linked to that, like the democratic control of the new governance of the
Economic and Monetary Union. The project also aims to explore the options for the future of European
integration and the transnational debates on this topic.
* Wolfgang Wessels is Jean Monnet Chairholder for Political Science, University of Cologne. Tobias
Kunstein is Research associate, Jean Monnet Chair for Political Science, University of Cologne.
1 See Uwe Puetter, “Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Council and European
Council in EU economic governance”, in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 19, No. 2 (March 2012),
p. 171.
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IAI Working Papers 1302 The New Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union:
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Bundesrat received a degree of public attention rarely observed in EU matters so far.
The Greek assembly also stood at the centre of attention, if for opposite reasons: its
agreement to the reform programme negotiated with international lenders was a
prerequisite for the bailout.
3) Beyond the crisis, in consolidating the governance architecture of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), the longer-term concern of shaping the EU polity in an open
and legitimate way has come to the fore. The concept of a multi-tier Europe - giving the
core group of (euro) states the opportunity to move forward - is a key aspect of such
considerations, and is reflected in major European Council agreements on crisis
management measures and efforts to make the euro area and the EU more resilient to
future crises. The flexibility offered by institutional constructions that do not include all
EU member states attempts to reconcile the integrity of EU-level policies such as the
single market, with the necessity to preserve the opportunity for outsiders to join at a
later stage.
Figure 1. The European Council in the “presidency model”
Source: Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council, Oxford and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013
forthcoming.
2. The crisis response: a broad differentiated set of instruments
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, which peaked with the Lehmann
Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008, EU decision-makers have introduced reforms
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going far beyond the conventional economic concepts discussed during the first
decade of EMU. Considering the impact of these reforms, one needs to underline that
what seems unavoidable now was quite unthinkable four years ago. The reforms can
be broadly categorized into projects implemented within the EU treaties framework,
and projects of “differentiated integration” implemented outside the EU treaties and by
a subset of EU member states only.
Reforms building on the EU treaties and using the “Community method” include a
number of key projects:
1) In reaction to the global financial crisis, supervision of financial markets has been
overhauled, primarily by creating the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and
the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) in 2010. These reforms,
enacted through the “ordinary legislative procedure” (OLP), were most recently
taken further when the European Council in summer 2012 called on the European
Commission to present a legislative proposal on a pan-European supervision of
banks (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM).2 Following disputes, especially
between France and Germany, on the number of banks to be overseen,3 the
legislation as proposed by the Commission is currently under discussion by the
Council and the European Parliament in accordance with the OLP.
2) In December 2011, the Six-Pack of legislative proposals addressing the area of
fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance and coordination came into force. It aimed
at strengthening the fiscal coordination under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
and complemented it with a new procedure for preventing macroeconomic
imbalances. The Six-Pack, the rules of which are partly based on coercion through
sanctions (that is, “hard” coordination) also incorporated the “soft” coordination
instrument of the “European Semester”, an annual timetable for economic policy
coordination already agreed upon by EU governments in 2010. Two additional
legislative proposals (“Two-pack”), which build on and tighten the rules of the Six-
Pack legislation for the 17 euro area members, are currently under negotiation
between the Council and the European Parliament in accordance with the OLP.
3) The institutional governance framework has also been transformed due to the
crisis. Notably, the Heads of State or Government of the euro area meet among
themselves in a new format, the Euro Summit. The agreement in October 2011 to
hold these meetings at least every six months and to equip the Euro Summit with a
more formal preparatory substructure attests to the general tendency of the EU
system to resort to forms of differentiation. The concepts of a “multi-tier”, “core
Europe” or “two-speed Europe”4 have thus become key issues for the development
of the EU polity.
2 According to the proposal, the European Central Bank (ECB) would receive responsibility for supervisory
tasks related to the financial stability of all euro area banks. In order to avoid fragmentation of the internal
market for financial services, the existing supervisory structures under the ESFS which apply to all 27
member states would be preserved, and member states outside the euro area would be invited to join the
SSM on a voluntary basis.
3 The French proposal that supervision would eventually include all 6000 or so banks in the euro area
basically prevailed in the end.
4 See e.g. Jean-Claude Piris, The Future of Europe. Towards a Two-Speed EU?, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2012; Funda Tekin, Differentiated integration at Work. The Institutionalisation and
Implementation of Opt-Outs from European Integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012.
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But steps towards more differentiated integration are especially visible in that a number
of additional reforms were possible only outside the treaty framework.
In response to the imminent threat of the break-up of the currency bloc in the first half
of 2010, euro area countries developed an internal crisis resolution mechanism
available to themselves alone. “Money” itself became a key instrument, at first in the
form of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a temporary “firewall”
established to provide liquidity to over-indebted countries. Its successor, the ESM, is
built on a limited change in the EU treaties,5 enabling the euro area countries to
establish a permanent rescue mechanism among themselves by means of an
intergovernmental treaty. The ESM entered into force in October 2012.
The Euro-plus Pact, created in March 2011 to improve the competitiveness of
participating countries, includes a larger number of countries (all euro area members,
plus Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania). However, given that it
relies exclusively on voluntary adherence to its rules - “soft” coordination - and that
there are no plans to incorporate the pact into the legal framework of the EU, its impact
is expected to be rather low.
Another intergovernmental agreement outside EU law is the TSCG. Negotiated among
euro area member states after the sovereign debt crisis had intensified anew in late
2011, the treaty aims at further strengthening fiscal discipline at the national level. At
the time of writing, all EU members except the United Kingdom and the Czech
Republic have signed the TSCG, ratification of which is a precondition for receiving
ESM assistance as of March 2013. In substance, the TSCG contains a proper “fiscal
compact”, which will run alongside the Six-Pack. Inter alia, the fiscal compact requires
national budgets to be in balance or in surplus, and introduces rules specifying an
automatic correction mechanism to that effect. These rules must be implemented in
national law through provisions of “binding force and permanent character, preferably
constitutional”,6 subject to legal review by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).7
3. The institutional balance: rivals and partners
3.1. The European Council and the Council: managing the crisis
Throughout the financial and sovereign debt crisis, the Heads of State or Government
have been engaged in both system-making and policy-making. Their role can be
described as an “upgraded and intensified leadership role”8 which spans five pillars of
economic governance (Figure 2). Besides their guiding function in the revision of the
procedures of hard and soft coordination and in the reforms based on the Community
5 Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), http://eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF.
6 Article 3(2) of the TSCG, http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf.
7 Moreover, the fiscal compact enshrines a numerical benchmark for debt reduction for government debt
exceeding 60% of GDP and increases the automaticity of the excessive deficit procedure under the SGP.
The TSCG also calls for ex ante reporting by member states of their national debt issuance plans.
8 Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council, Oxford and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013
forthcoming.
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method, the Heads of State or Government also have a major role in settling
fundamental issues in negotiations on the EU budget.
Figure 2. The European Council in the institutional architecture of economic governance: five
pillars
Source: Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council, Oxford and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013
forthcoming.
In terms of internal dynamics, the immediate management of the sovereign debt crisis
was dominated to a large extent by the French-German duo. Former French President
Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel were pivotal players - with the German part of
the tandem increasingly playing the role of “reluctant hegemon”.9 Behind the scenes,
however, the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, played an
important role, not least through the Task Force for strengthening economic
governance set up in 2010. His inconspicuous, yet often successful efforts to reconcile
national interests also consolidated the position of the European Council within the
institutional architecture.
In terms of institutional differentiation, the Euro Summit emerged as a potential rival to
the European Council. Against the background of the October 2011 decision to
9 William E. Paterson, “The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union”,
in The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2010, Special issue of the Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 49, Supplement 1 (September 2011), p. 57-75.
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IAI Working Papers 1302 The New Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union:
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complement EU governance structures at all levels with parallel formations for euro
area members, Euro Summits have become a decisive element in defining strategic
orientations for the conduct of economic policies in the euro area (see Figure 3). In
order to ensure some consistency between Euro Summit and European Council
meetings, for the time being the President of the European Council also chairs the Euro
Summits.
Figure 3. Institutional reforms of economic governance
European Council (EU Summit)a
27 Heads of State or Government, President of the European
Council, President of the Commission
EUROPEAN UNION
Euro Summit
17 Heads of State or Government, President of the Euro Summitb,
President of the Commission
Status quo:
• provides strategic orientations
• at least 4 meetings per year
• quasi-permanent President
since December 2009
Reforms:
• none
Status quo:
• ir regular informal
meetings since
May 2008
Reformsc:
• Continui ty: at least 2 meetings per year
• own president designated along with
President of the European Council
• President of the Euro Summit keeps
non-euro countries and European
Parliament informed about summits
Status quo:
• formal decision-making body
(EMU-related topics: only euro
countries vote
• rotating presidency
Reforms:
• modified decisionmaking
procedures, e.g.
regarding the Stabil ity
and Growth Pactd
• strengthening of General
Secretariatc
Ecofin Council
27 Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs
Eurogroup
17 Ministers of Finance and Economic Affairs, Commission, ECB
Status quo:
• informal meetings since
1998, regularly on the
eve of Ecofin meetings
since 2000
• elects a president from
its members since 2005
Reformsc:
• prepares Euro s ummits
• currently discussed: fulltime
president
Status quo:
• prepares Eurogroup
meetings since 2003
• chai r: President of Economic
and Financial Committee
Reformsc:
• full-time chairman
• possibly more permanent
sub-group
EurogroupWorking Group
17 high- ranking officials, Commission, ECB
Economic and Financial Committee
Max. 54 high-ranking officials from national ministries and central
banks, Commission, ECB
Status quo:
• set up in 1999, prepares Ecofin
• elects a president from its
members
• own secretariat which is
attached to Commission
services but independent
Reformsc :
• strengthening of
secretar iat
The President of the Euro Summit, the President of the Commission and the President of the Eurogroup meet at least once a month, the
President of the ECB may be invited to participate.c
a Art. 15 TEU; Art. 235-236 TEU.
b Pending the next election of the President of the European Council, the current President of the European Council will chair the Euro Summit meetings.
c Annex 1, Euro Summit Statement of 26 October 2011.
d Council of the European Union: Press Release. 3115th meeting of the Council. Economic and Financial Affairs, Luxembourg, 4 Oc tober 2011, Doc . 14890/11.
e Protocol (No. 14) on the Euro Group, in: Official Journal of the European Union, No. C 83 of 30 March 2010, p. 283.
f Art. 134 TFEU; revised Statutes of the Economic and Financial Committee, in: Official Journal of the European Union, No. L 158 of 27 June 2003, p. 58.
EUROZONE
Source: Tobias Kunstein and Wolfgang Wessels, “What we hope, what we fear, what we expect: possible
scenarios for the future of the eurozone”, in European View, Vol. 11, No. 1 (June 2012), p. 8.
In revising and extending the existing arrangements for hard and soft economic policy
coordination at the European level, the Heads of State or Government took
unprecedented steps towards integration, such as the ESM and the TSCG. But
European Council and Euro Summit decisions also reflect a trend towards upgrading
supranational institutions, especially the European Commission and the ECJ, in order
to safeguard past achievements and translate emergency measures into longer-term
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solutions.10 It would therefore be misleading to interpret the recent developments as a
“revival of the European nation state”. All in all, the European Council has not shifted
the institutional balance in a clearly intergovernmental direction.
3.2. The parliamentary dimension: accountability at the appropriate level
Besides the European Council, the European Parliament has emerged as one of the
primary poles of power in the post-Lisbon institutional system.11 The way national
parliaments interpret and use their new powers has also gained attention since the
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. But while the Heads of State or Government
have been able to use their key role on both the European and the national level
throughout the financial and sovereign debt crisis, neither the European Parliament nor
national parliaments can be characterized as multi-level players. Nevertheless, the
parliamentary dimension is regarded as vital for ameliorating the lack of democratic
control of policymaking in response to the turmoil.
In general terms, the European Parliament has acted as a constructive counterpart to
the Council in the legislative process in the post-Lisbon period. Although its role in
concluding major agreements to overcome the crisis of the euro area has been
marginal, it is an indispensable element in holding decision-makers at EU level to
account. National parliaments have also - with considerable variations - increased their
activities before and after European Council and Euro Summit meetings, even though
“only a few of them use their formal opportunities to a larger degree”.12
Most recently, there is a strong ongoing debate on how to reconcile parliamentary
involvement with the increasingly complex multi-tier construction of the EU. Out of
concern for the EU’s unity, the European Parliament has rejected suggestions to
endow a core group such as the euro area with its own parliamentary chamber: “The
European Parliament […] is the parliament of the Euro”.13 Increased cooperation
among parliaments of both levels to strengthen incrementally their position vis-à-vis the
other EU institutions seems to be the most promising option, although probably with
limited effects.
3.3. The Commission: a watchdog on a short leash?
The Commission has mostly been described as a loser in the inter-institutional balance
over the past years. It has had to cope with a loss of significance due both to the
10 Wulf Reiners und Wolfgang Wessels, “Rivalität und Gleichgewicht in der institutionellen Architektur der
EU”, in Werner Weidenfeld und Wolfgang Wessels (Hrsg.), Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2012,
Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012, p. 52.
11 Jorg Monar, “The European Union’s institutional balance of power after the Treaty of Lisbon”, in The
European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon: visions of leading policy-makers, academics and journalists,
Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2011, p. 86, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/theeuropean-
union-after-the-treaty-of-lisbon-pbNC311068286.
12 See Wolfgang Wessels et al., Democratic Control in the member states of the European Council and the
Euro zone summits. Study commissioned by the European Parliament, Brussels, European Parliament,
2013 forthcoming, p. 69.
13 European Parliament, Towards a real Economic and Monetary Union. Building a capacity to decide.
Reflection Note by the Representatives of the Parliament (PE 497.187/CPG), 2 October 2012, p. 2,
http://www.movimentoeuropeo.it/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=194.
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Lisbon Treaty and the rise of the European Council.14 Nonetheless, as far as economic
policies are concerned, the Commission has “received unprecedented supervisory
power”15 in response to the recent crises, for example in the framework of the TSCG for
countries subject to an excessive deficit procedure, and for countries receiving ESM
assistance. The Commission’s evaluation in these cases may ultimately lead to “a deep
cut into the parliamentary sovereignty of the concerned states”.16 However, the
Commission’s traditional role as “guardian of the treaties” in cooperation with the ECJ
is weaker in this area: The Commission may not go to the Court directly but has to rely
on a member state to take action. Moreover, the fact that the European Central Bank
(ECB) rather than the Commission has been assigned the leading role in the SSM
currently being negotiated also attests to the strict limitations on its role. Finally, the
President of the European Council seems to have superseded the Commission to
some extent as a key norm entrepreneur.
3.4. The European Central Bank: the most prominent winner?
The ECB has had to master the double challenge of conducting monetary policy for all
euro area member states in an extremely volatile environment, and contributing to the
resolution of the sovereign debt crisis. By expanding the banking sector’s access to
liquidity, as well as through unconventional measures such as the purchase of
government bonds, the bank has played a decisive part in preventing the euro area’s
disintegration. However, some of the ECB’s more unorthodox measures have been
very contentious. Critics (also from within the Bank) have argued that some dangerous
precedents have been set that might eventually put the primary goal of price stability at
risk.
Despite this criticism, the ECB as a technocratic supranational body emerged
strengthened from the crises and has influenced the debate on reforming EMU. New
responsibilities regarding the supervision of banks under the SSM will give it a leading
role in day-to-day management of financial markets. But they also pose the new
challenge of establishing a strict internal division between these and the ECB’s
traditional activities, with a view to preventing conflicting objectives between the two
domains.
4. Ways ahead: a roadmap towards a more “genuine” and stable EMU?
In the run-up to the December 2012 European Council, several contributions outlined a
reform agenda for EMU. Inter alia, the European Commission published a
14 Wulf Reiners und Wolfgang Wessels, “Rivalität und Gleichgewicht in der institutionellen Architektur der
EU”, cit., p. 47.
15 Herman Van Rompuy, The discovery of co-responsibility: Europe in the debt crisis. Speech at the
Humboldt University, Walter Hallstein Institute for European Constitutional Law (EUCO 21/12), Berlin, 6
February 2012, p. 6, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/127849.pdf.
16 Wulf Reiners und Wolfgang Wessels, “Rivalität und Gleichgewicht in der institutionellen Architektur der
EU”, cit., p. 14.
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comprehensive “blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU” in late November.17 Most
recently, a paper prepared by the President of the European Council “in close
collaboration” with the presidents of the Commission, the Eurogroup and the ECB
summarized these contributions into a roadmap18. While some of the proposed
measures can be realized within the present legal framework, others require more
fundamental treaty changes.
A major project that is largely compatible with the current legislative framework is the
idea of a “banking union” (at least among euro area banks). The intended SSM is a first
element of such a regime. Once the SSM is in place, the intention is to let the ESM
recapitalize struggling banks directly (instead of lending to governments). Additional
steps towards a full-fledged banking union would include a single resolution
mechanism for failing banks and a common deposit protection scheme. However,
political disputes make it uncertain if the ambitious timetable set out in the Van Rompuy
paper can be respected, given that implementing the necessary legislative changes
could take several years.19
A second major proposal, which would require far-reaching treaty changes, is to
establish some centralized “fiscal capacity” for the euro area to protect national
economies against financial shocks. The insurance-type system - open to the 10 euroouts
on a voluntary basis - would include national contributions according to economic
performance, but is not supposed to provide permanent transfers between countries.
The Van Rompuy paper takes care to underline that the fiscal capacity would not imply
the mutualization of debt, but notes that it could indeed offer an appropriate basis for
common debt issuance. Regardless of this aspect, a centralized fiscal capacity for the
euro area would constitute a decisive step towards an autonomous euro area budget.
Conclusion and outlook: towards “more Europe”
In terms of the inter-institutional balance, the crisis seems to have strengthened the
European Council as the incarnation of intergovernmentalism within the Union. But
there are also arguments that the European Council has reinforced the Community
method20 and might have become communitized itself.21 Spillover effects would thus
lead to more European federalism, reflected in the strengthening of supranational
institutions (the European Parliament, along with the ECB and the ECJ). In sum, given
that national parliaments are also increasingly making use of their rights, we may see a
development towards power-sharing in the evolution of the EU’s architecture.
17 European Commission, A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union. Launching a
European Debate (COM(2012) 777 final), Brussels, 28 November 2012, http://eurlex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM%3A2012%3A0777%3AFIN%3AEN%3APDF.
18 Herman Van Rompuy, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, 5 December 2012,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf.
19 Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Nach dem EU-Gipfel:
Zeit für langfristige Lösungen nutzen, Sondergutachten, 5 Juli 2012, p. 28,
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/download/publikationen/sg2012.pdf.
20 See Herman Van Rompuy, The discovery of co-responsibility: Europe in the debt crisis, cit., p. 6.
21 Wolfgang Wessels, The European Council, cit.
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An assessment of the forward-looking roadmap is more difficult. The European Council
of December 2012 embraced the blueprint of a “genuine EMU”, but deferred many
open questions on the further transformation of the euro area to the next year. Against
the background of the relative calm in financial markets over the past few months, it will
be important that this lack of a sense of urgency does not translate into a return to
business as usual. In order to make the common currency more resilient, long-term
reforms are clearly necessary. All elements of the new governance architecture need to
be considered in a broader perspective of constructing the EU polity. In their final report
of September 2012, a group of foreign ministers underlined that the overall functioning
of the EU needs to be strengthened independently of EMU reform.22 Both undertakings
might require a revised Treaty created by a constitutional convention - of either all EU
members or just those willing to press ahead. Regardless of which option prevails in
the end, it is becoming increasingly difficult to preserve simultaneously the
(geographic) breadth and (institutional) depth of the process of European integration.
“More Europe” in terms of making EMU more resilient to crises will in all likelihood be
accompanied by “less Europe” in terms of differentiated integration in the EU polity as a
whole.
Updated: 11 January 2013
22 Future of Europe Group, Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, 17
September 2012, http://www.auswaertigesamt.
de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626338/publicationFile/171838/120918-Abschlussbericht-
Zukunftsgruppe.pdf.
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References
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%3APDF
European Parliament, Towards a real Economic and Monetary Union. Building a
capacity to decide. Reflection Note by the Representatives of the Parliament (PE
497.187/CPG), 2 October 2012,
http://www.movimentoeuropeo.it/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download
&gid=194
Future of Europe Group, Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign
Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain, 17 September 2012,
http://www.auswaertigesamt.
de/cae/servlet/contentblob/626338/publicationFile/171838/120918-
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Tobias Kunstein and Wolfgang Wessels, “What we hope, what we fear, what we
expect: possible scenarios for the future of the eurozone”, in European View, Vol. 11,
No. 1 (June 2012), p. 5-14
Jorg Monar, “The European Union’s institutional balance of power after the Treaty of
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© Istituto Affari Internazionali
IAI Working Papers 1302 The New Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union:
Adapted Institutions and Innovative Instruments
13
http://www.sachverstaendigenratwirtschaft.
de/fileadmin/dateiablage/download/publikationen/sg2012.pdf
Funda Tekin, Differentiated integration at Work. The Institutionalisation and
Implementation of Opt-Outs from European Integration in the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012
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Speech at the Humboldt University, Walter Hallstein Institute for European
Constitutional Law (EUCO 21/12), Berlin, 6 February 2012,
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European Commission, Eurogroup and European Central Bank, 5 December 2012,
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2013 forthcoming
Wolfgang Wessels et al., Democratic Control in the member states of the European
Council and the Euro zone summits. Study commissioned by the European Parliament,
Brussels, European Parliament, 2013 forthcoming
Istituto Affari Internazionali
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