If you are having trouble viewing this email click here.
 
MEMRI - The Middle East Media Research Institute
 

MEMRI Daily: May 9, 2013

 

MEMRI | MEMRI TV | JIHAD AND TERRORISM THREAT MONITOR | SOUTH ASIA STUDIES PROJECT

 
donate image 2.jpg
Subscribe a Friend to Free Email List
Subscribe to Additional E-Newsletters
Find MEMRI On: Twitter Facebook YouTube 


 
 

 

Inquiry & Analysis No. 967

With Increase Of Sunni-Shi'ite Tension In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia Renews Involvement In Country

By: E. B. Picali*
On March 23, 2013, as the Sunni-Shi'ite struggle in Lebanon reached a peak, Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced his resignation and brought down the Hizbullah-dominated government that had been formed in June 2011 under the sponsorship of this organization. Two weeks later, on April 6, 2013, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman assigned the task of forming a new government to Tammam Salam, an MP from the Al-Mustaqbal faction, which heads the March 14 Forces. This new government, yet to be established, is to serve until elections are held this June. The appointment of Tammam Salam had the overwhelming support of 124 out of 128 parliament members, including the MPs from the Hizbullah–headed March 8 Forces  (the remaining four MPs abstained).
This surprising consensus was achieved largely thanks to the mediation of Saudi Arabia, which has renewed its involvement in Lebanon. Acting with the approval of Iran and perhaps also of Syria, this country took steps to calm the situation in Lebanon while remaining open to all sides, including the March 8 Forces. Its intervention was apparently motivated by a joint Saudi-Iranian desire to prevent Lebanon from sliding into Sunni-Shi'ite war and thus creating a new hotspot of conflict in the region, in addition to Syria.
The Saudi intervention sheds light on the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Qatar for influence over Lebanon's Sunni sector and for hegemony in the Arab world at large. It also reflects Saudi Arabia's fear that sectarian tensions in Lebanon might exacerbate Sunni-Shi'ite tensions in the kingdom itself and in other Gulf states, especially Bahrain.
This report reviews the moves that preceded the political developments in Lebanon, focusing on Saudi Arabia's return to the Lebanese arena and the reasons that motivated it, as well as Iran's part in these moves.  
967a.jpg
Lebanon's new prime minister, Tammam Salam
 (image: dailystar.com.lb)

Inquiry & Analysis No. 966

Fear In Lebanon Over Possible Slide Into Sectarian War

By: E. B. Picali*
The recent months have seen a considerable increase of tension between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Lebanon, to the extent that there is growing fear of a confrontation between the two sides – especially between the Shi'ite Hizbullah and Sunni Salafi elements. On February 27, 2013, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki – both of them Shi'ites – expressed concern that a sectarian war might break out in the region, including in Lebanon. Al-Maliki said to the television channel Russia Today: "If [the Syrian opposition] wins [the war in Syria], civil war will break out in Lebanon [as well]…" Nasrallah said in a speech he delivered that day: "There are those who are accelerating Lebanon's descent into sectarian fighting, in particular fighting between Sunnis and Shi'ites." Two weeks later, Lebanese Defense Minister Fayez Ghosn, a Christian, likewise warned that "winds of civil war have appeared on the horizon."
Arab and Lebanese press also warned against sectarian war in the country. Jean 'Aziz, a columnist for the Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar,  claimed that the current climate in Lebanon is reminiscent of the eve of the civil war in 1975. An April 2, 2013 editorial in the London daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi claimed that "sectarian tension in Lebanon is awaiting only a match to light it," and that "Lebanon is gradually sliding towards the volcano of the Syrian revolution."
The Sunni-Shi'ite strife in Lebanon is, to a great extent, a reflection of the sectarian tension in the region at large. This tension has grown in the last two years due to the emergence of a Sunni bloc in the region headed by Qatar and Turkey, which forms a counter-weight to the Shi'ite axis headed by Iran, and especially in light of Iran's involvement in Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf states. In addition to these regional factors, there are domestic factors that exacerbate the sectarian tension in Lebanon, namely: the involvement of the rival Lebanese factions in the Syrian war (the Shi'ite Hizbullah is fighting alongside the Assad regime against the Syrian rebels, most of whom are Sunni, whereas the Al-Mustaqbal faction and Salafis in Tripoli are supporting the rebels); the exclusion of the Al-Mustaqbal faction, the primary representative of Lebanon's Sunnis, from the centers of power upon the establishment of the Hizbullah-dominated Mikati government in June 2011; Hizbullah's weapons, which many Sunnis believe are intended to guard sectarian, rather than national Lebanese, interests; and the growing power of the Salafis in Tripoli and of Salafi sheikh Ahmad Al-Asir of Sidon, who challenge Hizbullah's right to keep these weapons.
The sectarian tension in Lebanon has expressed itself in several violent incidents. The severest of them occurred on March 17, 2013, when four Sunni sheikhs were beaten and assaulted with cold weapons by Shi'ite youths in two different locations in Beirut. The incidents evoked a furious response by Sunnis, who held protests, blocked roads, burned tyres and even threw firebombs in Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon and Akkar (in Northern Lebanon). The statement of Lebanese armed forces chief Jean Qahwaji, that March 17 had been "the most dangerous [day] in the last eight years in terms of [Lebanon's domestic] security," reflects the extent of the tension. However, it seems that tension between the sides rose even further in the last two weeks, after Salafi leaders issued fatwas calling on Sunni youths in Lebanon to embark on jihad in Syria in response to Hizbullah's involvement in the fighting there.
This report will review the escalation of sectarian tension in Lebanon during the recent months.

Special Dispatch No. 5297

Former Hizbullah Leader Subhi Al-Tufayli: Iran Forces Hizbullah To Participate In The Syrian War

Following are excerpts from an interview with former Hizbullah secretary-general Subhi Al-Tufayli, which aired on Future TV on April 24, 2013:
5297.jpg
Subhi Al-Tufayli: "I know for a fact that the vast majority within Hizbullah strongly oppose [joining] the Syrian war. However, a resolute decision to participate [in the war] has been imposed upon them."