Britannia Radio

A Plan for Action A New Era of International Cooperation for a Changed World:

2009, 2010, and Beyond Managing Global Insecurity

A Report by 2
Madeleine Albright
Principal, The Albright Group LLC;
Former U.S. Secretary of State
Richard Armitage
President, Armitage International;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Samuel Berger
Chairman, Stonebridge International;
Former U.S. National Security Advisor
Howard Berman
Representative from California,
Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee,
United States Congress
Coit D. Blacker
Director and Senior Fellow, Freeman
Spogli Institute, Stanford University;
Former Senior Director at the
National Security Council
U.S. Advisory Group Members
Sylvia Mathews Burwell
President, Global Development
Program, The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation; Former Deputy Director
of the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget
Chester A. Crocker
Professor of Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University; Former
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,
African Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger
Former U.S. Secretary of State
William Perry
Michael and Barbara Berberian
Professor and Co-Director of the
Preventive Defense Project at the
Center for International Security and
Cooperation; Senior Fellow, Freeman
Spogli Institute, Stanford University
Thomas Pickering
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations
John Podesta
President and CEO, Center for
American Progress; Former White
House Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft
President, The Scowcroft Group;
Former U.S. National Security Advisor
Abraham Sofaer
George P. Shultz Distinguished
Scholar and Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution; Former Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Department
of State
Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Timothy Wirth
President, The United Nations
Foundation; Former U.S. Senator
James D. Wolfensohn
Chairman and CEO, Wolfensohn
and Company; Former World Bank
President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso
Former President of Brazil
Jan Eliasson
Former Special Envoy to the
UN Secretary-General on Darfur;
Former Foreign Minister of Sweden
Ashraf Ghani
Chairman of the Institute for State
Effectiveness; Former Minister of
Finance for Afghanistan
Jeremy Greenstock
Director, Ditchley Foundation;
Former UK Ambassador to the UN
Rima Khalaf Hunaidi
Chief Executive Officer, Mohammed
bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation;
Former Assistant Secretary-General
and Director, Regional Bureau for
Arab States, UN Development Program
Anwar Ibrahim
Honorary President of AccountAbility;
Former Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia
Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman, Munich Conference on
Security Policy; Former German
Ambassador to the United States
Igor S. Ivanov
Former Russian Foreign Minister;
Former Secretary of the Security
Council of Russia
Wu Jianmin
President, China Foreign Affairs
University; Former Ambassador
of China to the UN
Kishore Mahbubani
Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Affairs; Former Ambassador of
Singapore to the UN
Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India
Vincent Maphai
Chairman, BHP Billiton, South Africa
Paul Martin
Former Prime Minister of Canada
Ayo Obe
Chair of the World Movement for
Democracy, Nigeria
Sadako Ogata
President, Japan International
Cooperation Agency; Former UN
High Commissioner for Refugees
Salim Ahmed Salim
Former Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity
Javier Solana
High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy,
European Union
International Advisory Group Members
3
Bruce Jones
Director and Senior Fellow
Center on International Cooperation
New York University
Carlos Pascual
Vice President and Director
Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution
Stephen John Stedman
Senior Fellow
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) Co-Directors
September 2008
We are especially indebted to MGI’s
research team–Holly Benner and
Jessie Duncan at the Brookings
Institution, Catherine Bellamy and
Richard Gowan at New York University’s
Center on International Cooperation
and Kate Chadwick at Stanford
University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation for their
instrumental role in developing the
ideas in this action plan and managing
the Project’s extensive U.S. and international
consultation agenda.
Generating This Plan for Action . 4
Executive Summary 6
International Cooperation in an Era of Transnational Threats 10
A Foundation of Responsible Sovereignty 10
The Political Moment: U.S. and International Convergence . 12
An Agenda for Action 15
Track 1. U.S. Engagement: Restoring Credible American Leadership . 16
Track 2. Power and Legitimacy: Revitalizing International Institutions 19
Track 3. Strategy and Capacity: Tackling Shared Threats 24
Track 4. Internationalizing Crisis Response: Focus on the Broader Middle East 30
Management: Sequencing and Targets of Opportunity 34
Timeline for Action 2009–2012 35
Summary of Recommendations Across Four Tracks . 37
Appendices
Acronym List . 39
Endnotes 40
CONTENTS
4
Generating this Plan for Action
The Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) Project seeks
to build international support for global institutions
and partnerships that can foster international peace and
security—and the prosperity they enable—for the next
50 years. MGI is a joint initiative among the Brookings
Institution, the Center on International Cooperation at
New York University, and the Center for International
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
Since its launch in the spring of 2007, MGI has sought
to develop its recommendations and conduct its work in
a manner best suited to address today’s most urgent
global challenges—namely, by fostering a global dialogue.
In a world where 21st century transnational
threats—from climate change to nuclear proliferation
and terrorism—require joint solutions, discussions on
these solutions must take place both inside and outside
American borders. As MGI launched this ambitious but
urgent agenda, the Project convened two advisory
groups—one American and bipartisan, and one international.
MGI’s advisors are experienced leaders with
diverse visions for how the international security system
must be transformed. They are also skilled politicians
who understand the political momentum that must
power substantive recommendations.
MGI brought these groups together for meetings in
Washington D.C., New York, Ditchley Park (UK),
Singapore, and Berlin. With their assistance, MGI also
conducted consultations with government officials,
policymakers and non-governmental organizations
across Europe and in Delhi, Beijing, Tokyo, Doha, and
Mexico City. MGI held meetings at the United Nations,
and with African and Latin American officials in
Washington D.C. and New York. On the domestic front,
MGI met with Congressional and Administration
officials as well as foreign policy advisors to the U.S.
Presidential campaigns. Ideas generated in international
consultations were tested on U.S. constituencies; ideas
generated among U.S. policymakers were sounded out
for their resonance internationally. American and
international leaders were brought together to consider
draft proposals. Through this global dialogue, the
Project sought a shared path forward.
MGI’s findings also derive from extensive research and
analysis of current global security threats and the performance
of international institutions. MGI solicited
case studies from leading regional and subject experts
that evaluated the successes and failures of international
responses to the “hard cases”—from the North Korean
nuclear threat to instability in Pakistan and state collapse
in Iraq. Both in the United States and internationally,
MGI convened experts to review the Project’s threatspecific
analyses and proposals.
Financial support for the MGI project has also been
robustly international. In addition to the Bertelsmann
Stiftung, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ditchley
Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation,
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and
UN Foundation, MGI has received funding and in-kind
support from the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and
the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. A number of
think tanks and other institutions in Japan, China and
India hosted workshops to debate the Project’s findings.
MGI is indebted to its diverse supporters.
MGI’s research and consultations provide the foundation
for the following Plan for Action, a series of policy briefs,
and MGI’s book, Power and Responsibility: International
Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (forthcoming,
Brookings Press 2009). The authors are solely responsible
for the following analysis and recommendations.
Based on MGI’s consultations, however, they are confident
this is a historic opportunity for the United States
to forge new partnerships to tackle the most pressing
problems of this century.
5
Top: MGI Advisory Group Member Sadako Ogata, President, Japan International Cooperation Agency;
Group shot: Members of the MGI Advisory Group meeting at Bertelsmann Stiftung in Berlin, Germany, July
2008; Bottom, left to right: MGI Advisory Group Member Salim Ahmed Salim, Former Secretary-General of
the Organization of African Unity; MGI Co-Directors (from left), Stephen Stedman, Senior Fellow, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director,
Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution; Bruce Jones, Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International
Cooperation, New York University.
The MGI project has consulted with field leaders and
policymakers from around the globe and across party
lines to generate discussion and debate, as well as build
consensus among diverse perspectives.
6
Executive Summary
The 21st century will be defined by
security threats unconstrained by
borders—from climate change, nuclear
proliferation, and terrorism to conflict,
poverty, disease, and economic instability.
The greatest test of global leadership
will be building partnerships and
institutions for cooperation that can
meet the challenge. Although all states
have a stake in solutions, responsibility
for a peaceful and prosperous world
will fall disproportionately to the
traditional and rising powers. The
United States most of all must provide
leadership for a global era.
U.S. domestic and international opinions
are converging around the urgent
need to build an international security
system for the 21st century. Global
leaders increasingly recognize that
alone they are unable to protect their
interests and their citizens—national
security has become interdependent
with global security.
Just as the founders of the United
Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
after World War II began with a vision
for international cooperation based
on a shared assessment of threat and
a shared notion of sovereignty, today’s
global powers must chart a new course
for today’s greatest challenges and
opportunities. International cooperation
today must be built on the principle
of responsible sovereignty, or the notion
that sovereignty entails obligations and
duties toward other states as well as to
one’s own citizens.
The US Presidential election provides
a moment of opportunity to renew
American leadership, galvanize action
against major threats, and refashion
key institutions to reflect the need for
partnership and legitimacy. Delays will
be tempting in the face of complex
threats. The siren song of unilateral action
will remain—both for the United
States and the other major powers.
To build a cooperative international
order based on responsible sovereignty,
global leaders must act across four
different tracks.
Trac k 1. U.S. Engagement: Restoring
Credible American Leadership
No other state has the diplomatic,
economic and military capacity necessary
to rejuvenate international
cooperation. But to lead, the United
States must first re-establish itself
as a good-faith partner.
Unilateral U.S. action in Iraq,
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture,
rendition, and the rhetorical association
of the Iraq war with democracy
promotion have damaged American
credibility internationally. The United
States must demonstrate its commitment
to a rule-based international
system that rejects unilateralism and
looks beyond military might. In turn,
major states will be more willing to
AGENDA FOR ACTION
VISION
An international order founded on
responsible sovereignty that delivers
global peace and prosperity for the
next 50 years.
OBJECTIVE
The next U.S. President, in partnership
with other major and emerging
powers, launches a campaign in
2009 to revitalize international
cooperation for a changed world.
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
TRACK 1
Revitalizing International
Institutions
TRACK 2
Tackling Shared Threats
TRACK 3
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
TRACK 4
7
affect their security and prosperity.
Traditional powers cannot achieve
sustainable solutions on issues from
economic stability to climate change
without the emerging powers at the negotiating
table. Global leaders should:
• Create a new Group of 16 (G16) to
foster cooperation between the G8
and Brazil, China, India, South
Africa, Mexico (the Outreach 5) and
the nations of Indonesia, Turkey,
Egypt or Nigeria. Replacing the
outdated G8, the G16 would serve
as a pre-negotiating forum to forge
preliminary agreements on major
global challenges;
• Initiate voluntary veto reform at the
UN Security Council (UNSC) as a
confidence building measure toward
UNSC reform;
• End the monopoly of the U.S.
and Europe on leadership at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank, and refocus the
IMF’s mandate to exercise surveillance
over exchange rate polices and
to facilitate the smooth unraveling of
global imbalances; and
• Strengthen regional organizations,
including a 10-year capacity building
effort for the African Union and support
for a regional security mechanism
for the Middle East.
Expansion of the UNSC would be the
most dramatic signal of commitment to
share the helm of the international system.
However, the conditions for this
are unlikely to be propitious in 2009,
and a mishandled effort could undermine
progress on other fronts. Decisive
expansion of the G8 in 2009 would lay
a credible foundation for action on
UNSC expansion within the first term
of the new U.S. President.
share the burden in resources and
expend political capital to manage
global threats. A new American
President should:
• Send his top cabinet officials for
early consultations on international
priorities with allies and the rising
powers alike;
• Deliver consistent and strong messages
on international cooperation
domestically and internationally—
including in speeches in the lead-up
to the Group of 8 (G8) and the UN
General Assembly meetings in 2009,
laying out a vision for a 21st century
security system; and
• Close the Guantanamo Detention
facility and initiate efforts toward a
more sustainable U.S. detainee
policy; and declare U.S. commitment
to uphold the Geneva Conventions,
the Convention Against Torture and
other laws of war.
Over time, the United States will also
need to dramatically upgrade its civilian
foreign policy corps, including doubling
the size of the foreign service in 10
years and re-writing the Foreign Assistance
Act to elevate development priorities
and improve aid effectiveness.
TRACK 2. Power and Legitimacy:
Revitalizing International Institutions
The legitimacy and effectiveness
of key international institutions are
enhanced by increasing representation
of emerging powers and
re-focusing mandates toward 21st
century challenges.
The leadership and mandates of key
international institutions—from the
G8 to the UN Security Council—have
not kept pace with the new powerholders
and dynamic threats of a changed
world. Emerging powers are excluded
from decision-making processes that
The aim of the MGI project is
ambitious and urgent: to
launch a new reform effort for
the global security system in
2009 … for the global system
is in serious trouble. It is simply
not capable of solving the
challenges of today. You all
know the list: terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, climate
change, pandemics, failing
states … None can be solved
by a single government alone.
— Javier Solana
High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, European Union;
MGI Advisory Group Member
8
trac k 3. Strategy and Capacity:
Tackling Shared Threats
Enhanced international cooperation
and international institutions are utilized
to manage key global threats.
The global agenda—the 2009 conference
of the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the
2010 review conference on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and global
trade pressures—demands action. In
the case of climate change, continuation
of current trends in the use of fossil
fuels would constitute a new form of
“mutually assured destruction.” There
is no doubt of the catastrophic effects
if nuclear weapons are used or fall into
the wrong hands. Global leaders should:
• Negotiate a climate change agreement
under UNFCCC auspices that
includes emission targets for 2020
and 2050 and investments in technology,
rain forests and mitigation;
• Revitalize the core bargain of the
non-proliferation regime by nuclear
weapons states, particularly the
United States and Russia, reducing
their arsenals, and by all states
endorsing the Additional Protocol
and working to develop an international
fuel bank; and
• Initiate G16 “pre-negotiations”
on an open and inclusive trade
regime to conclude a World Trade
Organization (WTO) round that
benefits poor countries.
Progress must also be made across other
key global challenges—deadly infectious
disease, the abuse of biotechnology,
regional and civil conflict, and global
terrorism. Global leaders should:
• Build local public health capacity to
achieve full implementation of the
International Health Regulations
(2005) and develop an intergovernmental
panel on biotechnology to
forge scientific consensus on the dangers
and benefits of biotechnology;
• Increase international investment in
conflict management with a goal of
50,000 international peacekeeping
reserves and two billion in funding
for peacebuilding; and
• Establish a UN High Commissioner for
Counter Terrorism Capacity Building
to focus international efforts to build
counter-terrorism norms and capacity.
trac k 4. Internationalizing Crisis
Response: Focus on the Broader
Middle East
Internationalize crisis response in
the broader Middle East to address
regional conflict and transnational
threats.
Global leaders must have confidence
that a 21st century international security
system will produce better outcomes
on the crises at the top of their national
security agendas. The Middle East is
the most unstable region in the world,
and a vortex of transnational threats.
The G16, in cooperation with leading
regional actors, can help to identify
shared interests in regional stability and
catalyze more focused international
support. Global leaders should:
• Move the Annapolis process forward
to support an Israeli-Palestinian
peace settlement;
• Commit adequate forces and civilian
capacity for a stable peace in
Afghanistan;
• Focus U.S. and international efforts
on a political settlement and civilian
surge for Iraq;
• Sustain regional and international
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program;
and
• Initiate efforts toward a regional
security arrangement for the Middle
East that could, as existing crises
eased, provide a mechanism to guarantee
borders and promote stability.
We are witnessing the early
stages of a shift of the center
of gravity of international relations
from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. A simple expansion
of the G8 is not enough—
new great powers must share
responsibility as equal partners
for setting the agenda. For its
part, China increasingly sees
that its security is closely tied
to global security. Particularly
in the area of climate change
and energy security, there is
vast scope for cooperation.
— Wu Jianmin
President, China Foreign Affairs University;
MGI Advisory Group Member
9
International Cooperation for a
Changed World
American and global leaders face a
choice: they can either use this moment
to help shape an international,
rule-based order that will protect their
global interests, or resign themselves to
an ad hoc international system where
they are increasingly powerless to
shape the course of international
affairs. The agenda for action will not
be completed in two years or ten. Yet,
we cannot wait to start. The longer
the delay in new approaches and new
cooperation against today’s threats,
the more difficult the challenges will
become. Global leaders must chart
a shared path forward that marries
power and responsibility to achieve
together what cannot be achieved
apart: peace and security in a transnational
world.
A new American President
will have to re-start a global
conversation with the world’s
traditional and emerging powers
that moves from monologue
to dialogue. Partnership and
cooperation must be the
centerpiece of successful
American leadership in
confronting 21st century
threats, where protecting U.S.
security is intimately linked
with promoting global stability.
— Thomas Pickering
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations;
MGI Advisory Group Member
10
International Cooperation in an
Era of Transnational Threats
The greatest test of global leadership
in the 21st century will be how
nations perform in the face of threats
that defy borders—from nuclear proliferation,
conflict, and climate change to
terrorism, threats to biological security,
and global poverty. Ours is now a world
where national security is interdependent
with global security.
Globalization has resulted in unprecedented
opportunities. The ability to
tap into global markets for capital,
technology and labor has allowed the
private sector to amass wealth unfathomable
50 years ago: it has helped lift
hundreds of millions out of poverty in
emerging economies. For China, integration
into the global economy has
been the driver of one of the most remarkable
stories of national progress
in human history—500 million people
have been raised out of poverty in just
thirty years.1
Yet, the forces of globalization that
have stitched the world together
and driven prosperity can also tear
it apart. In the face of new transnational
threats and profound security
interdependence, even the strongest
nations depend on the cooperation of
others to protect their own national
security. No country, including the
United States, is capable of successfully
meeting the challenges, or capitalizing
on the opportunities, of this
changed world alone. It is a world for
which we are unprepared, a world that
poses a challenge to leaders and citizens
alike to redefine their interests
and re-examine their responsibilities.
While that is true of every country,
it is especially true of the most powerful—
which must exercise the most
responsibility.
U.S. foreign policy has lagged behind
these realities. A new approach is
needed to revitalize the alliances, diplomacy,
and international institutions
central to the inseparable relationship
between national and global security.
U.S. leadership is indispensable if the
world as a whole is to be successful in
managing today’s threats. But American
leadership must be re-focused toward
partnership—continuing partnership
with allies in Europe, Asia and Latin
America, and cultivating new partnerships
with rising powers such as China,
India, Brazil and South Africa. The
policies, attitudes, and actions of major
states will have disproportionate influence
on whether the next 50 years tend
to international order or entropy. The
actions of a new U.S. President, working
with the leaders of the traditional and
rising powers, will profoundly influence
the shape of international security and
prosperity for a global age.
A Foundation of Responsible
Sovereignty
Unprecedented interdependence does
not make international cooperation
inevitable. Rather, shared interests
must be translated into a common
vision for a revitalized international
security system that benefits all.
The most pressing challenges
of this century are not constrained
by borders. Achieving
security and prosperity in
today’s interconnected world
requires greater cooperation
amongst the world’s leading
powers. The recommendations
of the Managing Global
Insecurity project provide a
vital step toward the necessary
reform of the international
security order.
— James Wolfensohn
Chairman and CEO, Wolfensohn and Company;
Former World Bank President;
MGI Advisory Group Member
11
Foresight, imagination, pragmatism
and political commitment, fueled by
effective American leadership, created
a new international era after World
War II. Institutions such as the United
Nations, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now
the World Trade Organization) contributed
to extraordinary economic
growth and helped to prevent majorpower
war. Innovation and political
engagement on the same scale are
needed to achieve security and prosperity
in the years ahead.
However, the vision necessary for a 21st
century international security system
is clouded by a mismatch between
existing post-World War II multilateral
institutions premised on traditional
sovereignty—a belief that borders are
sacrosanct and an insistence on noninterference
in domestic affairs—and
the realities of a now transnational
world where capital, technology, labor,
disease, pollution and non-state actors
traverse boundaries irrespective of the
desires of sovereign states.
The domestic burdens inflicted by
transnational threats such as poverty,
civil war, disease and environmental
degradation point in one direction:
toward cooperation with global partners
and a strengthening of international
institutions. Entering agreements or
accepting assistance is not a weakening
of sovereignty; it is the exercise of sovereignty
in order to protect it.
The MGI Project’s consultations have
informed and validated the view that
a new era of international cooperation
should be built on the principle of
responsible sovereignty: the idea that states
must take responsibility for the external
effects of their domestic actions—
that sovereignty entails obligations and
duties towards other sovereign states
as well as to one’s own citizens.2 To protect
national security, even to protect
sovereignty, states must negotiate rules
and norms to guide actions that reverberate
beyond national boundaries.
Responsible sovereignty also implies a
positive interest on the part of powerful
states to provide weaker states with the
capacity to exercise their sovereignty
responsibly—a responsibility to build.
MGI emphasizes sovereignty because
states are still the primary units of the
international system. As much as globalization
has diminished the power of
states, there is simply no alternative to
the legally defined state as the primary
actor in international affairs nor is
there any substitute for state legitimacy
in the use of force, the provision of
justice, and the regulation of public
spheres and private action.
MGI emphasizes responsibility because,
in an era of globalization, adherence
to traditional sovereignty, and deference
to individual state solutions, have failed
to produce peace and prosperity. In
a transnational world, international
cooperation is essential to give states the
means to meet the most fundamental
demands of sovereignty: to protect their
people and advance their interests.
Responsible sovereignty, in sum, is a
guidepost to a better international system.
Just as the founders of the United
Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
began with a vision for international
cooperation based on a shared assessment
of threat and a shared notion of
sovereignty, today’s global powers must
chart a new course for today’s greatest
challenges and opportunities.
Responsible sovereignty—
the idea that states must take
responsibility for external
effects of their actions—is a
brilliant new idea whose time
has come. No village can
accept a home whose actions
endanger the village. Neither
can the global village accept
the behavior of nations which
endanger the globe.
— Kishore Mahbubani
Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Affairs;
Former Ambassador of Singapore to the UN;
MGI Advisory Group Member
12
The Political Moment:U.S. and
International Convergence
A new vision for global security will
only succeed if it is powered by political
commitment and has the support
of diverse regions and influential constituencies.
International politics and
global realities are converging to make
such cooperation possible.
U.S. Interest
In the United States, MGI consultations
with policymakers and recent
polling highlight that American citizens
and American leadership across
party lines are concerned with a declining
U.S. image internationally.
In a 2007 national poll, 81% of
Americans favored a Presidential candidate
who said the United States should
“share the burden” and not be the sole
supplier of resources, finances, military
forces, and diplomacy for peace in
the world. Americans polled rejected
“going it alone,” and believed the
United States should be a global leader
and a “role model” for democracy.3
Presidential candidates have mirrored
this bipartisan public sentiment: both
major candidates have spoken out for
restoring U.S. leadership and moral
standing, viewing this as critical to the
protection of U.S. security.
The next U.S. President has the opportunity
to feature international cooperation
as the centerpiece of a strategy to
restore America’s global leadership.
Americans want their country to be
respected, they want to lead, and they
want to feel more secure as a result of
U.S. engagement.
Just as important, current global realities
leave no alternative to cooperation.
On January 20, 2009, the next
American President will inherit crises
in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North
Korea, Darfur, Pakistan, and the
Middle East. There will be many regional
and national challenges to a viable
foreign policy: the rise of India and
China, an energy-brash Russia, and an
African continent caught between new
economic opportunities and a legacy of
conflict and failed governance. The
international community will demand
action on climate change and the global
food crisis. An American recession will
TABLE 1: SEVEN REALITIES ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
For the United States For the World
In a world of new transnational dangers, the United States cannot defend
itself unilaterally against what threatens it. 1 Major and rising powers benefit from a strong United States that provides
vital global public goods.
To gain sustained cooperation on threats to U.S. security, the United States
must also address the security concerns of other nations. 2 International stability and prosperity in the next 20 years will depend heavily
on U.S. power and leadership.
Mililtary power, used in isolation, can be counterproductive in securing the
cooperation needed to ensure U.S. security. 3 America’s experience with unilateralism should be a salutary warning to
other rising powers tempted to ‘go-it-alone.’
International institutions are much more important to American security goals
than U.S. policy makers admit or the public realizes. 4 The costs of delaying revitalized international cooperation will increase over
time; it is best to engage now.
The international institutions that the United States uses daily to meet its
security needs must be strengthened or reinvented. 5 The United States will only commit itself to international norms and institutions
if it is convinced they protect U.S. interests.
American policies since 9/11 have led other states toward ‘soft balancing’:
resisting reforms of the international system perceived as beneficial to the
United States.
6
The road to a strengthened and more equitable international system requires
the engagement of all major powers, including the concerted engagement of
the United States.
If the United States wants cooperation in strengthening international institutions,
the U.S. must see them as more than tools to be used or ignored to
suit short-term political interests.
7
With greater voice and influence in the global system, new powers must
take on greater responsibility for its upkeep and health.
National sovereignty becomes
responsible sovereignty when
nations pay heed both to the
domestic demands of their
own citizens and to their international
responsibilities. Patriotism
requires internationalism.
— David Miliband
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom
Excerpt from speech to Peking University, Beijing,
February 29, 2008.
13
The next American President
will have to reintroduce America
to the world in order to
regain its trust in our purpose
as well as our power. ...The
success of [U.S.] policies and
efforts will depend not only on
the extent of our power, the
strength of our purpose and
cohesion of regional alliances,
but also by an appreciation of
great power limits.
— Chuck Hagel
U.S. Senator from Nebraska;
Excerpt from address at MGI speaker series event
at the Brookings Institution, June 26, 2008
focus attention on vulnerabilities in the
global financial system. Key U.S. allies
will seek renewed U.S. commitment to
multilateralism.
The United States cannot retreat from
this agenda any more than it can manage
it alone. America needs global
partners: to combat threats to the
American people, to wield influence
with actors such as North Korea and
Iran, to share the burden on complex
challenges, and to sustain global
systems that allow the United States
access to capital and markets critical to
economic growth in a dismal domestic
budget environment. It is in America’s
self-interest to act now, while its influence
is strong, to model leadership for
the 21st century based on the premise
of partnership and recognition of
interdependence.
Global Interest
MGI consultations in key capitals in diverse
regions—from Beijing and Delhi
to London and Doha—reinforced
that unilateral U.S. action in Iraq, and
across a range of foreign policy issues,
has cast a long shadow on America’s
standing in the world and alienated
even close allies. Key international
stakeholders are eager for strong signals
from a new U.S. administration that
it is willing to re-value global partnerships
and re-commit the United States
to a rules-based international system.
International public opinion polls
reinforce this sentiment. Of more than
24,000 people across 24 countries
surveyed in March and April 2008, a
majority expressed negative views of the
role that the United States is playing in
the world. In 14 of 24 countries, two-thirds
or more of respondents expressed little
or no confidence in President Bush to
do the right thing in world affairs. The
belief that the United States does not
take into account the interests of other
countries in formulating its foreign policy
is extensive even among U.S. allies such
as the UK and Australia and overwhelming
in the Middle East and Asia.4
Yet, internationally, most policymakers
also still recognize that there is no
prospect for international security and
prosperity in the next 20 years that
does not rely heavily on U.S. power and
leadership. The United States has the
world’s largest economy, strongest military
and broadest alliances. The world
needs the United States to use its leadership
and resources for the resolution
of transnational threats. If the United
States blocks international solutions on
issues such as climate change, nuclear
security and financial stability, sustainable
global outcomes are unachievable.
Traditional and emerging powers also
share with the United States a self-interest
in a resilient and effective international
order. Europe is the world’s most
rule-based society, yet erosion of a
rule-based international system means
that Europe is taking on commitments,
such as on carbon emissions and
foreign aid, with increasingly marginal
Crises Geopolitical global
Iraq
Iran
Afghanistan
North Korea
Middle East
Pakistan
Darfur
China
India
Africa
Russia
Latin America
Turkey
Trans-Atlantic
Asia-Pacific
Nuclear
Climate Change
Terrorism
Energy
Peace and Conflict
Poverty and
Financial Instability
On his first day in office, the next U.S. President
will face a daunting agenda — one that will be
impossible to address through unilateral action.
This agenda will contain regional crises, evolving
geopolitical dynamics and broader threats with the
potential to undermine global security. This action
plan demonstrates concrete steps for how an
American administration can leverage international
cooperation to tackle these challenges.
14
impact. Japan has a vital interest in a
stable transition in security arrangements
in Asia and globally. Leaders in
China, India and the emerging economies
recognize that their economic
growth relies on a strong and resilient
international trade and finance system.
To continue to develop its oil and gas
reserves, Russia will need international
technology, and sufficient trust from its
partners to invest in and secure transnational
pipelines. None of the traditional
or rising powers profit from unchecked
United Nations Foundation and Better World Campaign, Public Concern Poll 2008,
“New Consensus Emerging on Value of Forging Global Partnerships to Enhance
Security, Reduce Foreign Oil Dependence, Address Climate Change” http://www.
betterworldcampaign.org/news-room/press-releases/us-reject-go-it-alone.html.
More Respected v. Less Respected:
Compared with the past, would you say the United States is
more respected by other countries…less respected by other
countries…or as respected as it has been in the past?
Major Problem v. Minor Problem:
Do you think less respoect for America by other
countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
There continues to be an American consensus
that we are
less respected by other countries and this is a major problem.
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
More respected Less respected As respected
10%
20%
67%
6%
78%
15%
5%
78%
17%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
Major Problem Minor Problem Not a problem
Major Problem v. Minor Problem: Do you think less respect for
America by other countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
64%
6%
28%
76%
21%
3%
73%
23%
4%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
More respected Less respected As respected
10%
20%
67%
6%
78%
15%
5%
78%
17%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
Major Problem Minor Problem Not a problem
Major Problem v. Minor Problem: Do you think less respect for
America by other countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
64%
6%
28%
76%
21%
3%
73%
23%
4%
proliferation, or the spread of global
terrorism.
We must capitalize on momentum generated
from a convergence of global
and U.S. domestic interests to build an
international security system for the 21st
century. The case for amplified international
cooperation is not a soft-hearted
appeal to the common good but rather
a realist call to action that is demanded
both domestically and internationally.
Global governance requires simultaneously
dealing with different issues
in different ways while recognizing
and using to good effect the linkages
among them. Just as many of the
threats we face today are mutually
exacerbating, their solutions can be
mutually reinforcing. We are more
likely to make progress on specific
issues if we work on them in the
context of a broader agenda.
— Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State;
MGI Advisory Group Member
15
An Agenda for Action
During MGI consultations, U.S. and international
experts and policymakers
stressed that only through responsible
international action on transnational
threats can nations create the capacity
to defuse and ideally prevent regional
and global crises. If short-term crises
crowd out lasting reforms, nations and
policymakers will deny themselves the
tools to stem future disasters. If action
languishes, nationalistic opportunism
may provoke unilateral actions that undermine
sustainable solutions. Conflict,
isolationism, and protectionism then
become imminent threats to global
security and prosperity. Climate change
and nuclear proliferation will become
existential challenges to our planet: the
clock is already ticking.
Historically it has taken war or catastrophe
to bring about a redefinition of sovereignty
and a re-building of international order.
Our challenge is to use the urgency of
looming security challenges, and the prospect
for positive results, to drive progress.
International order will require power
to underpin responsibility. Our analysis
identified five pre-requisites: 1) effective
U.S. policy and leadership; 2) institutionalized
cooperation between the United
States and the traditional and emerging
powers; 3) negotiated understandings
of the application of responsible sovereignty
across key threat areas; 4) effective
and legitimate international institutions;
and 5) states capable of carrying out
their responsibilities toward their own
people and internationally.
We have incorporated these prerequisites
into a plan for action with four parallel
tracks: to restore U.S. standing internationally;
to revitalize international institutions;
to respond to transnational threats;
and to manage crises. We start with the
United States because American credibility
is critical for effective leadership. We
make crisis management the fourth track
to underscore that if not addressed in
tandem with the others, ad hoc solutions
will not be sustainable. The institutional
tools in track two are not ends in themselves—
they emerge from the agenda on
transnational threats. We present them
as the second track in order to apply
them in track three. Each track identifies
both opening actions to build political
momentum and a continuing agenda
to sustain the concerted engagement
required to produce results.
AGENDA FOR ACTION
VISION
An international order founded on
responsible sovereignty that delivers
global peace and prosperity for the
next 50 years.
OBJECTIVE
The next U.S. President, in partnership
with other major and emerging
powers, launches a campaign in
2009 to revitalize international
cooperation for a changed world.
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
TRACK 1
Revitalizing International
Institutions
TRACK 2
Tackling Shared Threats
TRACK 3
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
TRACK 4
16
TRACK 1
U.S. Engagement
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
Before investing political energy and
resources, other states will look
first for signs beyond rhetoric that the
United States seeks genuine global
partnerships and is committed to an
agenda for cooperative action.
Since the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. political system has vacillated in
its support for the international rule of
law and international institutions. The
United States has established itself as
sheriff and judge of the international
system but has at times neglected to
abide by the rules itself. In reality, no
country gains more from a strong international
legal regime than the United
States, precisely because the United
States has so many interests to protect.
A rule-based international system
safeguards American citizens, military
forces, and corporations.
While the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan
after 9/11 garnered widespread international
support, U.S. actions in Iraq
generated popular and political anger
against the United States both in the
region and internationally. This sentiment
has diminished the willingness
or ability of other nations to cooperate
with the United States.
The rhetorical association of the Iraq
war with democracy promotion has
further undermined American ideals
once admired globally and squandered
one of the United States’ great assets: its
reputation for protecting and promoting
human rights and the rule of law.
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, and
rendition have damaged American
credibility on human rights in large
parts of the world, especially in Muslimpopulated
countries.
U.S. engagement and leadership will
be required across many issue areas,
but first the United States must reestablish
its bona fides. The following
acts taken by the United States would
signal a willingness to re-commit to
a rule-based international order, and
look beyond military might as a primary
foreign policy tool.
I strongly believe that many of
the emerging threats the world
now faces, such as nuclear
proliferation, climate change,
and transnational terrorism,
must be met by strong U.S.
leadership and renewed
engagement with the global
community. Restoring U.S.
standing in the world and
encouraging the constructive
use of American power is
central to fostering greater
international cooperation to
counter these threats.
— Howard Berman
Representative from California,
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, United States Congress;
MGI Advisory Group Member
17
TRACK 1
Deliver Consistent and Strong
Messages on International Cooperation
The messages of the United States on the
value of international cooperation and its
commitment to global partnerships must be
consistent and strong. Style, tone and
vocabulary will make a difference. From the
outset of the administration, broad and
intense high-level consultation—by the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the
National Security Advisor, the Administrator
of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and senior ambassadors
or envoys—will signal to the international
community American dedication to
dialogue and cooperative approaches.
These high-level officials should engage
traditional and rising powers early in the
administration to gather insights on the
priorities of key states.
The new U.S. President should commit the
United States to leading efforts to revitalize
the international security system. The
President must deliver a strong message
internationally that the United States is
dedicated to global partnerships and will
uphold the rule of law, and speak to U.S.
audiences on the importance of international
cooperation to U.S. national security.
Following international and Congressional
consultations, the President should lay out
the main elements of a multi-year agenda for
key international agreements and institutions,
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Restoring Credible American Leadership
and call on global and regional leaders to
work together over the course of his term
to make decisive progress on a defined
action plan. This agenda could be set out
in speeches in the lead-up to the 2009
Group of 8 (G8) meeting in Italy, and at the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in
September 2009.
Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-
Based International System
The United States must make clear that
it will uphold the articles of the Geneva
Conventions, the Convention Against
Torture and other laws of war and reiterate
that it has no authority to torture anyone.
The President has an obligation under international
law, and with a view to reciprocity,
to prevent torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment of all prisoners, whatever
their status.
The 44th President should also immediately
announce his intention to close the
Guantanamo Detention facility and charge,
transfer, or release its approximately 270
detainees. Simultaneously, the U.S. administration
should announce an effort to develop
a sustainable detainee policy, not only for
Guantanamo but for U.S. detention facilities
worldwide. The next President must work
with Congress on a new detention framework
to address national security concerns
while providing basic legal protections.5
After years of missed opportunities
and some ill-considered
U.S. initiatives, the next Administration
inherits a complex and
challenging strategic situation.
This is compounded by...the
urgent need to revitalize and
rebuild international institutions
and to rebuild frayed or dysfunctional
relations with key
partners. The MGI project
does a masterful job of identifying
the challenges as well as
the opportunities for American
leadership...creatively weaving
together a series of critical
subject areas to be addressed
on parallel tracks.
— Chester A. Crocker
Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown
University; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State, African Affairs;
A Continuing Agenda: Restoring MGI Advisory Group Member
Credible American Leadership
Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for
Cooperative Diplomacy. The United
States needs a stronger civilian foreign
policy capacity to help restore its
international leadership and effectively
counter 21st century security threats.
Strengthened civilian tools for development
and diplomacy are critical to
combat key global challenges such
as climate change, terrorism, global
poverty and conflict. Yet, U.S. spending
on defense dwarfs civilian-side investments.
The Bush Administration’s fiscal
year 2009 budget request included
$38.3 billion to fund the civilian-side
foreign affairs and foreign aid budget.6
In comparison, the President asked
for $515 billion for the Department of
Defense’s core budget, before factoring
in the cost of waging war in Iraq and
18
Afghanistan.7 The United States is also
tied for last out of the 22 donor nations
of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in terms of international aid as a percentage
of gross national income.8
The first priority is to create the civilian
capability to understand and work with
local counterparts to address the drivers
of terrorism, proliferation, poverty,
conflict, and financial instability. This
would involve doubling the size of the
Foreign Service within ten years. U.S.
representatives on the ground, with an
understanding of local politics, culture,
history and language, are best placed
to inform policy choices. Such capacity
and flexibility requires more than the
7,000 Foreign Service officers in the
State Department and 1,000 in the U.S.
Agency for International Development
(USAID).
The very administration of foreign policy
and foreign aid must also be overhauled.
Whereas the private sector has
responded to globalization by decentralizing
operations, personnel shortages
have driven the State Department
and USAID to centralize policy and
programs in Washington while proliferating
the number of actors delivering
foreign aid. In 2008, there are
more than 50 separate units in the U.S.
government involved in aid delivery.9
The result: diminished capacity to act
locally and no systematic means to
ensure that civilian capacities are used
to their best effect to advance national
interests. The Executive Branch and
Congress must work together to conceptualize
anew the administration of
diplomacy, defense and development
to support common national security
goals. A new Foreign Assistance Act
must elevate global development as
a ‘third pillar’ of U.S. foreign policy
along with diplomacy and defense.10
TRACK 1
19
TRACK 2
Power and Legitimacy
Revitalizing International
Institutions
Rebuilding an effective international
security system will require
institutionalized venues for dialogue
and negotiation among the major
and rising powers, as well as mechanisms
to achieve buy-in and legitimacy
from a wider set of states. Neither the
membership nor decision-making
mechanisms of today’s international
institutions facilitate such a dialogue.
By 2050, the four most dynamic economies
in the world, Brazil, Russia, India,
and China, are projected to produce
40% of global output.11 Yet only two of
the four are permanent members of the
UN Security Council (UNSC) and only
Russia is a participant in the G8.
Emerging powers express intense
frustration about their lack of inclusion
in the decision-making processes that
affect their security and prosperity.
Conversely, there are fewer issues that
the G8 alone can resolve without the
participation of emerging powers. While
no individual nation wants to see itself
restrained by international norms, all
nations have an interest in seeing others
abide by a common set of rules.
If the United States and other traditional
powers seek sustainable solutions
on issues from conflict to climate
change and nuclear proliferation, they
will need to make room for these new
powers at the negotiating table. If new
powers are not integrated as partners
in the shaping of a revitalized international
security system, the enterprise has
little chance for success.
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
2005 MER 2050 MER 2005 PPP 2050 PPP
Relative size of G7 and E7 economies
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 16 May 2006
G7 GDP E7 GDP
The seven largest emerging economies, the E7, are China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. The
seven largest industrial economies, the G7, are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the
United Kingdom. Columns labeled as PPP demonstrate the scale of the economies as calculated by Purchasing
Power Parity exchange rates. Those labeled with MER were calculated using Market Exchange Rates.
The Russian incursion into Georgia in
2008, for example, reinforces rather
than diminishes the need for institutional
mechanisms that bring emerging
powers into a framework that intensifies
international checks and balances.
Some argue that the West should isolate
Russia. While there is no question that
the international community must condemn
Russia’s military action, isolation
will only spark Russian nationalism in
the short run, when Russia can afford
its truculence due to high energy prices.
Rather, the goal should be to play to
both the international community and
Russia’s long-term interests. In the long
run, Russia will need technology and
capital to sustain its energy sector and
diversify its economy. It will need access
to international markets. Bringing
Russia into a wider grouping of nations
that demonstrates these possibilities will
better encourage restraint than trying to
isolate Russia at a time when it is strong.
U.S. leadership in driving an expansion
of the UN Security Council would be
the most dramatic and effective signal of
a changed commitment to international
order. However, the conditions for this
are unlikely to be propitious in 2009,
and a mishandled effort at expansion
will do more damage than good. The
new U.S. administration should work
on parallel tracks to improve bilateral
relations with the traditional and rising
powers, including through decisive
expansion of the G8, and lay a credible
pathway towards early expansion of the
Security Council.
20
Create a Group of 16 (G16) to Bridge
Effectiveness and Legitimacy
The creation of a new G16 at the 2009 G8
summit meeting in Italy would be a bold
change to foster dynamic, cooperative
interaction between the United States and
the major and rising powers. Even if formal
inauguration of the G16 is not possible
in 2009, a core group already exists: the
G8 plus Brazil, China, India, South Africa,
and Mexico (called the “Outreach 5”). The
United States and other members of the
G8 should insist on meeting with this full
group routinely, and use this grouping to
forge consensus within the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other multilateral
fora on transnational issues. As
circumstances allow this G13 should add
Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria to
include voices from diverse regions with
significant populations and economic influence.
By 2012, when the United States
has the G8 Presidency, or preferably earlier,
the G16 should be fully established.
The G16 would represent economic,
political, and military powers from several
regions—incorporating those states whose
positive contributions and blocking powers
make them essential participants in a
wide range of international and transnational
agreements. The G16 would take the
place of the existing and outdated G8. Its
purpose would be to serve as a pre-negotiating
forum, a place where the smallest
possible grouping of necessary stakeholders
could meet to forge preliminary
agreements on responses to major global
challenges. It would be a place to build
knowledge, trust, and patterns of cooperation
among the most powerful states. The
G16 could, depending on the issue, draw on
the insights and energies of a wider range
of nations, large and small, by developing
“groups of responsibility” to tackle specific
problems.
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Revitalizing International Institutions
The G16 would also engage heads of the UN,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Word Bank,
World Trade Organization (WTO), World Health
Organization (WHO), regional organizations
and other international institutions and tap the
private and civic sectors for input. The G16
would not be an alternative to the UN or other
multilateral or regional bodies, but a vehicle to
make them more effective. It would not handle
acute threats, which should be addressed at
the UN Security Council. Informal agreements
within the G16 would be taken to more
representative bodies for discussion and
review. Like the G8, it would schedule and
conduct meetings flexibly—convening at the
Leader’s level annually, at the Foreign Ministers
level more often, and promote interaction
among G16 national security advisors, political
directors, and other officials.
Restrain Use of the Veto on the Path
Toward UN Security Council Reform
The G16 will be a critical part of an international
order based on responsible sovereignty,
but it is not a substitute for an effective and
credible UN Security Council, which must
remain at the core of the international security
system. However, an early initiative on UNSC
membership expansion would risk political
deadlock and detract attention from progress
on other issues. Three steps are needed as
interim measures on a path toward more
comprehensive reform: 1) a commitment by
permanent members to act on membership
reform within a defined time period; 2)
discussion within international forums to build
a shared definition of threat and conditions for
the use of force; and 3) action on procedural
and veto reform at the Security Council.
As a confidence building measure, the
United States should lead on voluntary veto
reform at the Council on the most serious
aspect of the Council’s business—the
authorization of the use of force, sanctions,
or peacekeeping operations. It would
substantially enhance the legitimacy of the
UNSC were the Permanent Five (P5) to
agree—informally—that they would not use
the veto to block action on these issues
unless at least two permanent members
opposed that action. This would allow the
Security Council to avoid an impasse in
responding to conflict and humanitarian
crises even if tensions arise among members.
This double veto agreement would
provide the foundation for future efforts to
improve the Council’s effectiveness and
legitimacy. The veto could still be used to
block non-operational resolutions (condemnatory,
exhortative, etc) of the kind that clog
the Council’s agenda. And in extremis—in
defense of core interests or core allies—the
veto could still be wielded.
TRACK 2
21
A Continuing Agenda: Revitalizing
International Institutions
Reform Representation and Mandate
of the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs). In order to achieve
a global system of economic governance
that reflects changes in capital, power,
and population, efforts to increase the
decision-making authority of emerging
economies in the IMF and the World
Bank must be bolstered. The stability of
the international financial system will
require stronger capacity to detect and
prevent financial crises in countries with
large capital balances that also have limited
financial transparency and experience
in crisis management. To consent
to such scrutiny, emerging markets will
want stronger representation in the IMF
and World Bank. The United States and
Europe should offer a further redistribution
of shares to emerging economies
and cede their monopoly on heading
the World Bank and IMF as part of a
package to strengthen and target the
roles of these institutions.
Forestalling future economic crises will
require the IMF to exercise transparent
and independent surveillance over the
exchange rate policies of the United
States, Europe, Japan, China, and
other systemically significant countries—
powers it has only just begun to
acquire. On financial crises such as the
sub-prime mortgage collapse, the IMF
would ideally play a preventative role,
alerting members to potential weaknesses
in the system before a crisis unfolds.
The IMF has the ability to spark
dialogue, provide in-depth analysis and
independent assessment, and serve as
an “honest broker” to bring together
the G16 and key regional groups to
redress the economic threat posed by
global imbalances.
Mandated to assist poor countries left
behind by the global economy, the
TRACK 2
If the G8 is to continue to play
an important role, it must widen
its membership to become
more representative of today’s
world. If it does not … the G8
will not only have become the
architect of its own decreasing
relevance, but global cooperation
will have lost out once
again to global competition
and the international system
will fall even further behind
the ever evolving reality of the
global landscape…The time to
share power is when you have
it to share, not when others
are in a position to wrest it
from your grip.
—Paul Martin
Former Prime Minister of Canada;
MGI Advisory Group Member
World Bank’s traditional leadership
role in global development has eroded.
Middle-income countries have other
sources of capital; poor countries have
other sources of development and technical
assistance. However, the Bank has
an important role to play in promoting
inclusive and sustainable globalization,
particularly by helping developing countries
link to the global economy, and
in helping emerging economies bridge
the divide between rich and poor within
their own borders. On climate change,
the World Bank has also emerged as a
key international player, as it has with respect
to fragile and post-conflict states:
these areas should be prioritized and
further developed in the Bank’s future
assistance efforts.
Expand the UN Security Council. The
legitimacy of the Security Council is
grounded in the Charter, but depends
as well on perceptions of whether its
decisions truly reflect global opinion.
Expansion to increase the representation
of emerging powers and major
donors is needed to sustain their cooperation
and financing for institutional
investments and for UNSC resolutions.
The United States would send a strong
signal to emerging powers if in 2009 it
announced its commitment to UNSC
reform and articulated a credible pathway
forward. By doing so, it would also
re-assert its leadership at the UN.
Seats in the Security Council should
not simply be a reflection of power,
but should be an inducement towards
responsibility. Linking new seats to contributions
to international peace and
security would send a strong signal.
Expansion should also deal with concerns
about a loss of the Council’s efficiency.
The smallest possible expansion
that can meet the goal of rebalancing
and legitimating the Security Council
must be pursued.
22
First, the P5 should agree to an expansion
from the current base of 15 to 21
seats. The General Assembly would
elect the new members for six to ten
year terms based on criteria including:
financial contributions to the UN and
larger contributions to international
peace and security, including at a regional
level. The criteria for election
could be pre-negotiated by the G16
(or the countries that would constitute
it if its creation lags) and then
debated within the UNSC and General
Assembly. A central feature of a viable
package would be a fixed date set for
when long-term seats are reviewed for
possible transformation into permanent
ones.
Revitalize UN Management of Security
and Development Efforts. The past
four years have seen a debate over
management reform at the UN that
has fluctuated between sterile and
politicized. At the core of the debate
has been the balance between the powers
accorded to the Secretary-General
as chief operating officer of the UN,
and the powers accorded to member
states as ‘board members.’ Of particular
concern has been the consensus
system (ironically, initiated by the
United States) by which the General
Assembly’s budget committees authorize
the UN’s budget and manage its
spending. This has degenerated into
a one-state, one-veto tool for micromanagement.
The debate needs to be refocused on
the UN’s operational roles both in
security and development. This is where
the UN most directly affects human
lives, where the UN makes the largest
investments, and where current
management reform efforts are most
lacking. While there are substantial
inefficiencies in UN headquarters, its
net budget of just over $2 billion pales
in comparison to the more than $15
billion spent in 2007 on peacekeeping
and by the UN’s development and
humanitarian agencies.12
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently
proposed an ‘accountability
initiative’ that would focus on modernizing
management performance
Some have proposed creating a League or
Concert of Democracies as a new institution
designed to strengthen security cooperation
among the world’s liberal democracies.
If the United Nations cannot be reformed,
the Concert would “provide an alternative forum
for liberal democracies to authorize collective
action, including the use of force.”14
In addition, many have argued that such a
Concert or League would create a mechanism
to mobilize support for emerging
democracies.
In MGI’s consultations across diverse regions,
we found few takers on the idea among any
states, democratic or not, whether in Europe,
Undermining U.S. and International Convergence: The Risks of a Concert/League of Democracies
Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America.
The Concert, no matter its official mandate,
would alienate China, whose cooperation is
essential for progress across other areas of
shared interest, such as climate change, terrorism
and nonproliferation. Instead of building
on international convergence, MGI interlocutors
in China said such a concept could form the
basis for a second Cold War. Policymakers in
India argued that such a club would heighten,
not reduce, international insecurity by creating
divisions rather than unifying nations, while officials
from other key states allied with the United
States privately underscored that such an institution
would be counter-productive, especially
by isolating China. Others noted that the idea
wrongly assumes that democracies would
agree on the use of force, which was clearly
refuted in the case of Iraq.
If the purpose of the Concert is to support
emerging democracies, others queried how
the Concert would differ from the existing
Community of Democracies. Among all regions
we heard that if the goal of the Concert
is even broader than authorizing the use
of force and promoting democracy, then
it would assure its irrelevance by excluding
countries (e.g., China, Egypt) crucial to solving
global threats.
We currently have multilateralism
a la carte where nations
choose among the forums that
best pursue their interests. We
need instead to restore the
legitimacy of the United Nations
and pursue UN Security
Council reform. We cannot
allow efficiency to trump
legitimacy in international
institutions—or permit the
reverse to be true.
— Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India;
MGI Advisory Group Member
23
within the UN Secretariat and improve
transparency and accountability of
the Secretariat to the member states.
It would also helpfully focus on the
accountability of member states to the
Organization—whether member states
live up to their commitments and back
mandates with resources.
The UN Ambassadors of the G16,
along with others, could commit to
supporting this initiative and extending
it to incorporate the rest of the
ten largest UN spending activities
where not already covered by the
Secretary-General’s initiative.13 The
goals should be increased effectiveness,
efficiency, and transparency in
the UN’s oversight and coordination
of dozens of complex peacekeeping
and development response efforts
worldwide. Early movement on such
reforms would help a new American
President argue with confidence for a
stronger UN role in the areas of peace
and security, and would bolster international
arguments for an expansion
of the UN’s role in development.
Strengthen Regional Organizations.
Regional organizations have played a
pioneering role in re-defining sovereignty,
developing cooperative norms
across states, serving as first-responders
to regional crises, and jointly addressing
transnational threats. Beyond the
G-16 and the United Nations, regional
organizations will play increasingly
important roles in managing and
implementing security arrangements.
Regional organizations can also make
use of their core comparative advantage—
proximity, in both physical and
political terms—to rapidly respond to
breaking crises.
Effective regional arrangements (formal
or informal) are also vital for ensuring
state compliance. Global institutions
are regulatory and normative devices,
but the diplomatic suasion and pressure
that is often required, especially in
managing escalating crises, resides
equally if not more so at the regional
level. While many threats have global
sources or causality, they are also felt
primarily at a regional level. This is
especially so for developmental and
environmental issues, as geographic
regions are frequently bound together in
common environmental or climate
systems. But it is also true of security
issues such as terrorism. Even global
phenomena like pandemics have
regional concentrations. The G16 and
the U.S. should focus concerted
attention on strengthening regional
fora as key elements of a revitalized
international security system.
The development and functions of regional
organizations around the world
vary. The Bush Administration recently
shifted towards a policy of recognizing
European security architecture as a positive
contribution to both regional and
global security—a policy that should continue.
Efforts to encourage the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization(NATO) to develop
modalities for civilian-military cooperation
should also be supported. In Africa,
the United States and the G16 should
support a ten-year capacity building
program for the African Union (AU),
particularly in the area of peace and security.
This will require multi-year legislative
commitments of financial resources
and sustained policy attention. As part of
a wider engagement strategy with Asia,
the next American President must also
focus policy attention and resources on
Asian regional security arrangements
such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN
Regional Forum, and the Six-Party Talks
to strengthen the infrastructure for cooperation
among Asian powers. The U.S.
and G16 should also support the development
of a regional architecture for the
Middle East (see track 4)—where despite
a proliferation of transnational threats
and conflict, a robust regional structure
does not exist.
The notion that the United
States and other powerful
nations understand what is
in the best interest of those
across the developing world,
or act based on these interests,
has vanished completely.
As a result, international institutions
dominated by these
nations face a serious legitimacy
gap in the eyes of the
broader global community.
— Ayo Obe
Chair of the World Movement for Democracy;
MGI Advisory Group Member
24
TRACK 3
Strategy and Capacity
Tackling Shared Threats
The central task for a 21st century
international security system is
creating cooperative arrangements to
counter the rise of threats that defy
borders and challenge sovereignty and,
at times, survival.
MGI has focused on six global challenges—
climate change, nuclear proliferation,
threats to biological security,
terrorism, conflict, and poverty and
economic instability. Each requires
near-term attention and a sustained
strategy. Different countries and regions
will prioritize different threats. In an
interdependent world, action is necessary
across this full agenda in order to
get reciprocal cooperation on any one
nation’s top priorities. In other words:
you have to cooperate with others if
you want them to cooperate with you.
The global agenda—the UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) meeting in
December 2009 to forge a new international
agreement on climate change,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) review conference in 2010, and
the combination of a global food crisis
and the failure of the latest Doha
Round meeting —put climate change,
nuclear proliferation, and global
poverty and economic instability at the
forefront of the debate.
In all these issues, both powerful and
vulnerable states are affected. In the
case of climate change, continuation
of current trends in the use of fossil
fuels would constitute a new form of
“mutually assured destruction.” There
is no doubt of the catastrophic effects
if nuclear weapons are used or fall
into the wrong hands.
This agenda must also centrally
involve actors beyond national governments.
The private sector holds
the capital and technology to solve
problems ranging from climate
change to catastrophic disease. Local
governments are leading innovators
on energy security and efforts to
combat global warming. Labor views
will be crucial to design means to
ease transitions in a global economy.
Non-governmental organizations play a
central role in advocacy and action on
key threats. Schools, universities and
centers of excellence remain leaders
in generating ideas. In today’s world,
public-private dialogue and action will
be an essential part of an international
security system for the 21st century.
The cities, power plants and
factories we build in the next
seven years will shape our
climate in mid-century. We
have to act now to price
carbon and create incentives
to change the way we use energy
and spread technology—
and thereby avert nothing less
than an existential threat to
civilization.
— Rajendra K. Pachauri
Director-General, The Energy and Resources
Institute (TERI), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2007,
Excerpt from keynote address at MGI Advisory
Group Meeting, Berlin, July 15–16th, 2008.
25
Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on
Climate Change Under UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Auspices
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change has estimated that the world has
seven years to begin the reduction of
annual greenhouse gas emissions to avoid
global temperature changes by mid-century
that would have devastating human,
environmental, and economic impacts.
Every major emitter must be party to the
agreement for it to be effective. Developed
and developing countries must partner to
design imaginative solutions to sustain
growth without the reliance on fossil fuels
that characterized the industrial revolution.
Getting there is a massive challenge given
diverse political interests: the European
Union (EU) and Japan favor binding carbon
emission targets, the United States does
not, China and India are focused on economic
growth, energy-exporting states care
about their markets, and poor developing
countries want both protection against the
impacts of climate change and investment
in modern infrastructure.
The goal must be a new agreement to
arrest global warming under the auspices of
the UNFCCC. An agreement must include
two tracks; 1) an ‘abatement track’ that
captures commitments on emissions
control; and 2) an ‘investment track’
covering conservation, technology,
rainforests and adaptation to the effects of
climate change. Ideally both tracks of such
an agreement will come together by the
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in
Copenhagen in December 2009. An
agreement on investment is within reach
and will gain support from developed and
developing countries alike who desire
access to technology, resources, and other
incentives to control emissions. Success on
the ‘abatement track’ will be far more
O P E N I N G ActI O N s :
Tackling Shared Threats
difficult: key states remain far apart on the
politics of the challenge.
Negotiations on the ‘abatement track’ could
be extended through a G16 Climate Group
(a ‘group of responsibility’ that included members
of the G16 plus other states central to
the emissions debate) that allowed for the
necessary negotiation between the major
emitters. The G16 Climate Group should be
established as a formal “Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technical Advice”—within
the UNFCCC—closing the gap between the
major emitters process and the UN process.
The Group would negotiate a global target
for 2015–2020 and commitments to pass
binding national laws to implement this target.
The G16 could accept the principle of pricing
carbon to promote conservation, spur innovation
and adopt common standards for reporting
carbon emissions. They would bring the
results of their negotiations to the UNFCCC
for wider discussion and buy-in, with the aim
of a binding agreement on emissions by 2012
or sooner as a companion to the international
agreement on investment.
Revitalize the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime
We have entered a second nuclear age where
proliferation is no longer only a problem of
states. Terrorists have sought nuclear weapons
and fissile material, while non-state actors have
created proliferation rings, selling nuclear weapons
technology and know-how. At the same
time, a combination of environmental concerns
related to global warming and the volatility of
international oil and gas markets is resurrecting
the demand for nuclear power, creating tensions
between energy needs and proliferation
concerns. In the Middle East and North Africa,
14 states either have or have declared they will
pursue some form of nuclear program.
Although the NPT has been a cornerstone of
collective security for more than 40 years, its
foundations have eroded. Without strong en-
TRACK 3
gagement with the NPT and other disarmament
treaties, the international community
does not have the moral authority to deter
states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.
Because the United States and Russia hold
the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they
play a critical role in setting the framework
for nuclear security. A coalition of former
cabinet secretaries, Shultz, Perry, and
Kissinger, and Senator Nunn has revived
U.S. bipartisan support for arms control.
Unless (nuclear weapon
states) make a serious effort
to reduce their nuclear
armaments, with concrete
measures including a CTBT,
a drastic cut in the existing
arsenal, and a fissile material
cut-off, we will not have
the moral authority to go
after those who are trying to
develop nuclear weapons…
—Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Excerpt from remarks
at MGI Advisory Group Meeting, Berlin, July
15–16th, 2008.
continued...
26
Even so, nuclear reductions have become
all the more difficult after the tense standoff
between Russia and the West after the
crisis in Georgia. Yet these tensions only reinforce
the need for the U.S. and Russia to
use arms control as a means to normalize
relations, just as in 1983 President Reagan
decided to launch the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty, START, negotiations after
the Soviets downed a Korean Airlines passenger
jet.
Russia and the United States should stand
down the alert status of nuclear forces,
pledge no-first use, negotiate strategic
arms reductions, and extend immediately
the inspection and verification provisions
to the START, which expires in December
2009. They must engage at multiple
levels on missile defense—at a minimum
bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia
Council—and thus build on the precept
of regulated missile defense established
under the now defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. To establish its credibility on disarmament,
the U.S. must also ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).15
A consensus had also begun to emerge
among nuclear experts that the United
States should declare a dramatic unilateral
reduction of nuclear weapons not needed
for deterrence or offensive purposes. While
the Russia-Georgia conflict has made a
unilateral reduction politically difficult, the
O P E N I N G ActI O N s :
Tackling Shared Threats (continued)
fundamental reality has not changed that the
United States can reduce its nuclear arsenal,
still deter against nuclear attacks, and better
advance it nonproliferation goals.
These opening steps need to be met with
equal purpose from non-nuclear weapons
states, who should endorse making the
Additional Protocol mandatory, and work with
the nuclear weapons states to develop an
international fuel bank under the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This bank would
assure nations access to nuclear fuel as long
as they observe the NPT’s provisions, and
would create a means to centralize the control
and storage of spent nuclear fuel.
Sustain Commitment to a Global Trade
Agreement
Global systems of finance and trade have created
unprecedented prosperity, yet the borderless
nature of international markets can spread
instability across countries and continents,
threatening rich and poor. The world’s most
powerful countries need resiliency in global
financial and trade systems to sustain prosperity.
The poorest countries in the world need
access to global markets to combat poverty.
The shock that emanated from Doha’s collapse
and the efforts made to avoid its failure reflect
a latent under-standing of the need to bring
poor countries into the global trade regime.
Some will argue that key players such as the
United States and Brazil should refocus
attention on regional and bilateral agreements.
However, the proliferation of bilateral
deals has made trade agreements harder
to negotiate and enforce. Moreover, the
very transnational problems on agricultural
subsides and industrial protection that have
thwarted a global agreement will continue
to prevail bilaterally and regionally.
The progress made in the 2008 negotiations
should not be lost. Pascal Lamy,
Director General of the WTO, should publish
the 18 (out of 20) agreed trade areas
from the negotiations. Even if they have
no formal legal standing, these 18 points
should be the starting point for new negotiations
rather than retreading old ground.
The principle trading partners—starting with
a G16 subgroup of trade ministers from
the United States, the European Union,
India, Brazil and China—must make clear
that they expect new trade negotiations by
2010 and not leave room for speculation.
These countries will shape the nature of the
trading regime. They must pre-negotiate on
the most contentious points, and commission
research on complex issues that have
blocked consensus. This research and
pre-negotiation on the margins of the G16
would form the basis for WTO convened
revival talks on the Doha round in late 2010
(following elections in the United States and
for the European Commission).
TRACK 3
A Continuing Agenda: Foundations
for Stability and Security
Create a Center of Excellence for
Economic Prosperity. Experience has
shown that a range of strategies—
from official development assistance
to stable financial markets to open
trade—are required to promote economic
prosperity tailored to the diverse
conditions facing the world’s poor.
Yet, no focal point exists to coordinate
analysis and measure impact. Many different
international institutions—from
the World Bank and the IMF to the UN
Development Program (UNDP)—hold
a piece of the puzzle.
The 2010 summit on the Millennium
Goals should be used as a target for
action. Well in advance, the UN
Secretary General and President of the
World Bank should propose and create
a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity
with members appointed by the heads
of the World Bank, IMF, WTO, OECD,
and the UN Development Group.
Networks should be created with top
research institutions globally to draw
on their expertise. The UN Secretary
General and the President of the World
27
Bank would appoint a prominent
international figure to head the Center,
supported by a secretariat seconded
from participating institutions.
The Center would present points of
consensus; identify causal trends on
poverty eradication; assess interrelationships
among trade, finance and development
measures in specific countries;
investigate pressures and remedies for
protectionism; and consolidate indicators
of both donor and recipient
performance. The Center would also
consolidate the vast array of existing
performance reports on MDGs and
financing into a poverty clock, a tool to
show how overall poverty rates change
over time within individual countries
and regions.16
The Center’s work would be debated
at the annual meetings of the IMF and
World Bank. G16 leaders would also
charge their development, finance
and trade ministers with completing a
comprehensive picture of progress and
problems. Findings would form the
basis of the Millenium + 10 (2010) and
Millenium + 15 (2015) Summits.
Address the Security Challenges of
the Biological Century. While we are
entering a second nuclear age, we are
at the beginning of what some are already
calling the “Biological Century.”
Discoveries in the life sciences have
the potential to reshape the worlds of
health, food production, energy, and
climate change, leading to new fuels,
heat and drought resistant food crops,
and eradication of deadly diseases. But
biotechnology’s discoveries also have a
dark side—potential immense harm
through accidental or intentional release
of designer pathogens.
We also face myriad natural biological
threats. Fifteen million people die each
year from deadly infectious diseases,
and every year new ones emerge, such
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Avian Flu. In a world of
700 million international air passengers
yearly, and almost all on flights
shorter than the incubation times of
infectious diseases, national health is
only as good as global health.
The challenge for biological security is
two-fold. First, developed and developing
countries alike benefit from a
strong global public health regime that
controls disease outbreaks and builds
local capacity to sustain the health of
citizens. Effective public health is also
crucial against the threat of bioterrorism.
Given the global diffusion of
dangerous techniques and substances,
prevention will be difficult and therefore
defenses—global and local public
health systems—must be robust.
The World Heath Organization’s
International Health Regulations
(2005) lay out state responsibilities to
strengthen national and global disease
surveillance and response. What
is needed now is full implementation
of the regulations and building local
health capacity in the developing
world. A G16 initiative, in conjunction
with key leaders from the private sector,
can ensure that when deadly infectious
disease occurs, global reaction is
swift and supports local capability. This
is a win-win opportunity for development
and security.
Second, there is the need to promote
the bright side of biotechnology and
protect against its dark side. In the
long run, a new regime for biotechnology
safety and security needs to be
created. The existing international
regime to stop biological weapons,
the Biological and Toxic Weapons
Convention, is too slow and state-
The recent food crisis is an
urgent reminder of how deeply
interrelated issues like energy,
climate change, and poverty
are. We need a robust international
architecture to effectively
tackle these threats to our
shared security and prosperity.
The MGI Project’s Plan for
Action puts forward important
and necessary steps for
strengthening the capacity of
our international frameworks
and institutions to produce
results in today’s complex
world.
— Sylvia Mathews Burwell
President, Global Development Program,
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation;
MGI Advisory Group Member
TRACK 3
28
centric to address the dark-side uses
of biotechnology. With individuals
working in tens of thousands of
industry, research, and university labs
in every part of the world, such a
regime must engage industry, science,
and the public. Intermediate steps
can help create scientific consensus
and international trust in order to spur
collective action. An Intergovernmental
Panel on Safety of Biotechnology,
akin to the body that generated
international scientific consensus
around climate change (the IPCC),
could bring scientists from around
the world to forge consensus about
the trajectory of biotechnology risks.
Increase International Investments in
Conflict Management. Fragile and conflict-
ridden states that cannot maintain
rule of law or provide for the well-being
of their citizens undermine international
order and magnify the risk
of other transnational threats such as
terrorism and deadly infectious disease.
Civil violence often crosses borders and
draws regional and international actors
into its vortex.
With a rise in attention to internal conflict
in the post Cold War period, the
international architecture for conflict
prevention and management grew by
leaps and bounds, with international
institutions such as the UN, regional
organizations such as the European
Union and African Union, and individual
states, including the United States,
UK, Canada, and India developing
capabilities for conflict response. Nearly
200,000 international peacekeepers
are deployed around the world, about
100,000 of these under the United
Nations. However, the performance
of international institutions has been
mixed and capabilities still fall short of
the challenge. If the U.S. military had
comparable limitations in resources,
support, unified doctrine and training
as UN-designated peacekeepers,
the United States would never deploy
its forces. If existing responsibilities are
to be fulfilled and new crises to be met
with adequate response, national and
multilateral capabilities will have to be
streamlined and strengthened.
A low-cost first step is investing in
capacities for mediation and preventive
diplomacy at the UN and regional
organizations to help forestall crises or
respond rapidly to them. But diplomatic
methods will frequently lead to
demand for new peacekeeping operations,
and capacity there must be
expanded. As a critical step, each G16
member could designate a part of its
armed forces and police force for international
peacekeeping, which could
be made available directly to the UN
or through regional organizations. The
goal would be 50,000 reserves supplemented
by 20,000 police. The UN
would be responsible for designating
performance standards and qualifying
training programs.
In parallel, steps must be taken to
strengthen international peacebuilding.
Peacebuilding is a complicated
endeavor that requires the integration
of traditional military peacekeeping
with civilian initiatives to address
humanitarian need, increase local
capacity to administer the rule of law,
promote reconciliation, and re-build
state functions. The G16 should support
an initiative to develop a civilian reserve
at the UN of at least 1,000 specialists
to undertake key peacebuilding tasks,
rather than relying on ad hoc deployment
through contracts and multiple
agencies and departments. The G16
and additional states with interest and
funds to devote to peacebuilding should
also commit two billion in replenishable
funds for peacebuilding to support
rapid start-up of operations. Finally, the
UN Peacebuilding Commission role
in coordinating strategic plans and the
contributions of diverse donors should
be strengthened. Between headquarters
staff of the Peacebuilding Support
Office, and in-country strategy teams in
up to five concurrent missions, this will
require approximately 150 full-time staff
members.
Establish a UN High-Commission for
Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building.
The deep unpopularity of the war in
Iraq, which was inappropriately connected
to the campaign against Al
Qaeda, has created a political context
in many countries where combating
terrorism is equated with supporting
While considerable progress
has been made in efforts
at conflict resolution, much
more has to be done to deal
with this scourge which has
caused and continues to
cause death, destruction, and
human misery as evidenced in
the tragic situations in Darfur
and Somalia.
— Salim Ahmed Salim
Former Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity;
MGI Advisory Group Member
TRACK 3
29
unpopular U.S. goals. Although many
governments continue to cooperate
with the United States on counterterrorism
objectives, they frequently
encounter significant domestic opposition.
Yet, all nations share an interest
in preventing terrorist attacks on
their own soil and internationally. The
world’s leading economies would bear
the burden if a major terrorist attack
disrupted international trade or destabilized
key financial markets.
Having been the victim of the largest
terrorist attack in history and because
of its global reach, the United States
should be the natural leader in
cooperative efforts to combat terrorism.
But to re-claim a credible lead,
the United States must shift strategy
and rhetoric away from a general ‘War
Against Terror’ and toward a specific
war against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
This will involve continuing offensive
operations in Afghanistan, including
devoting the necessary resources and
attention to that operation, as well as
sanctioning individuals and states that
support al Qaeda elsewhere.
Since 9/11, the international community
has mobilized to establish new
standards and principles for combating
terrorism, notably through the
UN Security Council, the OECD, and
Interpol. Yet, despite widespread recognition
in principle that states remain
the front line of any counter-terrorism
strategy, there is no dedicated international
capacity to help weaker states
build the capacity to combat terrorism.
A new G16 should play a catalytic
role in designing and generating
support for a UN High-Commission
for Counter-Terrorism Capacity
Building, modeled on the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
that would fill a critical gap in counterterrorism
efforts.
Following the UNHCR model, the
Commission’s board would be politically
and regionally diverse, and treaty
based. States seeking membership on
the board of the High Commission
would have to be in compliance with
UN counter-terrorism treaties and law,
creating an important lobby for continued
improvement in the counterterrorism
regime. As a UN body, its
policies and capacities could command
substantial legitimacy, especially within
states uncomfortable with the legacy of
U.S.-backed strategies.
Clockwise from top left: UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon; MGI Advisory Group Member Jan Eliasson,
Former Special Envoy to the UN Secretary-General on
Darfur; MGI Advisory Group Members Javier Solana,
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, European Union and Igor Ivanov, Former Russian
Foreign Minister; At MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin,
July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Member Wolfgang
Ischinger, Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy.
TRACK 3
30
TRACK 4
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
Focus on the Broader
Middle East
Global leaders must have confidence
that a 21st century international
security system will produce better
outcomes on the crises at the top of
their national security agendas.
Otherwise, they will not invest the
necessary resources and political effort
to cultivate global partnerships and
effective international institutions.
The broader Middle East is the most
unstable region in the world, and a
vortex of transnational threats and
interlocking crises from Lebanon to
Iran and Afghanistan. Unless crisis
response in the region is internationalized,
regional stability, global energy
supplies, and key security arrangements
such as the NPT are threatened.
The United States is neither solely
responsible for, nor solely capable of,
managing or resolving the several interlocking
crises in the broader Middle
East. Many states point to the U.S. role
in stoking regional instability, civil war
within Iraq, rising anti-Western sentiment,
and volatility of international
energy markets. However, each of the
G16 countries and much of the world
share an overriding interest in a stable
Middle East. All will be worse off if
crises in the Middle East escalate, if
terrorism spreads further, if energy
prices swing out of control, if Iraq falls
into permanent chaos, or if tensions
between the Muslim world and the
West fester or escalate. The complexity
of the challenge will require a truly
international response.
A unilateral U.S. approach has been
inadequate in the face of the region’s
complexities. Meanwhile, international
tools such as UN peacekeeping and the
IAEA’s inspections system have played
important roles in containing the region’s
crises. However, even the most
ambitious agenda for international
institutions would recognize serious
limits in this hardest of hard cases.
Neither U.S. unilateral policy nor multilateralism
as usual will suffice. The
Middle East illustrates the need to combine
U.S. leadership, the engagement
of the traditional and rising powers,
and effective institutions if crises are to
be overcome.
A peaceful, prosperous and
more stable Middle East requires
both reforming national
governance, and resolving the
Arab Israeli conflict. Ending
Israeli occupation of Palestinian
and Arab territories and establishing
a sovereign Palestinian
state, should enable sustainable
Arab Israeli reconciliation.
Reform based on an overall
strategic vision articulated by
Arabs themselves should move
their societies towards more
inclusive systems based on
respect for human rights and
the rule of law. But for peace
and reform to succeed, regional
efforts must be reinforced
with strong and even-handed
US involvement, international
partnerships, and effective
global institutions.
— Rima Khalaf Hunaidi
Chief Executive Officer, Mohammed bin Rashid
Al Maktoum Foundation; Former Assistant
Secretary-General and Director, Regional Bureau
for Arab States, UN Development Program;
MGI Advisory Group Member
31
TRACK 4
Convene a Friends Group and Plan for
an International Peacebuilding Mission
to Support the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process
The Bush Administration’s decision in
November 2007 to convene
a wider range of
interested and influential parties in Annapolis,
helped breathe life into a moribund Middle
East peace process. Keeping the process
moving forward, against the constant
temptation to move away from diplomacy in
the face of renewed violence, will be critical to
stabilizing the region.
All parties recognize that U.S. leadership
of the Middle East peace process is
necessary, but U.S. actions alone will not
suffice. The United States should establish
a “Friends Group” on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that broadens the existing Quartet
to include key members of the G16, including
Turkey. The Friends Group could help
bring Middle East peace closer by providing
encouragement, support, and occasional
pressure to move forward the peace process.
Arab and Muslim majority members
of a Friends Group could help to ensure
that Hamas accepts, or does not obstruct,
the negotiations on an agreement.
Forward movement on an Israeli-Palestinian
agreement will take place in the context of
a drastically weakened governing capacity
on the Palestinian side and likely spoilers
from both sides. The potential exists for a
credible, international, transitional administrative
and peacekeeping operation, mandated
(though not necessarily commanded)
by the United Nations, to be deployed to
help implement a peace agreement. The
Friends Group, perhaps under a joint U.S.-
Turkish lead, could begin fostering operational
plans for such a presence. The group
could help ensure the necessary political
authorization from the United Nations, as
well as the support of the League of Arab
States, and galvanize the necessary commitments
of troops and financial resources.
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Internationalizing Crisis Response in the Broader Middle East
Improve International Strategy and
Increase Investments for Afghanistan
With implications for counter-terrorism efforts,
regional stability, and the viability of international
peacebuilding support efforts, the global
stakes in the success of Afghanistan’s recovery
are enormous. For the Afghan people, this is a
moment to rebuild after almost thirty years of
war. Failure would signal that the international
community does not have the capacity to help a
fledgling democracy overcome a legacy of poverty
and terror. It would recreate a haven for the
Taliban and Al Qaeda, further erode stability in
Pakistan, and generate a massive crisis in confidence
in core international security instruments.
As of mid-2008, a stronger and more effective
international force and civilian presence
are needed in Afghanistan to break a cycle of
continued conflict and instability in the south
and east. A first prerequisite will be a combination
of adequate forces to give reconstruction
a chance, and a commitment to sustain those
forces until local capacity is stronger. After multiple
appeals, NATO countries are not likely to
increase forces further. The U.S. may be able
to redeploy some troops from Iraq. Several
European and Asian nations have participated
at low levels and are not likely to contribute
more. Moreover, many NATO and non-NATO
contributors to ISAF—with notable exceptions
like the UK and Canada—have placed
serious restrictions on the deployment of their
troops–damaging NATO’s credibility as a fighting
force. Nations will need to reconsider these
“caveats.” NATO should also pursue unprecedented
cooperation with China, perhaps first
in the area of police training, to add depth both
in numbers and in political relationships in the
sub-region. Success there could lead to wider
Chinese deployments in Afghanistan, which
could potentially free up NATO troops to redeploy
to more insecure parts of the country.
The United Nations, with unequivocal backing
from the United States and the major
European and Asian donors, must also
continued...
engage Afghan leaders on corruption. The
UN and NATO Secretaries General could
together appoint an “eminent persons
group” staffed by national and international
security, governance, and development
experts to recommend a shared Afghaninternational
framework to tackle corruption
and narcotics, while addressing the
need for alternative livelihoods.
Civilian capacity also needs to be radically
increased. The dearth of capacity in Afghan
structures requires skilled international
civilians deployed municipally to train and
support local Afghans. It means that governments
will have to hire and deploy more
civilians. The UN Special Representative
of the Secretary General could convene a
national planning exercise in Kabul with key
Afghan stakeholders and donors. Donors
will need to fund a civilian planning team
comparable to what they would expect for
a military operation.
A Political Settlement and Civilian
Surge for Iraq
Most nations want nothing to do with U.S.
policy in Iraq. They see it as an American
quagmire. Yet the entire Middle East and
much of the world would live with the consequences
of a meltdown in Iraq that would
spark a wider Sunni-Shi’a struggle, entrench
Iraq as a failed state and recruiting ground
for terrorism, exacerbate the displacement
of 4.5 million people, and further destabilize
energy markets. The meeting point between
American and international concern is regional
stability, and here there is scope for
cooperation.
The decline in violence in Iraq in 2008
creates a critical opportunity for political
stability. A starting point is endorsing
a “diplomatic surge,” undertaken through
cooperation between the United Nations
and the United States and with backing
from the G16, to reach a political settlement
32
TRACK 4
in Iraq. President Bush made evident in
his final State of the Union speech that the
United States will likely retain 130,000 to
150,000 troops in Iraq by the end of 2008.
Remove the U.S. force presence and the
chances for a conflagration are high. Keep
forces there without a political settlement
and the chances for greater resentment
and backlash against the United States are
high. The emerging lesson for the United
States has been documented repeatedly in
other conflicts: eventually there must be a
political agreement to end internal conflicts
and provide a foundation for sustainable
peace.
The G16 and other key states could exert
their influence with Iraq’s neighbors to support,
or at least not disrupt, the search for
a negotiated settlement. The United States
would need to coordinate its bilateral
military and diplomatic strategy to support
a wider peace agenda. If, by exploring a
deal among Iraqis, the UN were to call for
a peace conference such as the Bonn negotiations
for Afghanistan, the G16 states
would need to commit to provide tangible
support for a settlement. If the G16 states
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Internationalizing Crisis Response in the Broader Middle East
signal that a settlement in Iraq is a matter
of international concern, this will create a
better climate for compromise.
Regional and International Diplomacy
on Iran’s Nuclear Program
G16 states’ support to regional diplomacy
on Iraq would have an additional benefit of
engaging Iran, which could create a more
productive framework for negotiations over
its nuclear program. Although it is evident
that resolution of the current stand-off
between Iran and the Security Council
will require increased U.S. engagement in
negotiations, G16 states’ backing for a proposal
to Iran that includes civilian nuclear
power, fuel guarantees, and reprocessing
of spent fuel would underscore that such
an alternative is credible, not just a Western
ploy to deny Iran an enrichment capacity.
If Iran should continue to prove recalcitrant
in the face of UN Security Council and G16
efforts, the exercise of having worked diplomatically
through those mechanisms would
help to ensure a broad-based effort to contain
Iranian ambitions and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
A Continuing Agenda:
Internationalizing Crisis Response
Building Momentum Toward a
Regional Architecture for the Middle
East. The Annapolis Process and
Friends Group convened for the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process could serve
as the foundation for a future regional
security mechanism for the Middle East
that would provide a venue to create
patterns of cooperation among states,
reinforce borders, manage crises and
transnational threats and eventually
promote regional norms on political
reform and economic development.
Those G16 members that are part of
the Annapolis process could, with
concerted U.S. engagement, support
the diplomacy required to move forward
a regional structure. Its mandate and
structure could be based on the
Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE), which focused on
three categories of issues relevant to
the broader Middle East: border stability,
economic cooperation, and human
rights and political reform. In addition
to tackling contemporary crises, the
organization could help address broader
tensions that have arisen between the
West and the Muslim World.17
Progress towards a regional security
mechanism would depend on prior
progress on the Israeli-Palestinian,
Iraqi and Iranian crises—but prenegotiations
towards that mechanism
could constitute a significant inducement
towards settlement on these
fronts, aiding crisis-specific diplomacy.
To be effective, the effort would need
to be supported by the UN Security
Council, which could also task the
Secretary General with supporting a
regional mechanism, either through
an envoy or a regional diplomatic office.
Economic incentives from the
leading Gulf economies, Japan and
The international community
has simply been unable to
address failed states effectively.
Afghanistan exemplifies
the lack of political will
and sufficient capacity to
deal with areas of conflict …
There is little question that
building a more peaceful
Afghanistan is crucial to
global security—the only
doubt is whether the international
community can
surmount political obstacles
and summon the resources
to take on this daunting
task.
— Ashraf Ghani
Chairman of the Institute for State
Effectiveness; Former Minister of Finance for
Afghanistan; MGI Advisory Group Member
33
the European Union would add to the
prospect of success.
Improve Relations Between Islam
and the West. Misunderstanding and
distrust between Muslims and non-
Muslims have already created a divide
along religious and ethnic lines that
could dangerously split parts of the
world that desperately need to cooperate
on issues ranging from economic
stability to counterterrorism. Yet a legacy
of authoritarianism in the Middle
East, and the success of Islamist parties
in competing with the state to provide
social services, makes it likely that
competitive politics will bring Islamists
TRACK 4
to power in the short run. Conversely,
American abuses of human rights at
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, along
with phrases such as Islamic terrorism,
have created a perception that the
United States is hostile to Islam and
sees Islam as a driver of terrorism.
Consultations in the Middle East underscored
that there is a potential for
a new U.S. President to build bridges.
Muslim-majority states increasingly see
that they have an interest in a rulebased
international order. Western
leaders understand they must cooperate
with the Muslim majority states to
achieve their goals on counterterrorism
and regional security. Even with
the U.S. military surge in Iraq, success
has depended on the cooperation of
local leaders. In some cases simple
vocabulary will make a difference—
for example avoiding phrases such as
Islamic terrorism—but policy changes
are also needed, including actions MGI
has highlighted: promoting peace in
the Middle East, demonstrating respect
for international law, and avoiding double
standards on democratic principles.
Clockwise from top left: At MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008:
MGI Advisory Group Members Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University, and Vincent Maphai, Chairman, BHP Billiton, South Africa;
Top right: Francis Deng, UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide;
Middle Right: MGI Advisory Group and European Policymaker meeting at Ditchley
Park, February, 2008: from left, Jeff Gutman, Vice President and Head of Network,
Operations Policy and Country Service, The World Bank; Brett House, Senior
Macroeconomist, Earth Institute, Columbia University; MGI Advisory Group Member
Igor Ivanov, Former Russian Foreign Minister; James Kariuki, Head of Policy Planning
Staff, Foreign Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom; John McArthur, Deputy
Director, UN Millennium Project, Earth Institute, Columbia University; Bottom: MGI
Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Member
Sylvia Mathews Burwell, President, Global Development Program, The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation; Middle Left: MGI Consultations in Beijing, China: from
left, Chu Shurong, China Foreign Affairs University; MGI Co-Director Carlos Pascual;
MGI Advisory Group member Wu Jianmin, President, China Foreign Affairs University;
MGI Co-Director Stephen Stedman.
34
Management: Sequencing
and Targets of Opportunity
This agenda for action is sweeping
but unavoidable. It will require
immediate and sustained attention,
political momentum, and parallel
action to achieve results across the
diverse issues and pending crises
facing global powers.
The international community will look
first for signs that the United States
seeks genuine global partnerships.
Thus, Track 1 must begin in earnest
immediately following the election of
the new American President. Restored
American standing in the world is the
foundation for successful revitalization
of the international security system.
The rest of the world will not support
U.S. leadership on a reform agenda if
the United States does not commit to
international cooperation.
The G16’s convening power, the collective
weight of its economies and
diplomatic and military capacities, and
its combined populations would create
an unparalleled platform to catalyze
and mobilize effective international
action: a steering mechanism to navigate
the turbulence of diffuse power,
transnational threats, and the changing
distribution of power among key states.
The formation of a G16 in 2009 would
support progress on other aspects of
this action agenda such as revitalizing
other international institutions (Track
2), combating transnational threats
(Track 3), and internationalizing crisis
response (Track 4). G8 leaders must
make a concerted diplomatic push with
2009 host Italy to shape the agenda of
the 2009 meeting toward the goal of
G16 formation.
If the G16 is not formally created in 2009,
the United States and other traditional
powers should act as if the body exists and
use informal groupings to gain comparable
effects. That will put a strain on
American diplomatic capacity, but it will
pay dividends in making the U.S. diplomatic
efforts more effective.
The international agenda will also
impose a schedule of action on transnational
threats. This includes the 2009
Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change and 2010 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty review conference.
These events offer a venue to make
concrete progress on the climate change
and nuclear proliferation agendas.
Actions in the next two years will also
determine whether the Doha round of
the WTO or a successor arrangement
can be concluded. An agreement is
needed to produce a framework for
international trade that brings poor
countries into global supply chains, or
else undermines the WTO’s credibility
as a rule-setting global institution.
Finally, crises will continue. They will
remain at the top of domestic foreign
policy priorities and therefore require
immediate attention. Yet, powerful
states such as the United States will be
much more likely to achieve a political
settlement in Iraq, address the nuclear
threat in Iran, and promote stability in
Afghanistan, working with global partners
and through effective international
institutions. Progress on a wider agenda
to revitalize the international security
system and engage rising powers in cooperative
arrangements must occur in
parallel. Success on this global agenda
will not only deliver on today’s crises, it
will prevent tomorrow’s disasters.
The attached timeline represents the
global agenda for 2009 to 2012, the
first term for the next U.S. President.
These events present opportunities for
global leaders to move toward a revitalized
international order for the 21st
century. The agenda the MGI Project
has presented will continue much
farther into the future. The process of
building international capabilities to
manage transnational threats must be
dynamic—just as we would never expect
our national governments to stop
improving their governance capacities.
Yet, we cannot wait to start. The longer
the delay in new approaches and new
cooperation against mounting threats,
the harder the challenges will become
and the more trust will erode. We must
chart a shared path forward now to
manage the threats and capitalize on
the opportunities of a changed world.
TIMELINE GLOBAL AGENDA 2009–2010
TRACK 1
American Leadership
TRACK 2
International
Institutions
TRACK 3
Shared Threats
TRACK 4
Broader Middle
East
Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan Mar May July Sept Nov
2009 2010
Inauguration
State of
the Union
State of
the Union
Midterm
elections
President’s
budget due
Delayed
Iraqi Provincial
Elections
Iraqi National
Elections
NATO 60th
Anniversary
Summit
NATO Summit
Iranian
Presidential
Elections
Conference of the
Parties 15 (COP15)
UN Framework
Convention on
Climate Change
Review of the UN
Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy,
64th session of the
General Assembly
Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference
5 Year Review of the
United Nations Peace
Building Commission
G8+
Summit
Canada
G8+
Summit
Italy
United Nations
General Assembly
Millennium
Development
Summit + 10
WB/IMF
Meeting
UN General
Assembly
WB/IMF
Meeting
President’s
budget due
Afghanistan
Presidential
Elections
Afghanistan
Parliamentary
Elections
35
TIMELINE GLOBAL AGENDA 2011–2012 2012 Targets
• U.S. leadership restored on international
cooperation
• U.S. upholds commitments under
international law
• Expanded U.S. civilian toolbox for
cooperative diplomacy
• G16 to bridge effectiveness and legitimacy
• Reformed representation and mandate
of the IFIs
• Expanded and more effective UN Security
Council
• Accountability reforms in major UN bodies
• Strengthened regional organizations:
Africa and Middle East
• New climate change agreement under
UNFCCC auspices
• Revitalized nuclear non-proliferation regime
• New agreement on inclusive global trade
• Intergovernmental Panel on Biotechnology
• Increased international capacity for
sustaining peace
• UN High Commissioner for Counter
Terrorism Capacity Building
• Friends Group and international
peacebuilding effort for the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process
• A stable and sustainable peace in Afghanistan
• A political settlement in Iraq
• Diplomatic resolution to the Iranian
nuclear program
• Plans underway for Middle East regional
security mechanism
Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan Mar May July Sept Nov
2011 2012
State of
the Union
State of
the Union
10 year
anniversary
of 9/11
Proposed Iraqi timetable
for withdrawal
of U.S. combat troops
NATO
Summit
NATO
Summit
Review Conference of
the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC)
G8+
Summit
France
G8+
Summit
U.S.
G8+
Summit
U.S.
UNGA
UN General
Assembly
WB/IMF
Meeting
WB/IMF
Meeting
President’s
budget due
President’s
budget due
36
TRACK 1
TRACK 1 GOAL: America restores its standing internationally—a necessary foundation for credible U.S. leadership across this action agenda
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Deliver Consistent and Strong Messages on International Cooperation
• High-level consultations conducted to promote global dialogue
• Presidential speeches in the lead-up to the G8, UNGA, and in strategic international capitals;
message delivered on U.S. leadership to build a 21st century international security system
• U.S. shifts rhetoric away from a general GWOT and towards a specific war against
Al Qaeda and its affiliates
Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-Based System
• U.S. upholds Geneva Conventions, Convention Against Torture and other laws of war
• U.S. President closes Guantanamo and works with Congress on a
sustainable detainee policy
Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for Cooperative Diplomacy
• U.S. President commits to double the size of the foreign service within ten years
• U.S. administration works with Congress to re-write the Foreign Assistance Act to elevate development
priorities and increase the effectiveness of foreign aid delivery
TRACK 2
TRACK 2 GOAL: The legitimacy and effectiveness of key international institutions are enhanced by increasing representation of
emerging powers and re-focusing mandates toward 21st century challenges
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Create a Group of 16
• Create a new G16 to foster cooperation among the major and emerging powers; serve as
a pre-negotiating forum to forge preliminary agreements on global challenges
• Membership: G8 plus the Outreach 5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Mexico), plus Indonesia,
Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria
Restrain Use of the Veto as a Path Toward UN Security Council Reform
• As a confidence building measure, U.S. leads on voluntary veto reform at the Council on the most serious
aspect of UNSC business—authorization of the use of force, sanctions or peacekeeping operations
Reform Representation and Mandate of the International Financial Institutions
• The U.S. and Europe offer a further redistribution of shares to emerging economies and cede their
monopoly on choosing heads of the WB and IMF
• In exchange, the IMF exercises greater surveillance over the exchange rate policies of systematically
significant countries, including emerging economies; IMF leads on international negotiations to redress
global imbalances
• WB role focused to address inequality within emerging economies, climate change, and fragile and
conflict-ridden states
Expand the UN Security Council
• P5 agree to expand current base of 15 to 21 seats; General Assembly elects new members
for six to ten-year terms
• Fixed date set for when long-term seats are reviewed for possible transformation into permanent ones
Strengthen Regional Organizations
• G16 support for a 10-year capacity building program for the AU
• U.S. President invests in Asian regional security arrangements
• G16 support regional security mechanism for the Middle East
• U.S. continues concerted engagement with EU security arrangements, including promoting
EU/NATO cooperation
37
TRACK 3
TRACK 3 GOAL: Utilize enhanced international cooperation and international institutions to tackle key global threats
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on Climate Change Under UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) auspices
• Track 1 is emissions abatement: major emitters agree on global 2020 and 2050 emissions targets,
price carbon, and legislate/coordinate national measures
• Track 2 is investment: investment in technology, adaptation, and rainforests to manage the impacts
of climate change on the developing world
• Negotiations led through a G16 climate group under UNFCCC auspices
Revitalize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
• Nuclear states re-pledge commitment to disarmament: initiate a joint study of reducing their nuclear
weapons to zero
• Russia and the U.S. stand down the alert status of nuclear forces, pledge no-first use, extend inspection
and verification provisions to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), negotiate arms reductions
• U.S. President begins efforts toward U.S. ratification of CTBT
• Non-nuclear states endorse making the Additional Protocol mandatory
• All states work toward an international fuel bank under the International Atomic Energy Agency
Sustain Commitment to Global Trade
• Director of the WTO publishes the 18 (out of 20) trade agreements from the latest round of Doha
negotiations as a foundation for future efforts
• The principle WTO trading partners—starting with G16 trade ministers—conclude a trade round
focused on developing countries
Create a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity
• UN Secretary General and President of the World Bank create a Center of Excellence for Economic
Prosperity with members appointed by heads of relevant international institutions; networks created
with top research institutions globally
• Center consolidates existing performance reports on MDGs and financing into a poverty clock to show
how overall poverty rates change across countries/regions. Center’s work is debated at the annual meetings
of the IMF and WB; Finding form the basis of the Millennium + 10 (2010) and + 15 (2015) Summits
Strengthen Response to Biological Threats
• Initiate an effort to build local public health capacity to achieve full implementation of the International
Health Regulations (2005)
• Develop an intergovernmental panel on biotechnology to forge scientific consensus on the dangers and
benefits of biotechnology
Increase International Investments in Conflict Management
• Member states increase investments in UN capacities for mediation and preventive diplomacy at the
UN and regional organizations
• G16 designate a part of their armed forces for international peacekeeping with a goal of 50,000 reserves.
This should be supplemented by 20,000 police and rule-of-law specialists
• G16 plus key states with an interest/funds commit two billion in funding for peacebuilding to support
rapid start-up at the UN; UN Peacebuilding Commission strengthened to develop strategic plans and
coordinate operations
Establish a UN High Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building
• G16 plays a catalytic role in designing and generating support for a new High Commission for Counter-
Terrorism Capacity Building to focus international efforts to build counter-terrorism norms and capacity
TRACK 4
TRACK 4 GOAL: Internationalize crisis response in the broader Middle East to address regional conflict and transnational threats
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Continue the Annapolis Process
• U.S. promotes a “Friends Group” that broadens the Quartet to include key G16 members that can
exert leverage to reach agreement
• Parties and Friends Group plan for a credible, international peacekeeping operation to be deployed
to implement a future agreement
Improve International Strategy and Increase Investments for Afghanistan
• Seek further troop commitments to secure volatile regions
• UN and NATO Secretaries General appoint an eminent persons group to initiate an Afghan-international
framework to tackle corruption
• UN Special Representative of the Secretary General convenes a national planning exercise to build
civilian capacity
Support for a Political Settlement and Civilian Surge for Iraq
• UN and U.S. cooperate on a diplomatic surge for Iraq to reach a political settlement, including
investments in diplomatic and development personnel
• G16 support political settlement by exerting influence on Iraq’s neighbors and providing political
impetus for a peace agreement
Sustain Regional and International Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Program
• G16 backing for a proposal to Iran that includes civilian nuclear power, fuel guarantees, and
reprocessing of spent fuel in exchange for negotiations on its nuclear program
Build Momentum Toward a Regional Architecture for the Middle East
• Friends Group convened for Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as the foundation for a future regional
security mechanism for the Middle East
• Middle East regional mechanism provides a venue to encourage cooperation, reinforce borders,
manage crisis and transnational threats, and eventually promote regional norms on political reform
and development
• Regional organization development is supported by a UN envoy or regional diplomatic office and
economic incentives from Gulf countries, Japan, and the European Union
Improve Relations Between Islam and the West
• West focuses on messages that build bridges rather than alienate, including avoiding phrases such
as Islamic terrorism
• U.S. focuses on respect for international law, and avoiding double standards on democratic principles
in the Muslim world
38
39
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
GWOT Global War on Terror
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
G8 Group of Eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
GEF Global Environment Facility
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFI International Financial Institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
MDG Millennium Development Goal
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC U.S. National Security Council
Outreach 5 Five developing nations invited by the G8
participate in selected portions of the G8 meetings: Brazil,
China, India, Mexico South Africa. Also known as G8+5.
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
United Nations
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
P5 Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council
RDB Regional Development Bank
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN United Nations
UNDESA The United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping
Operations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary General
US DOS United States Department of State
US DOE United States Department of Energy
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank, or World Bank Group (WBG)
WFP World Food Program, United Nations
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
Appendix:
Acronym List
40
Appendix:
End Notes
1. David Dollar, “Poverty, Inequality
and Social Disparities During China’s
Economic Reform,” World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4253,
World Bank, June 2007.
2. Francis Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro,
Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild,
and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty
as Responsibility (The Brookings
Institution, Washington D.C., 1996).
Deng, an African statesman, first enunciated
the concept of sovereignty as
responsibility in 1993 in the context of
protection of civilians during humanitarian
emergency and in fragile and
conflict-ridden states.
3. “New Consensus Emerging on Value
of Forging Global Partnerships to
Enhance Security, Reduce Foreign Oil
Dependence, Address Climate Change”
United Nations Foundation and Better
World Campaign, Public Concern Poll
2008, http://www.betterworldcampaign.
org/news-room/press-releases/us-reject-
go-it-alone.html
4. Pew Research Center Global Attitudes
Poll 2008 “More See America’s Loss
of Global Respect as Major Problem”
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_
detail.aspx?id=298
5. One option that has been proposed
by legal experts is a National Security
Court whose architecture incorporates
a fair and robust due process system
thereby garnering broader legitimacy
than our current patchwork system.
Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War
(The Penguin Press, New York, 2008),
164–166.
6. Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2009 http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2009/
7. Steven Kosiak, “FY 2009 Request
Would Bring DoD Budget to Record
(Or Near-Record) Levels,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Update, February 4, 2008. http://
www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/U.20080204.FY_2009_
Request/U.20080204.FY_2009_Request.
pdf.
8. “Total Net ODA in 2007, USD million,
preliminary estimates”, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and
Development, http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/27/34/40381949.xls.
9. Brookings–CSIS Taskforce, Transforming
Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century,
Executive Recommendations, p. 4, (June
22, 2006).
10. The Modernizing Foreign Assistance
Network, New Day, New Way: U.S.
Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century,
June 1, 2008; Craig Cohen and Noam
Unger, “Surveying the Civilian Reform
Landscape,” The Stanley Foundation
Project Brief, 2008.
11. Wayne M. Morrison and Michael
F. Martin, “How Large is China’s
Economy? Does it Matter?” CRS Report
for Congress, February 13 (2008).
12. United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, “Financing
of United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations”, UN documents
A/C.5/61/18 and A/C.5/62/23 (July
2007) http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/contributors/financing.html;
World Food Programme: “Resource,
Financial and Budgetary Matters”,
(February 2008), http://www.wfp.org/
eb/docs/2008/wfp147420~1.pdf
13. This would then cover the UN’s
peacekeeping operations, field-based
political missions, humanitarian coordination
operations—each managed from
the Secretariat—and the work of the
World Food Program, the UN
Development Program, the UN
Children’s Fund, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, the UN
Relief and Works Agency, the UN Food
and Agricultural Organization, and the
UN Environment Program—
collectively, responsible for the majority
of the UN’s field-oriented spending.
14. The Princeton Project on National
Security, “Forging a World of Liberty
Under the Law,” September 27, 2006.
15. Michael O’Hanlon, “Resurrecting
the Test Ban Treaty,” Survival 50 (1),
February–March 2008, p. 119–132.
16. The idea of a poverty clock was first
put forward by our colleague Homi
Kharas, Senior Fellow in the Global
Development Program at the Brookings
Institution.
17. Here our proposals echo similar calls
made by the Princeton Project on
National Security and a forthcoming
report by the Brookings/Council on
Foreign Relations joint Task Force on
the Middle East (November 2008).
The Princeton Project on National
Security, ibid.
Managing Global Insecurity (MGI)
Partner Institutions
The Brookings Institution
Foreign Policy
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel (202) 741-6560
Fax (202) 797-6003
www.brookings.edu/projects/mgi.aspx
New York University
Center on International
Cooperation
418 Lafayette Street, Suite 543
New York, New York 10003
Tel (212) 998-3680
Fax (212) 995-4706
Stanford University
Center for International
A Report by 2
Madeleine Albright
Principal, The Albright Group LLC;
Former U.S. Secretary of State
Richard Armitage
President, Armitage International;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Samuel Berger
Chairman, Stonebridge International;
Former U.S. National Security Advisor
Howard Berman
Representative from California,
Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee,
United States Congress
Coit D. Blacker
Director and Senior Fellow, Freeman
Spogli Institute, Stanford University;
Former Senior Director at the
National Security Council
U.S. Advisory Group Members
Sylvia Mathews Burwell
President, Global Development
Program, The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation; Former Deputy Director
of the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget
Chester A. Crocker
Professor of Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University; Former
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,
African Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger
Former U.S. Secretary of State
William Perry
Michael and Barbara Berberian
Professor and Co-Director of the
Preventive Defense Project at the
Center for International Security and
Cooperation; Senior Fellow, Freeman
Spogli Institute, Stanford University
Thomas Pickering
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations
John Podesta
President and CEO, Center for
American Progress; Former White
House Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft
President, The Scowcroft Group;
Former U.S. National Security Advisor
Abraham Sofaer
George P. Shultz Distinguished
Scholar and Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution; Former Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Department
of State
Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Timothy Wirth
President, The United Nations
Foundation; Former U.S. Senator
James D. Wolfensohn
Chairman and CEO, Wolfensohn
and Company; Former World Bank
President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso
Former President of Brazil
Jan Eliasson
Former Special Envoy to the
UN Secretary-General on Darfur;
Former Foreign Minister of Sweden
Ashraf Ghani
Chairman of the Institute for State
Effectiveness; Former Minister of
Finance for Afghanistan
Jeremy Greenstock
Director, Ditchley Foundation;
Former UK Ambassador to the UN
Rima Khalaf Hunaidi
Chief Executive Officer, Mohammed
bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation;
Former Assistant Secretary-General
and Director, Regional Bureau for
Arab States, UN Development Program
Anwar Ibrahim
Honorary President of AccountAbility;
Former Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia
Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman, Munich Conference on
Security Policy; Former German
Ambassador to the United States
Igor S. Ivanov
Former Russian Foreign Minister;
Former Secretary of the Security
Council of Russia
Wu Jianmin
President, China Foreign Affairs
University; Former Ambassador
of China to the UN
Kishore Mahbubani
Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Affairs; Former Ambassador of
Singapore to the UN
Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India
Vincent Maphai
Chairman, BHP Billiton, South Africa
Paul Martin
Former Prime Minister of Canada
Ayo Obe
Chair of the World Movement for
Democracy, Nigeria
Sadako Ogata
President, Japan International
Cooperation Agency; Former UN
High Commissioner for Refugees
Salim Ahmed Salim
Former Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity
Javier Solana
High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy,
European Union
International Advisory Group Members
3
Bruce Jones
Director and Senior Fellow
Center on International Cooperation
New York University
Carlos Pascual
Vice President and Director
Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution
Stephen John Stedman
Senior Fellow
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) Co-Directors
September 2008
We are especially indebted to MGI’s
research team–Holly Benner and
Jessie Duncan at the Brookings
Institution, Catherine Bellamy and
Richard Gowan at New York University’s
Center on International Cooperation
and Kate Chadwick at Stanford
University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation for their
instrumental role in developing the
ideas in this action plan and managing
the Project’s extensive U.S. and international
consultation agenda.
Generating This Plan for Action . 4
Executive Summary 6
International Cooperation in an Era of Transnational Threats 10
A Foundation of Responsible Sovereignty 10
The Political Moment: U.S. and International Convergence . 12
An Agenda for Action 15
Track 1. U.S. Engagement: Restoring Credible American Leadership . 16
Track 2. Power and Legitimacy: Revitalizing International Institutions 19
Track 3. Strategy and Capacity: Tackling Shared Threats 24
Track 4. Internationalizing Crisis Response: Focus on the Broader Middle East 30
Management: Sequencing and Targets of Opportunity 34
Timeline for Action 2009–2012 35
Summary of Recommendations Across Four Tracks . 37
Appendices
Acronym List . 39
Endnotes 40
CONTENTS
4
Generating this Plan for Action
The Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) Project seeks
to build international support for global institutions
and partnerships that can foster international peace and
security—and the prosperity they enable—for the next
50 years. MGI is a joint initiative among the Brookings
Institution, the Center on International Cooperation at
New York University, and the Center for International
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
Since its launch in the spring of 2007, MGI has sought
to develop its recommendations and conduct its work in
a manner best suited to address today’s most urgent
global challenges—namely, by fostering a global dialogue.
In a world where 21st century transnational
threats—from climate change to nuclear proliferation
and terrorism—require joint solutions, discussions on
these solutions must take place both inside and outside
American borders. As MGI launched this ambitious but
urgent agenda, the Project convened two advisory
groups—one American and bipartisan, and one international.
MGI’s advisors are experienced leaders with
diverse visions for how the international security system
must be transformed. They are also skilled politicians
who understand the political momentum that must
power substantive recommendations.
MGI brought these groups together for meetings in
Washington D.C., New York, Ditchley Park (UK),
Singapore, and Berlin. With their assistance, MGI also
conducted consultations with government officials,
policymakers and non-governmental organizations
across Europe and in Delhi, Beijing, Tokyo, Doha, and
Mexico City. MGI held meetings at the United Nations,
and with African and Latin American officials in
Washington D.C. and New York. On the domestic front,
MGI met with Congressional and Administration
officials as well as foreign policy advisors to the U.S.
Presidential campaigns. Ideas generated in international
consultations were tested on U.S. constituencies; ideas
generated among U.S. policymakers were sounded out
for their resonance internationally. American and
international leaders were brought together to consider
draft proposals. Through this global dialogue, the
Project sought a shared path forward.
MGI’s findings also derive from extensive research and
analysis of current global security threats and the performance
of international institutions. MGI solicited
case studies from leading regional and subject experts
that evaluated the successes and failures of international
responses to the “hard cases”—from the North Korean
nuclear threat to instability in Pakistan and state collapse
in Iraq. Both in the United States and internationally,
MGI convened experts to review the Project’s threatspecific
analyses and proposals.
Financial support for the MGI project has also been
robustly international. In addition to the Bertelsmann
Stiftung, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ditchley
Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation,
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and
UN Foundation, MGI has received funding and in-kind
support from the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and
the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. A number of
think tanks and other institutions in Japan, China and
India hosted workshops to debate the Project’s findings.
MGI is indebted to its diverse supporters.
MGI’s research and consultations provide the foundation
for the following Plan for Action, a series of policy briefs,
and MGI’s book, Power and Responsibility: International
Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (forthcoming,
Brookings Press 2009). The authors are solely responsible
for the following analysis and recommendations.
Based on MGI’s consultations, however, they are confident
this is a historic opportunity for the United States
to forge new partnerships to tackle the most pressing
problems of this century.
5
Top: MGI Advisory Group Member Sadako Ogata, President, Japan International Cooperation Agency;
Group shot: Members of the MGI Advisory Group meeting at Bertelsmann Stiftung in Berlin, Germany, July
2008; Bottom, left to right: MGI Advisory Group Member Salim Ahmed Salim, Former Secretary-General of
the Organization of African Unity; MGI Co-Directors (from left), Stephen Stedman, Senior Fellow, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director,
Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution; Bruce Jones, Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International
Cooperation, New York University.
The MGI project has consulted with field leaders and
policymakers from around the globe and across party
lines to generate discussion and debate, as well as build
consensus among diverse perspectives.
6
Executive Summary
The 21st century will be defined by
security threats unconstrained by
borders—from climate change, nuclear
proliferation, and terrorism to conflict,
poverty, disease, and economic instability.
The greatest test of global leadership
will be building partnerships and
institutions for cooperation that can
meet the challenge. Although all states
have a stake in solutions, responsibility
for a peaceful and prosperous world
will fall disproportionately to the
traditional and rising powers. The
United States most of all must provide
leadership for a global era.
U.S. domestic and international opinions
are converging around the urgent
need to build an international security
system for the 21st century. Global
leaders increasingly recognize that
alone they are unable to protect their
interests and their citizens—national
security has become interdependent
with global security.
Just as the founders of the United
Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
after World War II began with a vision
for international cooperation based
on a shared assessment of threat and
a shared notion of sovereignty, today’s
global powers must chart a new course
for today’s greatest challenges and
opportunities. International cooperation
today must be built on the principle
of responsible sovereignty, or the notion
that sovereignty entails obligations and
duties toward other states as well as to
one’s own citizens.
The US Presidential election provides
a moment of opportunity to renew
American leadership, galvanize action
against major threats, and refashion
key institutions to reflect the need for
partnership and legitimacy. Delays will
be tempting in the face of complex
threats. The siren song of unilateral action
will remain—both for the United
States and the other major powers.
To build a cooperative international
order based on responsible sovereignty,
global leaders must act across four
different tracks.
Trac k 1. U.S. Engagement: Restoring
Credible American Leadership
No other state has the diplomatic,
economic and military capacity necessary
to rejuvenate international
cooperation. But to lead, the United
States must first re-establish itself
as a good-faith partner.
Unilateral U.S. action in Iraq,
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture,
rendition, and the rhetorical association
of the Iraq war with democracy
promotion have damaged American
credibility internationally. The United
States must demonstrate its commitment
to a rule-based international
system that rejects unilateralism and
looks beyond military might. In turn,
major states will be more willing to
AGENDA FOR ACTION
VISION
An international order founded on
responsible sovereignty that delivers
global peace and prosperity for the
next 50 years.
OBJECTIVE
The next U.S. President, in partnership
with other major and emerging
powers, launches a campaign in
2009 to revitalize international
cooperation for a changed world.
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
TRACK 1
Revitalizing International
Institutions
TRACK 2
Tackling Shared Threats
TRACK 3
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
TRACK 4
7
affect their security and prosperity.
Traditional powers cannot achieve
sustainable solutions on issues from
economic stability to climate change
without the emerging powers at the negotiating
table. Global leaders should:
• Create a new Group of 16 (G16) to
foster cooperation between the G8
and Brazil, China, India, South
Africa, Mexico (the Outreach 5) and
the nations of Indonesia, Turkey,
Egypt or Nigeria. Replacing the
outdated G8, the G16 would serve
as a pre-negotiating forum to forge
preliminary agreements on major
global challenges;
• Initiate voluntary veto reform at the
UN Security Council (UNSC) as a
confidence building measure toward
UNSC reform;
• End the monopoly of the U.S.
and Europe on leadership at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank, and refocus the
IMF’s mandate to exercise surveillance
over exchange rate polices and
to facilitate the smooth unraveling of
global imbalances; and
• Strengthen regional organizations,
including a 10-year capacity building
effort for the African Union and support
for a regional security mechanism
for the Middle East.
Expansion of the UNSC would be the
most dramatic signal of commitment to
share the helm of the international system.
However, the conditions for this
are unlikely to be propitious in 2009,
and a mishandled effort could undermine
progress on other fronts. Decisive
expansion of the G8 in 2009 would lay
a credible foundation for action on
UNSC expansion within the first term
of the new U.S. President.
share the burden in resources and
expend political capital to manage
global threats. A new American
President should:
• Send his top cabinet officials for
early consultations on international
priorities with allies and the rising
powers alike;
• Deliver consistent and strong messages
on international cooperation
domestically and internationally—
including in speeches in the lead-up
to the Group of 8 (G8) and the UN
General Assembly meetings in 2009,
laying out a vision for a 21st century
security system; and
• Close the Guantanamo Detention
facility and initiate efforts toward a
more sustainable U.S. detainee
policy; and declare U.S. commitment
to uphold the Geneva Conventions,
the Convention Against Torture and
other laws of war.
Over time, the United States will also
need to dramatically upgrade its civilian
foreign policy corps, including doubling
the size of the foreign service in 10
years and re-writing the Foreign Assistance
Act to elevate development priorities
and improve aid effectiveness.
TRACK 2. Power and Legitimacy:
Revitalizing International Institutions
The legitimacy and effectiveness
of key international institutions are
enhanced by increasing representation
of emerging powers and
re-focusing mandates toward 21st
century challenges.
The leadership and mandates of key
international institutions—from the
G8 to the UN Security Council—have
not kept pace with the new powerholders
and dynamic threats of a changed
world. Emerging powers are excluded
from decision-making processes that
The aim of the MGI project is
ambitious and urgent: to
launch a new reform effort for
the global security system in
2009 … for the global system
is in serious trouble. It is simply
not capable of solving the
challenges of today. You all
know the list: terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, climate
change, pandemics, failing
states … None can be solved
by a single government alone.
— Javier Solana
High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, European Union;
MGI Advisory Group Member
8
trac k 3. Strategy and Capacity:
Tackling Shared Threats
Enhanced international cooperation
and international institutions are utilized
to manage key global threats.
The global agenda—the 2009 conference
of the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the
2010 review conference on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and global
trade pressures—demands action. In
the case of climate change, continuation
of current trends in the use of fossil
fuels would constitute a new form of
“mutually assured destruction.” There
is no doubt of the catastrophic effects
if nuclear weapons are used or fall into
the wrong hands. Global leaders should:
• Negotiate a climate change agreement
under UNFCCC auspices that
includes emission targets for 2020
and 2050 and investments in technology,
rain forests and mitigation;
• Revitalize the core bargain of the
non-proliferation regime by nuclear
weapons states, particularly the
United States and Russia, reducing
their arsenals, and by all states
endorsing the Additional Protocol
and working to develop an international
fuel bank; and
• Initiate G16 “pre-negotiations”
on an open and inclusive trade
regime to conclude a World Trade
Organization (WTO) round that
benefits poor countries.
Progress must also be made across other
key global challenges—deadly infectious
disease, the abuse of biotechnology,
regional and civil conflict, and global
terrorism. Global leaders should:
• Build local public health capacity to
achieve full implementation of the
International Health Regulations
(2005) and develop an intergovernmental
panel on biotechnology to
forge scientific consensus on the dangers
and benefits of biotechnology;
• Increase international investment in
conflict management with a goal of
50,000 international peacekeeping
reserves and two billion in funding
for peacebuilding; and
• Establish a UN High Commissioner for
Counter Terrorism Capacity Building
to focus international efforts to build
counter-terrorism norms and capacity.
trac k 4. Internationalizing Crisis
Response: Focus on the Broader
Middle East
Internationalize crisis response in
the broader Middle East to address
regional conflict and transnational
threats.
Global leaders must have confidence
that a 21st century international security
system will produce better outcomes
on the crises at the top of their national
security agendas. The Middle East is
the most unstable region in the world,
and a vortex of transnational threats.
The G16, in cooperation with leading
regional actors, can help to identify
shared interests in regional stability and
catalyze more focused international
support. Global leaders should:
• Move the Annapolis process forward
to support an Israeli-Palestinian
peace settlement;
• Commit adequate forces and civilian
capacity for a stable peace in
Afghanistan;
• Focus U.S. and international efforts
on a political settlement and civilian
surge for Iraq;
• Sustain regional and international
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program;
and
• Initiate efforts toward a regional
security arrangement for the Middle
East that could, as existing crises
eased, provide a mechanism to guarantee
borders and promote stability.
We are witnessing the early
stages of a shift of the center
of gravity of international relations
from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. A simple expansion
of the G8 is not enough—
new great powers must share
responsibility as equal partners
for setting the agenda. For its
part, China increasingly sees
that its security is closely tied
to global security. Particularly
in the area of climate change
and energy security, there is
vast scope for cooperation.
— Wu Jianmin
President, China Foreign Affairs University;
MGI Advisory Group Member
9
International Cooperation for a
Changed World
American and global leaders face a
choice: they can either use this moment
to help shape an international,
rule-based order that will protect their
global interests, or resign themselves to
an ad hoc international system where
they are increasingly powerless to
shape the course of international
affairs. The agenda for action will not
be completed in two years or ten. Yet,
we cannot wait to start. The longer
the delay in new approaches and new
cooperation against today’s threats,
the more difficult the challenges will
become. Global leaders must chart
a shared path forward that marries
power and responsibility to achieve
together what cannot be achieved
apart: peace and security in a transnational
world.
A new American President
will have to re-start a global
conversation with the world’s
traditional and emerging powers
that moves from monologue
to dialogue. Partnership and
cooperation must be the
centerpiece of successful
American leadership in
confronting 21st century
threats, where protecting U.S.
security is intimately linked
with promoting global stability.
— Thomas Pickering
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations;
MGI Advisory Group Member
10
International Cooperation in an
Era of Transnational Threats
The greatest test of global leadership
in the 21st century will be how
nations perform in the face of threats
that defy borders—from nuclear proliferation,
conflict, and climate change to
terrorism, threats to biological security,
and global poverty. Ours is now a world
where national security is interdependent
with global security.
Globalization has resulted in unprecedented
opportunities. The ability to
tap into global markets for capital,
technology and labor has allowed the
private sector to amass wealth unfathomable
50 years ago: it has helped lift
hundreds of millions out of poverty in
emerging economies. For China, integration
into the global economy has
been the driver of one of the most remarkable
stories of national progress
in human history—500 million people
have been raised out of poverty in just
thirty years.1
Yet, the forces of globalization that
have stitched the world together
and driven prosperity can also tear
it apart. In the face of new transnational
threats and profound security
interdependence, even the strongest
nations depend on the cooperation of
others to protect their own national
security. No country, including the
United States, is capable of successfully
meeting the challenges, or capitalizing
on the opportunities, of this
changed world alone. It is a world for
which we are unprepared, a world that
poses a challenge to leaders and citizens
alike to redefine their interests
and re-examine their responsibilities.
While that is true of every country,
it is especially true of the most powerful—
which must exercise the most
responsibility.
U.S. foreign policy has lagged behind
these realities. A new approach is
needed to revitalize the alliances, diplomacy,
and international institutions
central to the inseparable relationship
between national and global security.
U.S. leadership is indispensable if the
world as a whole is to be successful in
managing today’s threats. But American
leadership must be re-focused toward
partnership—continuing partnership
with allies in Europe, Asia and Latin
America, and cultivating new partnerships
with rising powers such as China,
India, Brazil and South Africa. The
policies, attitudes, and actions of major
states will have disproportionate influence
on whether the next 50 years tend
to international order or entropy. The
actions of a new U.S. President, working
with the leaders of the traditional and
rising powers, will profoundly influence
the shape of international security and
prosperity for a global age.
A Foundation of Responsible
Sovereignty
Unprecedented interdependence does
not make international cooperation
inevitable. Rather, shared interests
must be translated into a common
vision for a revitalized international
security system that benefits all.
The most pressing challenges
of this century are not constrained
by borders. Achieving
security and prosperity in
today’s interconnected world
requires greater cooperation
amongst the world’s leading
powers. The recommendations
of the Managing Global
Insecurity project provide a
vital step toward the necessary
reform of the international
security order.
— James Wolfensohn
Chairman and CEO, Wolfensohn and Company;
Former World Bank President;
MGI Advisory Group Member
11
Foresight, imagination, pragmatism
and political commitment, fueled by
effective American leadership, created
a new international era after World
War II. Institutions such as the United
Nations, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now
the World Trade Organization) contributed
to extraordinary economic
growth and helped to prevent majorpower
war. Innovation and political
engagement on the same scale are
needed to achieve security and prosperity
in the years ahead.
However, the vision necessary for a 21st
century international security system
is clouded by a mismatch between
existing post-World War II multilateral
institutions premised on traditional
sovereignty—a belief that borders are
sacrosanct and an insistence on noninterference
in domestic affairs—and
the realities of a now transnational
world where capital, technology, labor,
disease, pollution and non-state actors
traverse boundaries irrespective of the
desires of sovereign states.
The domestic burdens inflicted by
transnational threats such as poverty,
civil war, disease and environmental
degradation point in one direction:
toward cooperation with global partners
and a strengthening of international
institutions. Entering agreements or
accepting assistance is not a weakening
of sovereignty; it is the exercise of sovereignty
in order to protect it.
The MGI Project’s consultations have
informed and validated the view that
a new era of international cooperation
should be built on the principle of
responsible sovereignty: the idea that states
must take responsibility for the external
effects of their domestic actions—
that sovereignty entails obligations and
duties towards other sovereign states
as well as to one’s own citizens.2 To protect
national security, even to protect
sovereignty, states must negotiate rules
and norms to guide actions that reverberate
beyond national boundaries.
Responsible sovereignty also implies a
positive interest on the part of powerful
states to provide weaker states with the
capacity to exercise their sovereignty
responsibly—a responsibility to build.
MGI emphasizes sovereignty because
states are still the primary units of the
international system. As much as globalization
has diminished the power of
states, there is simply no alternative to
the legally defined state as the primary
actor in international affairs nor is
there any substitute for state legitimacy
in the use of force, the provision of
justice, and the regulation of public
spheres and private action.
MGI emphasizes responsibility because,
in an era of globalization, adherence
to traditional sovereignty, and deference
to individual state solutions, have failed
to produce peace and prosperity. In
a transnational world, international
cooperation is essential to give states the
means to meet the most fundamental
demands of sovereignty: to protect their
people and advance their interests.
Responsible sovereignty, in sum, is a
guidepost to a better international system.
Just as the founders of the United
Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
began with a vision for international
cooperation based on a shared assessment
of threat and a shared notion of
sovereignty, today’s global powers must
chart a new course for today’s greatest
challenges and opportunities.
Responsible sovereignty—
the idea that states must take
responsibility for external
effects of their actions—is a
brilliant new idea whose time
has come. No village can
accept a home whose actions
endanger the village. Neither
can the global village accept
the behavior of nations which
endanger the globe.
— Kishore Mahbubani
Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Affairs;
Former Ambassador of Singapore to the UN;
MGI Advisory Group Member
12
The Political Moment:U.S. and
International Convergence
A new vision for global security will
only succeed if it is powered by political
commitment and has the support
of diverse regions and influential constituencies.
International politics and
global realities are converging to make
such cooperation possible.
U.S. Interest
In the United States, MGI consultations
with policymakers and recent
polling highlight that American citizens
and American leadership across
party lines are concerned with a declining
U.S. image internationally.
In a 2007 national poll, 81% of
Americans favored a Presidential candidate
who said the United States should
“share the burden” and not be the sole
supplier of resources, finances, military
forces, and diplomacy for peace in
the world. Americans polled rejected
“going it alone,” and believed the
United States should be a global leader
and a “role model” for democracy.3
Presidential candidates have mirrored
this bipartisan public sentiment: both
major candidates have spoken out for
restoring U.S. leadership and moral
standing, viewing this as critical to the
protection of U.S. security.
The next U.S. President has the opportunity
to feature international cooperation
as the centerpiece of a strategy to
restore America’s global leadership.
Americans want their country to be
respected, they want to lead, and they
want to feel more secure as a result of
U.S. engagement.
Just as important, current global realities
leave no alternative to cooperation.
On January 20, 2009, the next
American President will inherit crises
in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North
Korea, Darfur, Pakistan, and the
Middle East. There will be many regional
and national challenges to a viable
foreign policy: the rise of India and
China, an energy-brash Russia, and an
African continent caught between new
economic opportunities and a legacy of
conflict and failed governance. The
international community will demand
action on climate change and the global
food crisis. An American recession will
TABLE 1: SEVEN REALITIES ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
For the United States For the World
In a world of new transnational dangers, the United States cannot defend
itself unilaterally against what threatens it. 1 Major and rising powers benefit from a strong United States that provides
vital global public goods.
To gain sustained cooperation on threats to U.S. security, the United States
must also address the security concerns of other nations. 2 International stability and prosperity in the next 20 years will depend heavily
on U.S. power and leadership.
Mililtary power, used in isolation, can be counterproductive in securing the
cooperation needed to ensure U.S. security. 3 America’s experience with unilateralism should be a salutary warning to
other rising powers tempted to ‘go-it-alone.’
International institutions are much more important to American security goals
than U.S. policy makers admit or the public realizes. 4 The costs of delaying revitalized international cooperation will increase over
time; it is best to engage now.
The international institutions that the United States uses daily to meet its
security needs must be strengthened or reinvented. 5 The United States will only commit itself to international norms and institutions
if it is convinced they protect U.S. interests.
American policies since 9/11 have led other states toward ‘soft balancing’:
resisting reforms of the international system perceived as beneficial to the
United States.
6
The road to a strengthened and more equitable international system requires
the engagement of all major powers, including the concerted engagement of
the United States.
If the United States wants cooperation in strengthening international institutions,
the U.S. must see them as more than tools to be used or ignored to
suit short-term political interests.
7
With greater voice and influence in the global system, new powers must
take on greater responsibility for its upkeep and health.
National sovereignty becomes
responsible sovereignty when
nations pay heed both to the
domestic demands of their
own citizens and to their international
responsibilities. Patriotism
requires internationalism.
— David Miliband
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom
Excerpt from speech to Peking University, Beijing,
February 29, 2008.
13
The next American President
will have to reintroduce America
to the world in order to
regain its trust in our purpose
as well as our power. ...The
success of [U.S.] policies and
efforts will depend not only on
the extent of our power, the
strength of our purpose and
cohesion of regional alliances,
but also by an appreciation of
great power limits.
— Chuck Hagel
U.S. Senator from Nebraska;
Excerpt from address at MGI speaker series event
at the Brookings Institution, June 26, 2008
focus attention on vulnerabilities in the
global financial system. Key U.S. allies
will seek renewed U.S. commitment to
multilateralism.
The United States cannot retreat from
this agenda any more than it can manage
it alone. America needs global
partners: to combat threats to the
American people, to wield influence
with actors such as North Korea and
Iran, to share the burden on complex
challenges, and to sustain global
systems that allow the United States
access to capital and markets critical to
economic growth in a dismal domestic
budget environment. It is in America’s
self-interest to act now, while its influence
is strong, to model leadership for
the 21st century based on the premise
of partnership and recognition of
interdependence.
Global Interest
MGI consultations in key capitals in diverse
regions—from Beijing and Delhi
to London and Doha—reinforced
that unilateral U.S. action in Iraq, and
across a range of foreign policy issues,
has cast a long shadow on America’s
standing in the world and alienated
even close allies. Key international
stakeholders are eager for strong signals
from a new U.S. administration that
it is willing to re-value global partnerships
and re-commit the United States
to a rules-based international system.
International public opinion polls
reinforce this sentiment. Of more than
24,000 people across 24 countries
surveyed in March and April 2008, a
majority expressed negative views of the
role that the United States is playing in
the world. In 14 of 24 countries, two-thirds
or more of respondents expressed little
or no confidence in President Bush to
do the right thing in world affairs. The
belief that the United States does not
take into account the interests of other
countries in formulating its foreign policy
is extensive even among U.S. allies such
as the UK and Australia and overwhelming
in the Middle East and Asia.4
Yet, internationally, most policymakers
also still recognize that there is no
prospect for international security and
prosperity in the next 20 years that
does not rely heavily on U.S. power and
leadership. The United States has the
world’s largest economy, strongest military
and broadest alliances. The world
needs the United States to use its leadership
and resources for the resolution
of transnational threats. If the United
States blocks international solutions on
issues such as climate change, nuclear
security and financial stability, sustainable
global outcomes are unachievable.
Traditional and emerging powers also
share with the United States a self-interest
in a resilient and effective international
order. Europe is the world’s most
rule-based society, yet erosion of a
rule-based international system means
that Europe is taking on commitments,
such as on carbon emissions and
foreign aid, with increasingly marginal
Crises Geopolitical global
Iraq
Iran
Afghanistan
North Korea
Middle East
Pakistan
Darfur
China
India
Africa
Russia
Latin America
Turkey
Trans-Atlantic
Asia-Pacific
Nuclear
Climate Change
Terrorism
Energy
Peace and Conflict
Poverty and
Financial Instability
On his first day in office, the next U.S. President
will face a daunting agenda — one that will be
impossible to address through unilateral action.
This agenda will contain regional crises, evolving
geopolitical dynamics and broader threats with the
potential to undermine global security. This action
plan demonstrates concrete steps for how an
American administration can leverage international
cooperation to tackle these challenges.
14
impact. Japan has a vital interest in a
stable transition in security arrangements
in Asia and globally. Leaders in
China, India and the emerging economies
recognize that their economic
growth relies on a strong and resilient
international trade and finance system.
To continue to develop its oil and gas
reserves, Russia will need international
technology, and sufficient trust from its
partners to invest in and secure transnational
pipelines. None of the traditional
or rising powers profit from unchecked
United Nations Foundation and Better World Campaign, Public Concern Poll 2008,
“New Consensus Emerging on Value of Forging Global Partnerships to Enhance
Security, Reduce Foreign Oil Dependence, Address Climate Change” http://www.
betterworldcampaign.org/news-room/press-releases/us-reject-go-it-alone.html.
More Respected v. Less Respected:
Compared with the past, would you say the United States is
more respected by other countries…less respected by other
countries…or as respected as it has been in the past?
Major Problem v. Minor Problem:
Do you think less respoect for America by other
countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
There continues to be an American consensus
that we are
less respected by other countries and this is a major problem.
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
More respected Less respected As respected
10%
20%
67%
6%
78%
15%
5%
78%
17%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
Major Problem Minor Problem Not a problem
Major Problem v. Minor Problem: Do you think less respect for
America by other countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
64%
6%
28%
76%
21%
3%
73%
23%
4%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
More respected Less respected As respected
10%
20%
67%
6%
78%
15%
5%
78%
17%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
Major Problem Minor Problem Not a problem
Major Problem v. Minor Problem: Do you think less respect for
America by other countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
64%
6%
28%
76%
21%
3%
73%
23%
4%
proliferation, or the spread of global
terrorism.
We must capitalize on momentum generated
from a convergence of global
and U.S. domestic interests to build an
international security system for the 21st
century. The case for amplified international
cooperation is not a soft-hearted
appeal to the common good but rather
a realist call to action that is demanded
both domestically and internationally.
Global governance requires simultaneously
dealing with different issues
in different ways while recognizing
and using to good effect the linkages
among them. Just as many of the
threats we face today are mutually
exacerbating, their solutions can be
mutually reinforcing. We are more
likely to make progress on specific
issues if we work on them in the
context of a broader agenda.
— Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State;
MGI Advisory Group Member
15
An Agenda for Action
During MGI consultations, U.S. and international
experts and policymakers
stressed that only through responsible
international action on transnational
threats can nations create the capacity
to defuse and ideally prevent regional
and global crises. If short-term crises
crowd out lasting reforms, nations and
policymakers will deny themselves the
tools to stem future disasters. If action
languishes, nationalistic opportunism
may provoke unilateral actions that undermine
sustainable solutions. Conflict,
isolationism, and protectionism then
become imminent threats to global
security and prosperity. Climate change
and nuclear proliferation will become
existential challenges to our planet: the
clock is already ticking.
Historically it has taken war or catastrophe
to bring about a redefinition of sovereignty
and a re-building of international order.
Our challenge is to use the urgency of
looming security challenges, and the prospect
for positive results, to drive progress.
International order will require power
to underpin responsibility. Our analysis
identified five pre-requisites: 1) effective
U.S. policy and leadership; 2) institutionalized
cooperation between the United
States and the traditional and emerging
powers; 3) negotiated understandings
of the application of responsible sovereignty
across key threat areas; 4) effective
and legitimate international institutions;
and 5) states capable of carrying out
their responsibilities toward their own
people and internationally.
We have incorporated these prerequisites
into a plan for action with four parallel
tracks: to restore U.S. standing internationally;
to revitalize international institutions;
to respond to transnational threats;
and to manage crises. We start with the
United States because American credibility
is critical for effective leadership. We
make crisis management the fourth track
to underscore that if not addressed in
tandem with the others, ad hoc solutions
will not be sustainable. The institutional
tools in track two are not ends in themselves—
they emerge from the agenda on
transnational threats. We present them
as the second track in order to apply
them in track three. Each track identifies
both opening actions to build political
momentum and a continuing agenda
to sustain the concerted engagement
required to produce results.
AGENDA FOR ACTION
VISION
An international order founded on
responsible sovereignty that delivers
global peace and prosperity for the
next 50 years.
OBJECTIVE
The next U.S. President, in partnership
with other major and emerging
powers, launches a campaign in
2009 to revitalize international
cooperation for a changed world.
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
TRACK 1
Revitalizing International
Institutions
TRACK 2
Tackling Shared Threats
TRACK 3
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
TRACK 4
16
TRACK 1
U.S. Engagement
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
Before investing political energy and
resources, other states will look
first for signs beyond rhetoric that the
United States seeks genuine global
partnerships and is committed to an
agenda for cooperative action.
Since the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. political system has vacillated in
its support for the international rule of
law and international institutions. The
United States has established itself as
sheriff and judge of the international
system but has at times neglected to
abide by the rules itself. In reality, no
country gains more from a strong international
legal regime than the United
States, precisely because the United
States has so many interests to protect.
A rule-based international system
safeguards American citizens, military
forces, and corporations.
While the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan
after 9/11 garnered widespread international
support, U.S. actions in Iraq
generated popular and political anger
against the United States both in the
region and internationally. This sentiment
has diminished the willingness
or ability of other nations to cooperate
with the United States.
The rhetorical association of the Iraq
war with democracy promotion has
further undermined American ideals
once admired globally and squandered
one of the United States’ great assets: its
reputation for protecting and promoting
human rights and the rule of law.
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, and
rendition have damaged American
credibility on human rights in large
parts of the world, especially in Muslimpopulated
countries.
U.S. engagement and leadership will
be required across many issue areas,
but first the United States must reestablish
its bona fides. The following
acts taken by the United States would
signal a willingness to re-commit to
a rule-based international order, and
look beyond military might as a primary
foreign policy tool.
I strongly believe that many of
the emerging threats the world
now faces, such as nuclear
proliferation, climate change,
and transnational terrorism,
must be met by strong U.S.
leadership and renewed
engagement with the global
community. Restoring U.S.
standing in the world and
encouraging the constructive
use of American power is
central to fostering greater
international cooperation to
counter these threats.
— Howard Berman
Representative from California,
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, United States Congress;
MGI Advisory Group Member
17
TRACK 1
Deliver Consistent and Strong
Messages on International Cooperation
The messages of the United States on the
value of international cooperation and its
commitment to global partnerships must be
consistent and strong. Style, tone and
vocabulary will make a difference. From the
outset of the administration, broad and
intense high-level consultation—by the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the
National Security Advisor, the Administrator
of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and senior ambassadors
or envoys—will signal to the international
community American dedication to
dialogue and cooperative approaches.
These high-level officials should engage
traditional and rising powers early in the
administration to gather insights on the
priorities of key states.
The new U.S. President should commit the
United States to leading efforts to revitalize
the international security system. The
President must deliver a strong message
internationally that the United States is
dedicated to global partnerships and will
uphold the rule of law, and speak to U.S.
audiences on the importance of international
cooperation to U.S. national security.
Following international and Congressional
consultations, the President should lay out
the main elements of a multi-year agenda for
key international agreements and institutions,
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Restoring Credible American Leadership
and call on global and regional leaders to
work together over the course of his term
to make decisive progress on a defined
action plan. This agenda could be set out
in speeches in the lead-up to the 2009
Group of 8 (G8) meeting in Italy, and at the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in
September 2009.
Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-
Based International System
The United States must make clear that
it will uphold the articles of the Geneva
Conventions, the Convention Against
Torture and other laws of war and reiterate
that it has no authority to torture anyone.
The President has an obligation under international
law, and with a view to reciprocity,
to prevent torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment of all prisoners, whatever
their status.
The 44th President should also immediately
announce his intention to close the
Guantanamo Detention facility and charge,
transfer, or release its approximately 270
detainees. Simultaneously, the U.S. administration
should announce an effort to develop
a sustainable detainee policy, not only for
Guantanamo but for U.S. detention facilities
worldwide. The next President must work
with Congress on a new detention framework
to address national security concerns
while providing basic legal protections.5
After years of missed opportunities
and some ill-considered
U.S. initiatives, the next Administration
inherits a complex and
challenging strategic situation.
This is compounded by...the
urgent need to revitalize and
rebuild international institutions
and to rebuild frayed or dysfunctional
relations with key
partners. The MGI project
does a masterful job of identifying
the challenges as well as
the opportunities for American
leadership...creatively weaving
together a series of critical
subject areas to be addressed
on parallel tracks.
— Chester A. Crocker
Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown
University; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State, African Affairs;
A Continuing Agenda: Restoring MGI Advisory Group Member
Credible American Leadership
Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for
Cooperative Diplomacy. The United
States needs a stronger civilian foreign
policy capacity to help restore its
international leadership and effectively
counter 21st century security threats.
Strengthened civilian tools for development
and diplomacy are critical to
combat key global challenges such
as climate change, terrorism, global
poverty and conflict. Yet, U.S. spending
on defense dwarfs civilian-side investments.
The Bush Administration’s fiscal
year 2009 budget request included
$38.3 billion to fund the civilian-side
foreign affairs and foreign aid budget.6
In comparison, the President asked
for $515 billion for the Department of
Defense’s core budget, before factoring
in the cost of waging war in Iraq and
18
Afghanistan.7 The United States is also
tied for last out of the 22 donor nations
of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in terms of international aid as a percentage
of gross national income.8
The first priority is to create the civilian
capability to understand and work with
local counterparts to address the drivers
of terrorism, proliferation, poverty,
conflict, and financial instability. This
would involve doubling the size of the
Foreign Service within ten years. U.S.
representatives on the ground, with an
understanding of local politics, culture,
history and language, are best placed
to inform policy choices. Such capacity
and flexibility requires more than the
7,000 Foreign Service officers in the
State Department and 1,000 in the U.S.
Agency for International Development
(USAID).
The very administration of foreign policy
and foreign aid must also be overhauled.
Whereas the private sector has
responded to globalization by decentralizing
operations, personnel shortages
have driven the State Department
and USAID to centralize policy and
programs in Washington while proliferating
the number of actors delivering
foreign aid. In 2008, there are
more than 50 separate units in the U.S.
government involved in aid delivery.9
The result: diminished capacity to act
locally and no systematic means to
ensure that civilian capacities are used
to their best effect to advance national
interests. The Executive Branch and
Congress must work together to conceptualize
anew the administration of
diplomacy, defense and development
to support common national security
goals. A new Foreign Assistance Act
must elevate global development as
a ‘third pillar’ of U.S. foreign policy
along with diplomacy and defense.10
TRACK 1
19
TRACK 2
Power and Legitimacy
Revitalizing International
Institutions
Rebuilding an effective international
security system will require
institutionalized venues for dialogue
and negotiation among the major
and rising powers, as well as mechanisms
to achieve buy-in and legitimacy
from a wider set of states. Neither the
membership nor decision-making
mechanisms of today’s international
institutions facilitate such a dialogue.
By 2050, the four most dynamic economies
in the world, Brazil, Russia, India,
and China, are projected to produce
40% of global output.11 Yet only two of
the four are permanent members of the
UN Security Council (UNSC) and only
Russia is a participant in the G8.
Emerging powers express intense
frustration about their lack of inclusion
in the decision-making processes that
affect their security and prosperity.
Conversely, there are fewer issues that
the G8 alone can resolve without the
participation of emerging powers. While
no individual nation wants to see itself
restrained by international norms, all
nations have an interest in seeing others
abide by a common set of rules.
If the United States and other traditional
powers seek sustainable solutions
on issues from conflict to climate
change and nuclear proliferation, they
will need to make room for these new
powers at the negotiating table. If new
powers are not integrated as partners
in the shaping of a revitalized international
security system, the enterprise has
little chance for success.
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
2005 MER 2050 MER 2005 PPP 2050 PPP
Relative size of G7 and E7 economies
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 16 May 2006
G7 GDP E7 GDP
The seven largest emerging economies, the E7, are China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. The
seven largest industrial economies, the G7, are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the
United Kingdom. Columns labeled as PPP demonstrate the scale of the economies as calculated by Purchasing
Power Parity exchange rates. Those labeled with MER were calculated using Market Exchange Rates.
The Russian incursion into Georgia in
2008, for example, reinforces rather
than diminishes the need for institutional
mechanisms that bring emerging
powers into a framework that intensifies
international checks and balances.
Some argue that the West should isolate
Russia. While there is no question that
the international community must condemn
Russia’s military action, isolation
will only spark Russian nationalism in
the short run, when Russia can afford
its truculence due to high energy prices.
Rather, the goal should be to play to
both the international community and
Russia’s long-term interests. In the long
run, Russia will need technology and
capital to sustain its energy sector and
diversify its economy. It will need access
to international markets. Bringing
Russia into a wider grouping of nations
that demonstrates these possibilities will
better encourage restraint than trying to
isolate Russia at a time when it is strong.
U.S. leadership in driving an expansion
of the UN Security Council would be
the most dramatic and effective signal of
a changed commitment to international
order. However, the conditions for this
are unlikely to be propitious in 2009,
and a mishandled effort at expansion
will do more damage than good. The
new U.S. administration should work
on parallel tracks to improve bilateral
relations with the traditional and rising
powers, including through decisive
expansion of the G8, and lay a credible
pathway towards early expansion of the
Security Council.
20
Create a Group of 16 (G16) to Bridge
Effectiveness and Legitimacy
The creation of a new G16 at the 2009 G8
summit meeting in Italy would be a bold
change to foster dynamic, cooperative
interaction between the United States and
the major and rising powers. Even if formal
inauguration of the G16 is not possible
in 2009, a core group already exists: the
G8 plus Brazil, China, India, South Africa,
and Mexico (called the “Outreach 5”). The
United States and other members of the
G8 should insist on meeting with this full
group routinely, and use this grouping to
forge consensus within the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other multilateral
fora on transnational issues. As
circumstances allow this G13 should add
Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria to
include voices from diverse regions with
significant populations and economic influence.
By 2012, when the United States
has the G8 Presidency, or preferably earlier,
the G16 should be fully established.
The G16 would represent economic,
political, and military powers from several
regions—incorporating those states whose
positive contributions and blocking powers
make them essential participants in a
wide range of international and transnational
agreements. The G16 would take the
place of the existing and outdated G8. Its
purpose would be to serve as a pre-negotiating
forum, a place where the smallest
possible grouping of necessary stakeholders
could meet to forge preliminary
agreements on responses to major global
challenges. It would be a place to build
knowledge, trust, and patterns of cooperation
among the most powerful states. The
G16 could, depending on the issue, draw on
the insights and energies of a wider range
of nations, large and small, by developing
“groups of responsibility” to tackle specific
problems.
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Revitalizing International Institutions
The G16 would also engage heads of the UN,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Word Bank,
World Trade Organization (WTO), World Health
Organization (WHO), regional organizations
and other international institutions and tap the
private and civic sectors for input. The G16
would not be an alternative to the UN or other
multilateral or regional bodies, but a vehicle to
make them more effective. It would not handle
acute threats, which should be addressed at
the UN Security Council. Informal agreements
within the G16 would be taken to more
representative bodies for discussion and
review. Like the G8, it would schedule and
conduct meetings flexibly—convening at the
Leader’s level annually, at the Foreign Ministers
level more often, and promote interaction
among G16 national security advisors, political
directors, and other officials.
Restrain Use of the Veto on the Path
Toward UN Security Council Reform
The G16 will be a critical part of an international
order based on responsible sovereignty,
but it is not a substitute for an effective and
credible UN Security Council, which must
remain at the core of the international security
system. However, an early initiative on UNSC
membership expansion would risk political
deadlock and detract attention from progress
on other issues. Three steps are needed as
interim measures on a path toward more
comprehensive reform: 1) a commitment by
permanent members to act on membership
reform within a defined time period; 2)
discussion within international forums to build
a shared definition of threat and conditions for
the use of force; and 3) action on procedural
and veto reform at the Security Council.
As a confidence building measure, the
United States should lead on voluntary veto
reform at the Council on the most serious
aspect of the Council’s business—the
authorization of the use of force, sanctions,
or peacekeeping operations. It would
substantially enhance the legitimacy of the
UNSC were the Permanent Five (P5) to
agree—informally—that they would not use
the veto to block action on these issues
unless at least two permanent members
opposed that action. This would allow the
Security Council to avoid an impasse in
responding to conflict and humanitarian
crises even if tensions arise among members.
This double veto agreement would
provide the foundation for future efforts to
improve the Council’s effectiveness and
legitimacy. The veto could still be used to
block non-operational resolutions (condemnatory,
exhortative, etc) of the kind that clog
the Council’s agenda. And in extremis—in
defense of core interests or core allies—the
veto could still be wielded.
TRACK 2
21
A Continuing Agenda: Revitalizing
International Institutions
Reform Representation and Mandate
of the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs). In order to achieve
a global system of economic governance
that reflects changes in capital, power,
and population, efforts to increase the
decision-making authority of emerging
economies in the IMF and the World
Bank must be bolstered. The stability of
the international financial system will
require stronger capacity to detect and
prevent financial crises in countries with
large capital balances that also have limited
financial transparency and experience
in crisis management. To consent
to such scrutiny, emerging markets will
want stronger representation in the IMF
and World Bank. The United States and
Europe should offer a further redistribution
of shares to emerging economies
and cede their monopoly on heading
the World Bank and IMF as part of a
package to strengthen and target the
roles of these institutions.
Forestalling future economic crises will
require the IMF to exercise transparent
and independent surveillance over the
exchange rate policies of the United
States, Europe, Japan, China, and
other systemically significant countries—
powers it has only just begun to
acquire. On financial crises such as the
sub-prime mortgage collapse, the IMF
would ideally play a preventative role,
alerting members to potential weaknesses
in the system before a crisis unfolds.
The IMF has the ability to spark
dialogue, provide in-depth analysis and
independent assessment, and serve as
an “honest broker” to bring together
the G16 and key regional groups to
redress the economic threat posed by
global imbalances.
Mandated to assist poor countries left
behind by the global economy, the
TRACK 2
If the G8 is to continue to play
an important role, it must widen
its membership to become
more representative of today’s
world. If it does not … the G8
will not only have become the
architect of its own decreasing
relevance, but global cooperation
will have lost out once
again to global competition
and the international system
will fall even further behind
the ever evolving reality of the
global landscape…The time to
share power is when you have
it to share, not when others
are in a position to wrest it
from your grip.
—Paul Martin
Former Prime Minister of Canada;
MGI Advisory Group Member
World Bank’s traditional leadership
role in global development has eroded.
Middle-income countries have other
sources of capital; poor countries have
other sources of development and technical
assistance. However, the Bank has
an important role to play in promoting
inclusive and sustainable globalization,
particularly by helping developing countries
link to the global economy, and
in helping emerging economies bridge
the divide between rich and poor within
their own borders. On climate change,
the World Bank has also emerged as a
key international player, as it has with respect
to fragile and post-conflict states:
these areas should be prioritized and
further developed in the Bank’s future
assistance efforts.
Expand the UN Security Council. The
legitimacy of the Security Council is
grounded in the Charter, but depends
as well on perceptions of whether its
decisions truly reflect global opinion.
Expansion to increase the representation
of emerging powers and major
donors is needed to sustain their cooperation
and financing for institutional
investments and for UNSC resolutions.
The United States would send a strong
signal to emerging powers if in 2009 it
announced its commitment to UNSC
reform and articulated a credible pathway
forward. By doing so, it would also
re-assert its leadership at the UN.
Seats in the Security Council should
not simply be a reflection of power,
but should be an inducement towards
responsibility. Linking new seats to contributions
to international peace and
security would send a strong signal.
Expansion should also deal with concerns
about a loss of the Council’s efficiency.
The smallest possible expansion
that can meet the goal of rebalancing
and legitimating the Security Council
must be pursued.
22
First, the P5 should agree to an expansion
from the current base of 15 to 21
seats. The General Assembly would
elect the new members for six to ten
year terms based on criteria including:
financial contributions to the UN and
larger contributions to international
peace and security, including at a regional
level. The criteria for election
could be pre-negotiated by the G16
(or the countries that would constitute
it if its creation lags) and then
debated within the UNSC and General
Assembly. A central feature of a viable
package would be a fixed date set for
when long-term seats are reviewed for
possible transformation into permanent
ones.
Revitalize UN Management of Security
and Development Efforts. The past
four years have seen a debate over
management reform at the UN that
has fluctuated between sterile and
politicized. At the core of the debate
has been the balance between the powers
accorded to the Secretary-General
as chief operating officer of the UN,
and the powers accorded to member
states as ‘board members.’ Of particular
concern has been the consensus
system (ironically, initiated by the
United States) by which the General
Assembly’s budget committees authorize
the UN’s budget and manage its
spending. This has degenerated into
a one-state, one-veto tool for micromanagement.
The debate needs to be refocused on
the UN’s operational roles both in
security and development. This is where
the UN most directly affects human
lives, where the UN makes the largest
investments, and where current
management reform efforts are most
lacking. While there are substantial
inefficiencies in UN headquarters, its
net budget of just over $2 billion pales
in comparison to the more than $15
billion spent in 2007 on peacekeeping
and by the UN’s development and
humanitarian agencies.12
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently
proposed an ‘accountability
initiative’ that would focus on modernizing
management performance
Some have proposed creating a League or
Concert of Democracies as a new institution
designed to strengthen security cooperation
among the world’s liberal democracies.
If the United Nations cannot be reformed,
the Concert would “provide an alternative forum
for liberal democracies to authorize collective
action, including the use of force.”14
In addition, many have argued that such a
Concert or League would create a mechanism
to mobilize support for emerging
democracies.
In MGI’s consultations across diverse regions,
we found few takers on the idea among any
states, democratic or not, whether in Europe,
Undermining U.S. and International Convergence: The Risks of a Concert/League of Democracies
Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America.
The Concert, no matter its official mandate,
would alienate China, whose cooperation is
essential for progress across other areas of
shared interest, such as climate change, terrorism
and nonproliferation. Instead of building
on international convergence, MGI interlocutors
in China said such a concept could form the
basis for a second Cold War. Policymakers in
India argued that such a club would heighten,
not reduce, international insecurity by creating
divisions rather than unifying nations, while officials
from other key states allied with the United
States privately underscored that such an institution
would be counter-productive, especially
by isolating China. Others noted that the idea
wrongly assumes that democracies would
agree on the use of force, which was clearly
refuted in the case of Iraq.
If the purpose of the Concert is to support
emerging democracies, others queried how
the Concert would differ from the existing
Community of Democracies. Among all regions
we heard that if the goal of the Concert
is even broader than authorizing the use
of force and promoting democracy, then
it would assure its irrelevance by excluding
countries (e.g., China, Egypt) crucial to solving
global threats.
We currently have multilateralism
a la carte where nations
choose among the forums that
best pursue their interests. We
need instead to restore the
legitimacy of the United Nations
and pursue UN Security
Council reform. We cannot
allow efficiency to trump
legitimacy in international
institutions—or permit the
reverse to be true.
— Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India;
MGI Advisory Group Member
23
within the UN Secretariat and improve
transparency and accountability of
the Secretariat to the member states.
It would also helpfully focus on the
accountability of member states to the
Organization—whether member states
live up to their commitments and back
mandates with resources.
The UN Ambassadors of the G16,
along with others, could commit to
supporting this initiative and extending
it to incorporate the rest of the
ten largest UN spending activities
where not already covered by the
Secretary-General’s initiative.13 The
goals should be increased effectiveness,
efficiency, and transparency in
the UN’s oversight and coordination
of dozens of complex peacekeeping
and development response efforts
worldwide. Early movement on such
reforms would help a new American
President argue with confidence for a
stronger UN role in the areas of peace
and security, and would bolster international
arguments for an expansion
of the UN’s role in development.
Strengthen Regional Organizations.
Regional organizations have played a
pioneering role in re-defining sovereignty,
developing cooperative norms
across states, serving as first-responders
to regional crises, and jointly addressing
transnational threats. Beyond the
G-16 and the United Nations, regional
organizations will play increasingly
important roles in managing and
implementing security arrangements.
Regional organizations can also make
use of their core comparative advantage—
proximity, in both physical and
political terms—to rapidly respond to
breaking crises.
Effective regional arrangements (formal
or informal) are also vital for ensuring
state compliance. Global institutions
are regulatory and normative devices,
but the diplomatic suasion and pressure
that is often required, especially in
managing escalating crises, resides
equally if not more so at the regional
level. While many threats have global
sources or causality, they are also felt
primarily at a regional level. This is
especially so for developmental and
environmental issues, as geographic
regions are frequently bound together in
common environmental or climate
systems. But it is also true of security
issues such as terrorism. Even global
phenomena like pandemics have
regional concentrations. The G16 and
the U.S. should focus concerted
attention on strengthening regional
fora as key elements of a revitalized
international security system.
The development and functions of regional
organizations around the world
vary. The Bush Administration recently
shifted towards a policy of recognizing
European security architecture as a positive
contribution to both regional and
global security—a policy that should continue.
Efforts to encourage the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization(NATO) to develop
modalities for civilian-military cooperation
should also be supported. In Africa,
the United States and the G16 should
support a ten-year capacity building
program for the African Union (AU),
particularly in the area of peace and security.
This will require multi-year legislative
commitments of financial resources
and sustained policy attention. As part of
a wider engagement strategy with Asia,
the next American President must also
focus policy attention and resources on
Asian regional security arrangements
such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN
Regional Forum, and the Six-Party Talks
to strengthen the infrastructure for cooperation
among Asian powers. The U.S.
and G16 should also support the development
of a regional architecture for the
Middle East (see track 4)—where despite
a proliferation of transnational threats
and conflict, a robust regional structure
does not exist.
The notion that the United
States and other powerful
nations understand what is
in the best interest of those
across the developing world,
or act based on these interests,
has vanished completely.
As a result, international institutions
dominated by these
nations face a serious legitimacy
gap in the eyes of the
broader global community.
— Ayo Obe
Chair of the World Movement for Democracy;
MGI Advisory Group Member
24
TRACK 3
Strategy and Capacity
Tackling Shared Threats
The central task for a 21st century
international security system is
creating cooperative arrangements to
counter the rise of threats that defy
borders and challenge sovereignty and,
at times, survival.
MGI has focused on six global challenges—
climate change, nuclear proliferation,
threats to biological security,
terrorism, conflict, and poverty and
economic instability. Each requires
near-term attention and a sustained
strategy. Different countries and regions
will prioritize different threats. In an
interdependent world, action is necessary
across this full agenda in order to
get reciprocal cooperation on any one
nation’s top priorities. In other words:
you have to cooperate with others if
you want them to cooperate with you.
The global agenda—the UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) meeting in
December 2009 to forge a new international
agreement on climate change,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) review conference in 2010, and
the combination of a global food crisis
and the failure of the latest Doha
Round meeting —put climate change,
nuclear proliferation, and global
poverty and economic instability at the
forefront of the debate.
In all these issues, both powerful and
vulnerable states are affected. In the
case of climate change, continuation
of current trends in the use of fossil
fuels would constitute a new form of
“mutually assured destruction.” There
is no doubt of the catastrophic effects
if nuclear weapons are used or fall
into the wrong hands.
This agenda must also centrally
involve actors beyond national governments.
The private sector holds
the capital and technology to solve
problems ranging from climate
change to catastrophic disease. Local
governments are leading innovators
on energy security and efforts to
combat global warming. Labor views
will be crucial to design means to
ease transitions in a global economy.
Non-governmental organizations play a
central role in advocacy and action on
key threats. Schools, universities and
centers of excellence remain leaders
in generating ideas. In today’s world,
public-private dialogue and action will
be an essential part of an international
security system for the 21st century.
The cities, power plants and
factories we build in the next
seven years will shape our
climate in mid-century. We
have to act now to price
carbon and create incentives
to change the way we use energy
and spread technology—
and thereby avert nothing less
than an existential threat to
civilization.
— Rajendra K. Pachauri
Director-General, The Energy and Resources
Institute (TERI), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2007,
Excerpt from keynote address at MGI Advisory
Group Meeting, Berlin, July 15–16th, 2008.
25
Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on
Climate Change Under UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Auspices
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change has estimated that the world has
seven years to begin the reduction of
annual greenhouse gas emissions to avoid
global temperature changes by mid-century
that would have devastating human,
environmental, and economic impacts.
Every major emitter must be party to the
agreement for it to be effective. Developed
and developing countries must partner to
design imaginative solutions to sustain
growth without the reliance on fossil fuels
that characterized the industrial revolution.
Getting there is a massive challenge given
diverse political interests: the European
Union (EU) and Japan favor binding carbon
emission targets, the United States does
not, China and India are focused on economic
growth, energy-exporting states care
about their markets, and poor developing
countries want both protection against the
impacts of climate change and investment
in modern infrastructure.
The goal must be a new agreement to
arrest global warming under the auspices of
the UNFCCC. An agreement must include
two tracks; 1) an ‘abatement track’ that
captures commitments on emissions
control; and 2) an ‘investment track’
covering conservation, technology,
rainforests and adaptation to the effects of
climate change. Ideally both tracks of such
an agreement will come together by the
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in
Copenhagen in December 2009. An
agreement on investment is within reach
and will gain support from developed and
developing countries alike who desire
access to technology, resources, and other
incentives to control emissions. Success on
the ‘abatement track’ will be far more
O P E N I N G ActI O N s :
Tackling Shared Threats
difficult: key states remain far apart on the
politics of the challenge.
Negotiations on the ‘abatement track’ could
be extended through a G16 Climate Group
(a ‘group of responsibility’ that included members
of the G16 plus other states central to
the emissions debate) that allowed for the
necessary negotiation between the major
emitters. The G16 Climate Group should be
established as a formal “Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technical Advice”—within
the UNFCCC—closing the gap between the
major emitters process and the UN process.
The Group would negotiate a global target
for 2015–2020 and commitments to pass
binding national laws to implement this target.
The G16 could accept the principle of pricing
carbon to promote conservation, spur innovation
and adopt common standards for reporting
carbon emissions. They would bring the
results of their negotiations to the UNFCCC
for wider discussion and buy-in, with the aim
of a binding agreement on emissions by 2012
or sooner as a companion to the international
agreement on investment.
Revitalize the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime
We have entered a second nuclear age where
proliferation is no longer only a problem of
states. Terrorists have sought nuclear weapons
and fissile material, while non-state actors have
created proliferation rings, selling nuclear weapons
technology and know-how. At the same
time, a combination of environmental concerns
related to global warming and the volatility of
international oil and gas markets is resurrecting
the demand for nuclear power, creating tensions
between energy needs and proliferation
concerns. In the Middle East and North Africa,
14 states either have or have declared they will
pursue some form of nuclear program.
Although the NPT has been a cornerstone of
collective security for more than 40 years, its
foundations have eroded. Without strong en-
TRACK 3
gagement with the NPT and other disarmament
treaties, the international community
does not have the moral authority to deter
states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.
Because the United States and Russia hold
the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they
play a critical role in setting the framework
for nuclear security. A coalition of former
cabinet secretaries, Shultz, Perry, and
Kissinger, and Senator Nunn has revived
U.S. bipartisan support for arms control.
Unless (nuclear weapon
states) make a serious effort
to reduce their nuclear
armaments, with concrete
measures including a CTBT,
a drastic cut in the existing
arsenal, and a fissile material
cut-off, we will not have
the moral authority to go
after those who are trying to
develop nuclear weapons…
—Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Excerpt from remarks
at MGI Advisory Group Meeting, Berlin, July
15–16th, 2008.
continued...
26
Even so, nuclear reductions have become
all the more difficult after the tense standoff
between Russia and the West after the
crisis in Georgia. Yet these tensions only reinforce
the need for the U.S. and Russia to
use arms control as a means to normalize
relations, just as in 1983 President Reagan
decided to launch the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty, START, negotiations after
the Soviets downed a Korean Airlines passenger
jet.
Russia and the United States should stand
down the alert status of nuclear forces,
pledge no-first use, negotiate strategic
arms reductions, and extend immediately
the inspection and verification provisions
to the START, which expires in December
2009. They must engage at multiple
levels on missile defense—at a minimum
bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia
Council—and thus build on the precept
of regulated missile defense established
under the now defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. To establish its credibility on disarmament,
the U.S. must also ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).15
A consensus had also begun to emerge
among nuclear experts that the United
States should declare a dramatic unilateral
reduction of nuclear weapons not needed
for deterrence or offensive purposes. While
the Russia-Georgia conflict has made a
unilateral reduction politically difficult, the
O P E N I N G ActI O N s :
Tackling Shared Threats (continued)
fundamental reality has not changed that the
United States can reduce its nuclear arsenal,
still deter against nuclear attacks, and better
advance it nonproliferation goals.
These opening steps need to be met with
equal purpose from non-nuclear weapons
states, who should endorse making the
Additional Protocol mandatory, and work with
the nuclear weapons states to develop an
international fuel bank under the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This bank would
assure nations access to nuclear fuel as long
as they observe the NPT’s provisions, and
would create a means to centralize the control
and storage of spent nuclear fuel.
Sustain Commitment to a Global Trade
Agreement
Global systems of finance and trade have created
unprecedented prosperity, yet the borderless
nature of international markets can spread
instability across countries and continents,
threatening rich and poor. The world’s most
powerful countries need resiliency in global
financial and trade systems to sustain prosperity.
The poorest countries in the world need
access to global markets to combat poverty.
The shock that emanated from Doha’s collapse
and the efforts made to avoid its failure reflect
a latent under-standing of the need to bring
poor countries into the global trade regime.
Some will argue that key players such as the
United States and Brazil should refocus
attention on regional and bilateral agreements.
However, the proliferation of bilateral
deals has made trade agreements harder
to negotiate and enforce. Moreover, the
very transnational problems on agricultural
subsides and industrial protection that have
thwarted a global agreement will continue
to prevail bilaterally and regionally.
The progress made in the 2008 negotiations
should not be lost. Pascal Lamy,
Director General of the WTO, should publish
the 18 (out of 20) agreed trade areas
from the negotiations. Even if they have
no formal legal standing, these 18 points
should be the starting point for new negotiations
rather than retreading old ground.
The principle trading partners—starting with
a G16 subgroup of trade ministers from
the United States, the European Union,
India, Brazil and China—must make clear
that they expect new trade negotiations by
2010 and not leave room for speculation.
These countries will shape the nature of the
trading regime. They must pre-negotiate on
the most contentious points, and commission
research on complex issues that have
blocked consensus. This research and
pre-negotiation on the margins of the G16
would form the basis for WTO convened
revival talks on the Doha round in late 2010
(following elections in the United States and
for the European Commission).
TRACK 3
A Continuing Agenda: Foundations
for Stability and Security
Create a Center of Excellence for
Economic Prosperity. Experience has
shown that a range of strategies—
from official development assistance
to stable financial markets to open
trade—are required to promote economic
prosperity tailored to the diverse
conditions facing the world’s poor.
Yet, no focal point exists to coordinate
analysis and measure impact. Many different
international institutions—from
the World Bank and the IMF to the UN
Development Program (UNDP)—hold
a piece of the puzzle.
The 2010 summit on the Millennium
Goals should be used as a target for
action. Well in advance, the UN
Secretary General and President of the
World Bank should propose and create
a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity
with members appointed by the heads
of the World Bank, IMF, WTO, OECD,
and the UN Development Group.
Networks should be created with top
research institutions globally to draw
on their expertise. The UN Secretary
General and the President of the World
27
Bank would appoint a prominent
international figure to head the Center,
supported by a secretariat seconded
from participating institutions.
The Center would present points of
consensus; identify causal trends on
poverty eradication; assess interrelationships
among trade, finance and development
measures in specific countries;
investigate pressures and remedies for
protectionism; and consolidate indicators
of both donor and recipient
performance. The Center would also
consolidate the vast array of existing
performance reports on MDGs and
financing into a poverty clock, a tool to
show how overall poverty rates change
over time within individual countries
and regions.16
The Center’s work would be debated
at the annual meetings of the IMF and
World Bank. G16 leaders would also
charge their development, finance
and trade ministers with completing a
comprehensive picture of progress and
problems. Findings would form the
basis of the Millenium + 10 (2010) and
Millenium + 15 (2015) Summits.
Address the Security Challenges of
the Biological Century. While we are
entering a second nuclear age, we are
at the beginning of what some are already
calling the “Biological Century.”
Discoveries in the life sciences have
the potential to reshape the worlds of
health, food production, energy, and
climate change, leading to new fuels,
heat and drought resistant food crops,
and eradication of deadly diseases. But
biotechnology’s discoveries also have a
dark side—potential immense harm
through accidental or intentional release
of designer pathogens.
We also face myriad natural biological
threats. Fifteen million people die each
year from deadly infectious diseases,
and every year new ones emerge, such
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Avian Flu. In a world of
700 million international air passengers
yearly, and almost all on flights
shorter than the incubation times of
infectious diseases, national health is
only as good as global health.
The challenge for biological security is
two-fold. First, developed and developing
countries alike benefit from a
strong global public health regime that
controls disease outbreaks and builds
local capacity to sustain the health of
citizens. Effective public health is also
crucial against the threat of bioterrorism.
Given the global diffusion of
dangerous techniques and substances,
prevention will be difficult and therefore
defenses—global and local public
health systems—must be robust.
The World Heath Organization’s
International Health Regulations
(2005) lay out state responsibilities to
strengthen national and global disease
surveillance and response. What
is needed now is full implementation
of the regulations and building local
health capacity in the developing
world. A G16 initiative, in conjunction
with key leaders from the private sector,
can ensure that when deadly infectious
disease occurs, global reaction is
swift and supports local capability. This
is a win-win opportunity for development
and security.
Second, there is the need to promote
the bright side of biotechnology and
protect against its dark side. In the
long run, a new regime for biotechnology
safety and security needs to be
created. The existing international
regime to stop biological weapons,
the Biological and Toxic Weapons
Convention, is too slow and state-
The recent food crisis is an
urgent reminder of how deeply
interrelated issues like energy,
climate change, and poverty
are. We need a robust international
architecture to effectively
tackle these threats to our
shared security and prosperity.
The MGI Project’s Plan for
Action puts forward important
and necessary steps for
strengthening the capacity of
our international frameworks
and institutions to produce
results in today’s complex
world.
— Sylvia Mathews Burwell
President, Global Development Program,
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation;
MGI Advisory Group Member
TRACK 3
28
centric to address the dark-side uses
of biotechnology. With individuals
working in tens of thousands of
industry, research, and university labs
in every part of the world, such a
regime must engage industry, science,
and the public. Intermediate steps
can help create scientific consensus
and international trust in order to spur
collective action. An Intergovernmental
Panel on Safety of Biotechnology,
akin to the body that generated
international scientific consensus
around climate change (the IPCC),
could bring scientists from around
the world to forge consensus about
the trajectory of biotechnology risks.
Increase International Investments in
Conflict Management. Fragile and conflict-
ridden states that cannot maintain
rule of law or provide for the well-being
of their citizens undermine international
order and magnify the risk
of other transnational threats such as
terrorism and deadly infectious disease.
Civil violence often crosses borders and
draws regional and international actors
into its vortex.
With a rise in attention to internal conflict
in the post Cold War period, the
international architecture for conflict
prevention and management grew by
leaps and bounds, with international
institutions such as the UN, regional
organizations such as the European
Union and African Union, and individual
states, including the United States,
UK, Canada, and India developing
capabilities for conflict response. Nearly
200,000 international peacekeepers
are deployed around the world, about
100,000 of these under the United
Nations. However, the performance
of international institutions has been
mixed and capabilities still fall short of
the challenge. If the U.S. military had
comparable limitations in resources,
support, unified doctrine and training
as UN-designated peacekeepers,
the United States would never deploy
its forces. If existing responsibilities are
to be fulfilled and new crises to be met
with adequate response, national and
multilateral capabilities will have to be
streamlined and strengthened.
A low-cost first step is investing in
capacities for mediation and preventive
diplomacy at the UN and regional
organizations to help forestall crises or
respond rapidly to them. But diplomatic
methods will frequently lead to
demand for new peacekeeping operations,
and capacity there must be
expanded. As a critical step, each G16
member could designate a part of its
armed forces and police force for international
peacekeeping, which could
be made available directly to the UN
or through regional organizations. The
goal would be 50,000 reserves supplemented
by 20,000 police. The UN
would be responsible for designating
performance standards and qualifying
training programs.
In parallel, steps must be taken to
strengthen international peacebuilding.
Peacebuilding is a complicated
endeavor that requires the integration
of traditional military peacekeeping
with civilian initiatives to address
humanitarian need, increase local
capacity to administer the rule of law,
promote reconciliation, and re-build
state functions. The G16 should support
an initiative to develop a civilian reserve
at the UN of at least 1,000 specialists
to undertake key peacebuilding tasks,
rather than relying on ad hoc deployment
through contracts and multiple
agencies and departments. The G16
and additional states with interest and
funds to devote to peacebuilding should
also commit two billion in replenishable
funds for peacebuilding to support
rapid start-up of operations. Finally, the
UN Peacebuilding Commission role
in coordinating strategic plans and the
contributions of diverse donors should
be strengthened. Between headquarters
staff of the Peacebuilding Support
Office, and in-country strategy teams in
up to five concurrent missions, this will
require approximately 150 full-time staff
members.
Establish a UN High-Commission for
Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building.
The deep unpopularity of the war in
Iraq, which was inappropriately connected
to the campaign against Al
Qaeda, has created a political context
in many countries where combating
terrorism is equated with supporting
While considerable progress
has been made in efforts
at conflict resolution, much
more has to be done to deal
with this scourge which has
caused and continues to
cause death, destruction, and
human misery as evidenced in
the tragic situations in Darfur
and Somalia.
— Salim Ahmed Salim
Former Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity;
MGI Advisory Group Member
TRACK 3
29
unpopular U.S. goals. Although many
governments continue to cooperate
with the United States on counterterrorism
objectives, they frequently
encounter significant domestic opposition.
Yet, all nations share an interest
in preventing terrorist attacks on
their own soil and internationally. The
world’s leading economies would bear
the burden if a major terrorist attack
disrupted international trade or destabilized
key financial markets.
Having been the victim of the largest
terrorist attack in history and because
of its global reach, the United States
should be the natural leader in
cooperative efforts to combat terrorism.
But to re-claim a credible lead,
the United States must shift strategy
and rhetoric away from a general ‘War
Against Terror’ and toward a specific
war against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
This will involve continuing offensive
operations in Afghanistan, including
devoting the necessary resources and
attention to that operation, as well as
sanctioning individuals and states that
support al Qaeda elsewhere.
Since 9/11, the international community
has mobilized to establish new
standards and principles for combating
terrorism, notably through the
UN Security Council, the OECD, and
Interpol. Yet, despite widespread recognition
in principle that states remain
the front line of any counter-terrorism
strategy, there is no dedicated international
capacity to help weaker states
build the capacity to combat terrorism.
A new G16 should play a catalytic
role in designing and generating
support for a UN High-Commission
for Counter-Terrorism Capacity
Building, modeled on the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
that would fill a critical gap in counterterrorism
efforts.
Following the UNHCR model, the
Commission’s board would be politically
and regionally diverse, and treaty
based. States seeking membership on
the board of the High Commission
would have to be in compliance with
UN counter-terrorism treaties and law,
creating an important lobby for continued
improvement in the counterterrorism
regime. As a UN body, its
policies and capacities could command
substantial legitimacy, especially within
states uncomfortable with the legacy of
U.S.-backed strategies.
Clockwise from top left: UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon; MGI Advisory Group Member Jan Eliasson,
Former Special Envoy to the UN Secretary-General on
Darfur; MGI Advisory Group Members Javier Solana,
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, European Union and Igor Ivanov, Former Russian
Foreign Minister; At MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin,
July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Member Wolfgang
Ischinger, Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy.
TRACK 3
30
TRACK 4
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
Focus on the Broader
Middle East
Global leaders must have confidence
that a 21st century international
security system will produce better
outcomes on the crises at the top of
their national security agendas.
Otherwise, they will not invest the
necessary resources and political effort
to cultivate global partnerships and
effective international institutions.
The broader Middle East is the most
unstable region in the world, and a
vortex of transnational threats and
interlocking crises from Lebanon to
Iran and Afghanistan. Unless crisis
response in the region is internationalized,
regional stability, global energy
supplies, and key security arrangements
such as the NPT are threatened.
The United States is neither solely
responsible for, nor solely capable of,
managing or resolving the several interlocking
crises in the broader Middle
East. Many states point to the U.S. role
in stoking regional instability, civil war
within Iraq, rising anti-Western sentiment,
and volatility of international
energy markets. However, each of the
G16 countries and much of the world
share an overriding interest in a stable
Middle East. All will be worse off if
crises in the Middle East escalate, if
terrorism spreads further, if energy
prices swing out of control, if Iraq falls
into permanent chaos, or if tensions
between the Muslim world and the
West fester or escalate. The complexity
of the challenge will require a truly
international response.
A unilateral U.S. approach has been
inadequate in the face of the region’s
complexities. Meanwhile, international
tools such as UN peacekeeping and the
IAEA’s inspections system have played
important roles in containing the region’s
crises. However, even the most
ambitious agenda for international
institutions would recognize serious
limits in this hardest of hard cases.
Neither U.S. unilateral policy nor multilateralism
as usual will suffice. The
Middle East illustrates the need to combine
U.S. leadership, the engagement
of the traditional and rising powers,
and effective institutions if crises are to
be overcome.
A peaceful, prosperous and
more stable Middle East requires
both reforming national
governance, and resolving the
Arab Israeli conflict. Ending
Israeli occupation of Palestinian
and Arab territories and establishing
a sovereign Palestinian
state, should enable sustainable
Arab Israeli reconciliation.
Reform based on an overall
strategic vision articulated by
Arabs themselves should move
their societies towards more
inclusive systems based on
respect for human rights and
the rule of law. But for peace
and reform to succeed, regional
efforts must be reinforced
with strong and even-handed
US involvement, international
partnerships, and effective
global institutions.
— Rima Khalaf Hunaidi
Chief Executive Officer, Mohammed bin Rashid
Al Maktoum Foundation; Former Assistant
Secretary-General and Director, Regional Bureau
for Arab States, UN Development Program;
MGI Advisory Group Member
31
TRACK 4
Convene a Friends Group and Plan for
an International Peacebuilding Mission
to Support the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process
The Bush Administration’s decision in
November 2007 to convene
a wider range of
interested and influential parties in Annapolis,
helped breathe life into a moribund Middle
East peace process. Keeping the process
moving forward, against the constant
temptation to move away from diplomacy in
the face of renewed violence, will be critical to
stabilizing the region.
All parties recognize that U.S. leadership
of the Middle East peace process is
necessary, but U.S. actions alone will not
suffice. The United States should establish
a “Friends Group” on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that broadens the existing Quartet
to include key members of the G16, including
Turkey. The Friends Group could help
bring Middle East peace closer by providing
encouragement, support, and occasional
pressure to move forward the peace process.
Arab and Muslim majority members
of a Friends Group could help to ensure
that Hamas accepts, or does not obstruct,
the negotiations on an agreement.
Forward movement on an Israeli-Palestinian
agreement will take place in the context of
a drastically weakened governing capacity
on the Palestinian side and likely spoilers
from both sides. The potential exists for a
credible, international, transitional administrative
and peacekeeping operation, mandated
(though not necessarily commanded)
by the United Nations, to be deployed to
help implement a peace agreement. The
Friends Group, perhaps under a joint U.S.-
Turkish lead, could begin fostering operational
plans for such a presence. The group
could help ensure the necessary political
authorization from the United Nations, as
well as the support of the League of Arab
States, and galvanize the necessary commitments
of troops and financial resources.
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Internationalizing Crisis Response in the Broader Middle East
Improve International Strategy and
Increase Investments for Afghanistan
With implications for counter-terrorism efforts,
regional stability, and the viability of international
peacebuilding support efforts, the global
stakes in the success of Afghanistan’s recovery
are enormous. For the Afghan people, this is a
moment to rebuild after almost thirty years of
war. Failure would signal that the international
community does not have the capacity to help a
fledgling democracy overcome a legacy of poverty
and terror. It would recreate a haven for the
Taliban and Al Qaeda, further erode stability in
Pakistan, and generate a massive crisis in confidence
in core international security instruments.
As of mid-2008, a stronger and more effective
international force and civilian presence
are needed in Afghanistan to break a cycle of
continued conflict and instability in the south
and east. A first prerequisite will be a combination
of adequate forces to give reconstruction
a chance, and a commitment to sustain those
forces until local capacity is stronger. After multiple
appeals, NATO countries are not likely to
increase forces further. The U.S. may be able
to redeploy some troops from Iraq. Several
European and Asian nations have participated
at low levels and are not likely to contribute
more. Moreover, many NATO and non-NATO
contributors to ISAF—with notable exceptions
like the UK and Canada—have placed
serious restrictions on the deployment of their
troops–damaging NATO’s credibility as a fighting
force. Nations will need to reconsider these
“caveats.” NATO should also pursue unprecedented
cooperation with China, perhaps first
in the area of police training, to add depth both
in numbers and in political relationships in the
sub-region. Success there could lead to wider
Chinese deployments in Afghanistan, which
could potentially free up NATO troops to redeploy
to more insecure parts of the country.
The United Nations, with unequivocal backing
from the United States and the major
European and Asian donors, must also
continued...
engage Afghan leaders on corruption. The
UN and NATO Secretaries General could
together appoint an “eminent persons
group” staffed by national and international
security, governance, and development
experts to recommend a shared Afghaninternational
framework to tackle corruption
and narcotics, while addressing the
need for alternative livelihoods.
Civilian capacity also needs to be radically
increased. The dearth of capacity in Afghan
structures requires skilled international
civilians deployed municipally to train and
support local Afghans. It means that governments
will have to hire and deploy more
civilians. The UN Special Representative
of the Secretary General could convene a
national planning exercise in Kabul with key
Afghan stakeholders and donors. Donors
will need to fund a civilian planning team
comparable to what they would expect for
a military operation.
A Political Settlement and Civilian
Surge for Iraq
Most nations want nothing to do with U.S.
policy in Iraq. They see it as an American
quagmire. Yet the entire Middle East and
much of the world would live with the consequences
of a meltdown in Iraq that would
spark a wider Sunni-Shi’a struggle, entrench
Iraq as a failed state and recruiting ground
for terrorism, exacerbate the displacement
of 4.5 million people, and further destabilize
energy markets. The meeting point between
American and international concern is regional
stability, and here there is scope for
cooperation.
The decline in violence in Iraq in 2008
creates a critical opportunity for political
stability. A starting point is endorsing
a “diplomatic surge,” undertaken through
cooperation between the United Nations
and the United States and with backing
from the G16, to reach a political settlement
32
TRACK 4
in Iraq. President Bush made evident in
his final State of the Union speech that the
United States will likely retain 130,000 to
150,000 troops in Iraq by the end of 2008.
Remove the U.S. force presence and the
chances for a conflagration are high. Keep
forces there without a political settlement
and the chances for greater resentment
and backlash against the United States are
high. The emerging lesson for the United
States has been documented repeatedly in
other conflicts: eventually there must be a
political agreement to end internal conflicts
and provide a foundation for sustainable
peace.
The G16 and other key states could exert
their influence with Iraq’s neighbors to support,
or at least not disrupt, the search for
a negotiated settlement. The United States
would need to coordinate its bilateral
military and diplomatic strategy to support
a wider peace agenda. If, by exploring a
deal among Iraqis, the UN were to call for
a peace conference such as the Bonn negotiations
for Afghanistan, the G16 states
would need to commit to provide tangible
support for a settlement. If the G16 states
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Internationalizing Crisis Response in the Broader Middle East
signal that a settlement in Iraq is a matter
of international concern, this will create a
better climate for compromise.
Regional and International Diplomacy
on Iran’s Nuclear Program
G16 states’ support to regional diplomacy
on Iraq would have an additional benefit of
engaging Iran, which could create a more
productive framework for negotiations over
its nuclear program. Although it is evident
that resolution of the current stand-off
between Iran and the Security Council
will require increased U.S. engagement in
negotiations, G16 states’ backing for a proposal
to Iran that includes civilian nuclear
power, fuel guarantees, and reprocessing
of spent fuel would underscore that such
an alternative is credible, not just a Western
ploy to deny Iran an enrichment capacity.
If Iran should continue to prove recalcitrant
in the face of UN Security Council and G16
efforts, the exercise of having worked diplomatically
through those mechanisms would
help to ensure a broad-based effort to contain
Iranian ambitions and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
A Continuing Agenda:
Internationalizing Crisis Response
Building Momentum Toward a
Regional Architecture for the Middle
East. The Annapolis Process and
Friends Group convened for the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process could serve
as the foundation for a future regional
security mechanism for the Middle East
that would provide a venue to create
patterns of cooperation among states,
reinforce borders, manage crises and
transnational threats and eventually
promote regional norms on political
reform and economic development.
Those G16 members that are part of
the Annapolis process could, with
concerted U.S. engagement, support
the diplomacy required to move forward
a regional structure. Its mandate and
structure could be based on the
Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE), which focused on
three categories of issues relevant to
the broader Middle East: border stability,
economic cooperation, and human
rights and political reform. In addition
to tackling contemporary crises, the
organization could help address broader
tensions that have arisen between the
West and the Muslim World.17
Progress towards a regional security
mechanism would depend on prior
progress on the Israeli-Palestinian,
Iraqi and Iranian crises—but prenegotiations
towards that mechanism
could constitute a significant inducement
towards settlement on these
fronts, aiding crisis-specific diplomacy.
To be effective, the effort would need
to be supported by the UN Security
Council, which could also task the
Secretary General with supporting a
regional mechanism, either through
an envoy or a regional diplomatic office.
Economic incentives from the
leading Gulf economies, Japan and
The international community
has simply been unable to
address failed states effectively.
Afghanistan exemplifies
the lack of political will
and sufficient capacity to
deal with areas of conflict …
There is little question that
building a more peaceful
Afghanistan is crucial to
global security—the only
doubt is whether the international
community can
surmount political obstacles
and summon the resources
to take on this daunting
task.
— Ashraf Ghani
Chairman of the Institute for State
Effectiveness; Former Minister of Finance for
Afghanistan; MGI Advisory Group Member
33
the European Union would add to the
prospect of success.
Improve Relations Between Islam
and the West. Misunderstanding and
distrust between Muslims and non-
Muslims have already created a divide
along religious and ethnic lines that
could dangerously split parts of the
world that desperately need to cooperate
on issues ranging from economic
stability to counterterrorism. Yet a legacy
of authoritarianism in the Middle
East, and the success of Islamist parties
in competing with the state to provide
social services, makes it likely that
competitive politics will bring Islamists
TRACK 4
to power in the short run. Conversely,
American abuses of human rights at
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, along
with phrases such as Islamic terrorism,
have created a perception that the
United States is hostile to Islam and
sees Islam as a driver of terrorism.
Consultations in the Middle East underscored
that there is a potential for
a new U.S. President to build bridges.
Muslim-majority states increasingly see
that they have an interest in a rulebased
international order. Western
leaders understand they must cooperate
with the Muslim majority states to
achieve their goals on counterterrorism
and regional security. Even with
the U.S. military surge in Iraq, success
has depended on the cooperation of
local leaders. In some cases simple
vocabulary will make a difference—
for example avoiding phrases such as
Islamic terrorism—but policy changes
are also needed, including actions MGI
has highlighted: promoting peace in
the Middle East, demonstrating respect
for international law, and avoiding double
standards on democratic principles.
Clockwise from top left: At MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008:
MGI Advisory Group Members Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University, and Vincent Maphai, Chairman, BHP Billiton, South Africa;
Top right: Francis Deng, UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide;
Middle Right: MGI Advisory Group and European Policymaker meeting at Ditchley
Park, February, 2008: from left, Jeff Gutman, Vice President and Head of Network,
Operations Policy and Country Service, The World Bank; Brett House, Senior
Macroeconomist, Earth Institute, Columbia University; MGI Advisory Group Member
Igor Ivanov, Former Russian Foreign Minister; James Kariuki, Head of Policy Planning
Staff, Foreign Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom; John McArthur, Deputy
Director, UN Millennium Project, Earth Institute, Columbia University; Bottom: MGI
Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Member
Sylvia Mathews Burwell, President, Global Development Program, The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation; Middle Left: MGI Consultations in Beijing, China: from
left, Chu Shurong, China Foreign Affairs University; MGI Co-Director Carlos Pascual;
MGI Advisory Group member Wu Jianmin, President, China Foreign Affairs University;
MGI Co-Director Stephen Stedman.
34
Management: Sequencing
and Targets of Opportunity
This agenda for action is sweeping
but unavoidable. It will require
immediate and sustained attention,
political momentum, and parallel
action to achieve results across the
diverse issues and pending crises
facing global powers.
The international community will look
first for signs that the United States
seeks genuine global partnerships.
Thus, Track 1 must begin in earnest
immediately following the election of
the new American President. Restored
American standing in the world is the
foundation for successful revitalization
of the international security system.
The rest of the world will not support
U.S. leadership on a reform agenda if
the United States does not commit to
international cooperation.
The G16’s convening power, the collective
weight of its economies and
diplomatic and military capacities, and
its combined populations would create
an unparalleled platform to catalyze
and mobilize effective international
action: a steering mechanism to navigate
the turbulence of diffuse power,
transnational threats, and the changing
distribution of power among key states.
The formation of a G16 in 2009 would
support progress on other aspects of
this action agenda such as revitalizing
other international institutions (Track
2), combating transnational threats
(Track 3), and internationalizing crisis
response (Track 4). G8 leaders must
make a concerted diplomatic push with
2009 host Italy to shape the agenda of
the 2009 meeting toward the goal of
G16 formation.
If the G16 is not formally created in 2009,
the United States and other traditional
powers should act as if the body exists and
use informal groupings to gain comparable
effects. That will put a strain on
American diplomatic capacity, but it will
pay dividends in making the U.S. diplomatic
efforts more effective.
The international agenda will also
impose a schedule of action on transnational
threats. This includes the 2009
Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change and 2010 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty review conference.
These events offer a venue to make
concrete progress on the climate change
and nuclear proliferation agendas.
Actions in the next two years will also
determine whether the Doha round of
the WTO or a successor arrangement
can be concluded. An agreement is
needed to produce a framework for
international trade that brings poor
countries into global supply chains, or
else undermines the WTO’s credibility
as a rule-setting global institution.
Finally, crises will continue. They will
remain at the top of domestic foreign
policy priorities and therefore require
immediate attention. Yet, powerful
states such as the United States will be
much more likely to achieve a political
settlement in Iraq, address the nuclear
threat in Iran, and promote stability in
Afghanistan, working with global partners
and through effective international
institutions. Progress on a wider agenda
to revitalize the international security
system and engage rising powers in cooperative
arrangements must occur in
parallel. Success on this global agenda
will not only deliver on today’s crises, it
will prevent tomorrow’s disasters.
The attached timeline represents the
global agenda for 2009 to 2012, the
first term for the next U.S. President.
These events present opportunities for
global leaders to move toward a revitalized
international order for the 21st
century. The agenda the MGI Project
has presented will continue much
farther into the future. The process of
building international capabilities to
manage transnational threats must be
dynamic—just as we would never expect
our national governments to stop
improving their governance capacities.
Yet, we cannot wait to start. The longer
the delay in new approaches and new
cooperation against mounting threats,
the harder the challenges will become
and the more trust will erode. We must
chart a shared path forward now to
manage the threats and capitalize on
the opportunities of a changed world.
TIMELINE GLOBAL AGENDA 2009–2010
TRACK 1
American Leadership
TRACK 2
International
Institutions
TRACK 3
Shared Threats
TRACK 4
Broader Middle
East
Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan Mar May July Sept Nov
2009 2010
Inauguration
State of
the Union
State of
the Union
Midterm
elections
President’s
budget due
Delayed
Iraqi Provincial
Elections
Iraqi National
Elections
NATO 60th
Anniversary
Summit
NATO Summit
Iranian
Presidential
Elections
Conference of the
Parties 15 (COP15)
UN Framework
Convention on
Climate Change
Review of the UN
Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy,
64th session of the
General Assembly
Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference
5 Year Review of the
United Nations Peace
Building Commission
G8+
Summit
Canada
G8+
Summit
Italy
United Nations
General Assembly
Millennium
Development
Summit + 10
WB/IMF
Meeting
UN General
Assembly
WB/IMF
Meeting
President’s
budget due
Afghanistan
Presidential
Elections
Afghanistan
Parliamentary
Elections
35
TIMELINE GLOBAL AGENDA 2011–2012 2012 Targets
• U.S. leadership restored on international
cooperation
• U.S. upholds commitments under
international law
• Expanded U.S. civilian toolbox for
cooperative diplomacy
• G16 to bridge effectiveness and legitimacy
• Reformed representation and mandate
of the IFIs
• Expanded and more effective UN Security
Council
• Accountability reforms in major UN bodies
• Strengthened regional organizations:
Africa and Middle East
• New climate change agreement under
UNFCCC auspices
• Revitalized nuclear non-proliferation regime
• New agreement on inclusive global trade
• Intergovernmental Panel on Biotechnology
• Increased international capacity for
sustaining peace
• UN High Commissioner for Counter
Terrorism Capacity Building
• Friends Group and international
peacebuilding effort for the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process
• A stable and sustainable peace in Afghanistan
• A political settlement in Iraq
• Diplomatic resolution to the Iranian
nuclear program
• Plans underway for Middle East regional
security mechanism
Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan Mar May July Sept Nov
2011 2012
State of
the Union
State of
the Union
10 year
anniversary
of 9/11
Proposed Iraqi timetable
for withdrawal
of U.S. combat troops
NATO
Summit
NATO
Summit
Review Conference of
the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC)
G8+
Summit
France
G8+
Summit
U.S.
G8+
Summit
U.S.
UNGA
UN General
Assembly
WB/IMF
Meeting
WB/IMF
Meeting
President’s
budget due
President’s
budget due
36
TRACK 1
TRACK 1 GOAL: America restores its standing internationally—a necessary foundation for credible U.S. leadership across this action agenda
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Deliver Consistent and Strong Messages on International Cooperation
• High-level consultations conducted to promote global dialogue
• Presidential speeches in the lead-up to the G8, UNGA, and in strategic international capitals;
message delivered on U.S. leadership to build a 21st century international security system
• U.S. shifts rhetoric away from a general GWOT and towards a specific war against
Al Qaeda and its affiliates
Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-Based System
• U.S. upholds Geneva Conventions, Convention Against Torture and other laws of war
• U.S. President closes Guantanamo and works with Congress on a
sustainable detainee policy
Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for Cooperative Diplomacy
• U.S. President commits to double the size of the foreign service within ten years
• U.S. administration works with Congress to re-write the Foreign Assistance Act to elevate development
priorities and increase the effectiveness of foreign aid delivery
TRACK 2
TRACK 2 GOAL: The legitimacy and effectiveness of key international institutions are enhanced by increasing representation of
emerging powers and re-focusing mandates toward 21st century challenges
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Create a Group of 16
• Create a new G16 to foster cooperation among the major and emerging powers; serve as
a pre-negotiating forum to forge preliminary agreements on global challenges
• Membership: G8 plus the Outreach 5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Mexico), plus Indonesia,
Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria
Restrain Use of the Veto as a Path Toward UN Security Council Reform
• As a confidence building measure, U.S. leads on voluntary veto reform at the Council on the most serious
aspect of UNSC business—authorization of the use of force, sanctions or peacekeeping operations
Reform Representation and Mandate of the International Financial Institutions
• The U.S. and Europe offer a further redistribution of shares to emerging economies and cede their
monopoly on choosing heads of the WB and IMF
• In exchange, the IMF exercises greater surveillance over the exchange rate policies of systematically
significant countries, including emerging economies; IMF leads on international negotiations to redress
global imbalances
• WB role focused to address inequality within emerging economies, climate change, and fragile and
conflict-ridden states
Expand the UN Security Council
• P5 agree to expand current base of 15 to 21 seats; General Assembly elects new members
for six to ten-year terms
• Fixed date set for when long-term seats are reviewed for possible transformation into permanent ones
Strengthen Regional Organizations
• G16 support for a 10-year capacity building program for the AU
• U.S. President invests in Asian regional security arrangements
• G16 support regional security mechanism for the Middle East
• U.S. continues concerted engagement with EU security arrangements, including promoting
EU/NATO cooperation
37
TRACK 3
TRACK 3 GOAL: Utilize enhanced international cooperation and international institutions to tackle key global threats
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on Climate Change Under UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) auspices
• Track 1 is emissions abatement: major emitters agree on global 2020 and 2050 emissions targets,
price carbon, and legislate/coordinate national measures
• Track 2 is investment: investment in technology, adaptation, and rainforests to manage the impacts
of climate change on the developing world
• Negotiations led through a G16 climate group under UNFCCC auspices
Revitalize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
• Nuclear states re-pledge commitment to disarmament: initiate a joint study of reducing their nuclear
weapons to zero
• Russia and the U.S. stand down the alert status of nuclear forces, pledge no-first use, extend inspection
and verification provisions to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), negotiate arms reductions
• U.S. President begins efforts toward U.S. ratification of CTBT
• Non-nuclear states endorse making the Additional Protocol mandatory
• All states work toward an international fuel bank under the International Atomic Energy Agency
Sustain Commitment to Global Trade
• Director of the WTO publishes the 18 (out of 20) trade agreements from the latest round of Doha
negotiations as a foundation for future efforts
• The principle WTO trading partners—starting with G16 trade ministers—conclude a trade round
focused on developing countries
Create a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity
• UN Secretary General and President of the World Bank create a Center of Excellence for Economic
Prosperity with members appointed by heads of relevant international institutions; networks created
with top research institutions globally
• Center consolidates existing performance reports on MDGs and financing into a poverty clock to show
how overall poverty rates change across countries/regions. Center’s work is debated at the annual meetings
of the IMF and WB; Finding form the basis of the Millennium + 10 (2010) and + 15 (2015) Summits
Strengthen Response to Biological Threats
• Initiate an effort to build local public health capacity to achieve full implementation of the International
Health Regulations (2005)
• Develop an intergovernmental panel on biotechnology to forge scientific consensus on the dangers and
benefits of biotechnology
Increase International Investments in Conflict Management
• Member states increase investments in UN capacities for mediation and preventive diplomacy at the
UN and regional organizations
• G16 designate a part of their armed forces for international peacekeeping with a goal of 50,000 reserves.
This should be supplemented by 20,000 police and rule-of-law specialists
• G16 plus key states with an interest/funds commit two billion in funding for peacebuilding to support
rapid start-up at the UN; UN Peacebuilding Commission strengthened to develop strategic plans and
coordinate operations
Establish a UN High Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building
• G16 plays a catalytic role in designing and generating support for a new High Commission for Counter-
Terrorism Capacity Building to focus international efforts to build counter-terrorism norms and capacity
TRACK 4
TRACK 4 GOAL: Internationalize crisis response in the broader Middle East to address regional conflict and transnational threats
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Continue the Annapolis Process
• U.S. promotes a “Friends Group” that broadens the Quartet to include key G16 members that can
exert leverage to reach agreement
• Parties and Friends Group plan for a credible, international peacekeeping operation to be deployed
to implement a future agreement
Improve International Strategy and Increase Investments for Afghanistan
• Seek further troop commitments to secure volatile regions
• UN and NATO Secretaries General appoint an eminent persons group to initiate an Afghan-international
framework to tackle corruption
• UN Special Representative of the Secretary General convenes a national planning exercise to build
civilian capacity
Support for a Political Settlement and Civilian Surge for Iraq
• UN and U.S. cooperate on a diplomatic surge for Iraq to reach a political settlement, including
investments in diplomatic and development personnel
• G16 support political settlement by exerting influence on Iraq’s neighbors and providing political
impetus for a peace agreement
Sustain Regional and International Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Program
• G16 backing for a proposal to Iran that includes civilian nuclear power, fuel guarantees, and
reprocessing of spent fuel in exchange for negotiations on its nuclear program
Build Momentum Toward a Regional Architecture for the Middle East
• Friends Group convened for Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as the foundation for a future regional
security mechanism for the Middle East
• Middle East regional mechanism provides a venue to encourage cooperation, reinforce borders,
manage crisis and transnational threats, and eventually promote regional norms on political reform
and development
• Regional organization development is supported by a UN envoy or regional diplomatic office and
economic incentives from Gulf countries, Japan, and the European Union
Improve Relations Between Islam and the West
• West focuses on messages that build bridges rather than alienate, including avoiding phrases such
as Islamic terrorism
• U.S. focuses on respect for international law, and avoiding double standards on democratic principles
in the Muslim world
38
39
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
GWOT Global War on Terror
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
G8 Group of Eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
GEF Global Environment Facility
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFI International Financial Institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
MDG Millennium Development Goal
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC U.S. National Security Council
Outreach 5 Five developing nations invited by the G8
participate in selected portions of the G8 meetings: Brazil,
China, India, Mexico South Africa. Also known as G8+5.
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
United Nations
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
P5 Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council
RDB Regional Development Bank
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN United Nations
UNDESA The United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping
Operations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary General
US DOS United States Department of State
US DOE United States Department of Energy
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank, or World Bank Group (WBG)
WFP World Food Program, United Nations
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
Appendix:
Acronym List
40
Appendix:
End Notes
1. David Dollar, “Poverty, Inequality
and Social Disparities During China’s
Economic Reform,” World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4253,
World Bank, June 2007.
2. Francis Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro,
Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild,
and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty
as Responsibility (The Brookings
Institution, Washington D.C., 1996).
Deng, an African statesman, first enunciated
the concept of sovereignty as
responsibility in 1993 in the context of
protection of civilians during humanitarian
emergency and in fragile and
conflict-ridden states.
3. “New Consensus Emerging on Value
of Forging Global Partnerships to
Enhance Security, Reduce Foreign Oil
Dependence, Address Climate Change”
United Nations Foundation and Better
World Campaign, Public Concern Poll
2008, http://www.betterworldcampaign.
org/news-room/press-releases/us-reject-
go-it-alone.html
4. Pew Research Center Global Attitudes
Poll 2008 “More See America’s Loss
of Global Respect as Major Problem”
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_
detail.aspx?id=298
5. One option that has been proposed
by legal experts is a National Security
Court whose architecture incorporates
a fair and robust due process system
thereby garnering broader legitimacy
than our current patchwork system.
Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War
(The Penguin Press, New York, 2008),
164–166.
6. Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2009 http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2009/
7. Steven Kosiak, “FY 2009 Request
Would Bring DoD Budget to Record
(Or Near-Record) Levels,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Update, February 4, 2008. http://
www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/U.20080204.FY_2009_
Request/U.20080204.FY_2009_Request.
pdf.
8. “Total Net ODA in 2007, USD million,
preliminary estimates”, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and
Development, http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/27/34/40381949.xls.
9. Brookings–CSIS Taskforce, Transforming
Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century,
Executive Recommendations, p. 4, (June
22, 2006).
10. The Modernizing Foreign Assistance
Network, New Day, New Way: U.S.
Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century,
June 1, 2008; Craig Cohen and Noam
Unger, “Surveying the Civilian Reform
Landscape,” The Stanley Foundation
Project Brief, 2008.
11. Wayne M. Morrison and Michael
F. Martin, “How Large is China’s
Economy? Does it Matter?” CRS Report
for Congress, February 13 (2008).
12. United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, “Financing
of United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations”, UN documents
A/C.5/61/18 and A/C.5/62/23 (July
2007) http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/contributors/financing.html;
World Food Programme: “Resource,
Financial and Budgetary Matters”,
(February 2008), http://www.wfp.org/
eb/docs/2008/wfp147420~1.pdf
13. This would then cover the UN’s
peacekeeping operations, field-based
political missions, humanitarian coordination
operations—each managed from
the Secretariat—and the work of the
World Food Program, the UN
Development Program, the UN
Children’s Fund, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, the UN
Relief and Works Agency, the UN Food
and Agricultural Organization, and the
UN Environment Program—
collectively, responsible for the majority
of the UN’s field-oriented spending.
14. The Princeton Project on National
Security, “Forging a World of Liberty
Under the Law,” September 27, 2006.
15. Michael O’Hanlon, “Resurrecting
the Test Ban Treaty,” Survival 50 (1),
February–March 2008, p. 119–132.
16. The idea of a poverty clock was first
put forward by our colleague Homi
Kharas, Senior Fellow in the Global
Development Program at the Brookings
Institution.
17. Here our proposals echo similar calls
made by the Princeton Project on
National Security and a forthcoming
report by the Brookings/Council on
Foreign Relations joint Task Force on
the Middle East (November 2008).
The Princeton Project on National
Security, ibid.
Managing Global Insecurity (MGI)
Partner Institutions
The Brookings Institution
Foreign Policy
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel (202) 741-6560
Fax (202) 797-6003
www.brookings.edu/projects/mgi.aspx
New York University
Center on International
Cooperation
418 Lafayette Street, Suite 543
New York, New York 10003
Tel (212) 998-3680
Fax (212) 995-4706
Stanford University
Center for International
Security and Cooperation
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Tel (650) 723-2300
Fax (650) 723-0089
The Brookings Institution
Foreign PolicyA Report by 2
Madeleine Albright
Principal, The Albright Group LLC;
Former U.S. Secretary of State
Richard Armitage
President, Armitage International;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Samuel Berger
Chairman, Stonebridge International;
Former U.S. National Security Advisor
Howard Berman
Representative from California,
Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee,
United States Congress
Coit D. Blacker
Director and Senior Fellow, Freeman
Spogli Institute, Stanford University;
Former Senior Director at the
National Security Council
U.S. Advisory Group Members
Sylvia Mathews Burwell
President, Global Development
Program, The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation; Former Deputy Director
of the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget
Chester A. Crocker
Professor of Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University; Former
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State,
African Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger
Former U.S. Secretary of State
William Perry
Michael and Barbara Berberian
Professor and Co-Director of the
Preventive Defense Project at the
Center for International Security and
Cooperation; Senior Fellow, Freeman
Spogli Institute, Stanford University
Thomas Pickering
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations
John Podesta
President and CEO, Center for
American Progress; Former White
House Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft
President, The Scowcroft Group;
Former U.S. National Security Advisor
Abraham Sofaer
George P. Shultz Distinguished
Scholar and Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution; Former Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Department
of State
Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
Timothy Wirth
President, The United Nations
Foundation; Former U.S. Senator
James D. Wolfensohn
Chairman and CEO, Wolfensohn
and Company; Former World Bank
President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso
Former President of Brazil
Jan Eliasson
Former Special Envoy to the
UN Secretary-General on Darfur;
Former Foreign Minister of Sweden
Ashraf Ghani
Chairman of the Institute for State
Effectiveness; Former Minister of
Finance for Afghanistan
Jeremy Greenstock
Director, Ditchley Foundation;
Former UK Ambassador to the UN
Rima Khalaf Hunaidi
Chief Executive Officer, Mohammed
bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation;
Former Assistant Secretary-General
and Director, Regional Bureau for
Arab States, UN Development Program
Anwar Ibrahim
Honorary President of AccountAbility;
Former Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia
Wolfgang Ischinger
Chairman, Munich Conference on
Security Policy; Former German
Ambassador to the United States
Igor S. Ivanov
Former Russian Foreign Minister;
Former Secretary of the Security
Council of Russia
Wu Jianmin
President, China Foreign Affairs
University; Former Ambassador
of China to the UN
Kishore Mahbubani
Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Affairs; Former Ambassador of
Singapore to the UN
Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India
Vincent Maphai
Chairman, BHP Billiton, South Africa
Paul Martin
Former Prime Minister of Canada
Ayo Obe
Chair of the World Movement for
Democracy, Nigeria
Sadako Ogata
President, Japan International
Cooperation Agency; Former UN
High Commissioner for Refugees
Salim Ahmed Salim
Former Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity
Javier Solana
High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy,
European Union
International Advisory Group Members
3
Bruce Jones
Director and Senior Fellow
Center on International Cooperation
New York University
Carlos Pascual
Vice President and Director
Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution
Stephen John Stedman
Senior Fellow
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Stanford University
Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) Co-Directors
September 2008
We are especially indebted to MGI’s
research team–Holly Benner and
Jessie Duncan at the Brookings
Institution, Catherine Bellamy and
Richard Gowan at New York University’s
Center on International Cooperation
and Kate Chadwick at Stanford
University’s Center for International
Security and Cooperation for their
instrumental role in developing the
ideas in this action plan and managing
the Project’s extensive U.S. and international
consultation agenda.
Generating This Plan for Action . 4
Executive Summary 6
International Cooperation in an Era of Transnational Threats 10
A Foundation of Responsible Sovereignty 10
The Political Moment: U.S. and International Convergence . 12
An Agenda for Action 15
Track 1. U.S. Engagement: Restoring Credible American Leadership . 16
Track 2. Power and Legitimacy: Revitalizing International Institutions 19
Track 3. Strategy and Capacity: Tackling Shared Threats 24
Track 4. Internationalizing Crisis Response: Focus on the Broader Middle East 30
Management: Sequencing and Targets of Opportunity 34
Timeline for Action 2009–2012 35
Summary of Recommendations Across Four Tracks . 37
Appendices
Acronym List . 39
Endnotes 40
CONTENTS
4
Generating this Plan for Action
The Managing Global Insecurity (MGI) Project seeks
to build international support for global institutions
and partnerships that can foster international peace and
security—and the prosperity they enable—for the next
50 years. MGI is a joint initiative among the Brookings
Institution, the Center on International Cooperation at
New York University, and the Center for International
Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
Since its launch in the spring of 2007, MGI has sought
to develop its recommendations and conduct its work in
a manner best suited to address today’s most urgent
global challenges—namely, by fostering a global dialogue.
In a world where 21st century transnational
threats—from climate change to nuclear proliferation
and terrorism—require joint solutions, discussions on
these solutions must take place both inside and outside
American borders. As MGI launched this ambitious but
urgent agenda, the Project convened two advisory
groups—one American and bipartisan, and one international.
MGI’s advisors are experienced leaders with
diverse visions for how the international security system
must be transformed. They are also skilled politicians
who understand the political momentum that must
power substantive recommendations.
MGI brought these groups together for meetings in
Washington D.C., New York, Ditchley Park (UK),
Singapore, and Berlin. With their assistance, MGI also
conducted consultations with government officials,
policymakers and non-governmental organizations
across Europe and in Delhi, Beijing, Tokyo, Doha, and
Mexico City. MGI held meetings at the United Nations,
and with African and Latin American officials in
Washington D.C. and New York. On the domestic front,
MGI met with Congressional and Administration
officials as well as foreign policy advisors to the U.S.
Presidential campaigns. Ideas generated in international
consultations were tested on U.S. constituencies; ideas
generated among U.S. policymakers were sounded out
for their resonance internationally. American and
international leaders were brought together to consider
draft proposals. Through this global dialogue, the
Project sought a shared path forward.
MGI’s findings also derive from extensive research and
analysis of current global security threats and the performance
of international institutions. MGI solicited
case studies from leading regional and subject experts
that evaluated the successes and failures of international
responses to the “hard cases”—from the North Korean
nuclear threat to instability in Pakistan and state collapse
in Iraq. Both in the United States and internationally,
MGI convened experts to review the Project’s threatspecific
analyses and proposals.
Financial support for the MGI project has also been
robustly international. In addition to the Bertelsmann
Stiftung, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Ditchley
Foundation, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation,
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and
UN Foundation, MGI has received funding and in-kind
support from the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and
the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. A number of
think tanks and other institutions in Japan, China and
India hosted workshops to debate the Project’s findings.
MGI is indebted to its diverse supporters.
MGI’s research and consultations provide the foundation
for the following Plan for Action, a series of policy briefs,
and MGI’s book, Power and Responsibility: International
Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (forthcoming,
Brookings Press 2009). The authors are solely responsible
for the following analysis and recommendations.
Based on MGI’s consultations, however, they are confident
this is a historic opportunity for the United States
to forge new partnerships to tackle the most pressing
problems of this century.
5
Top: MGI Advisory Group Member Sadako Ogata, President, Japan International Cooperation Agency;
Group shot: Members of the MGI Advisory Group meeting at Bertelsmann Stiftung in Berlin, Germany, July
2008; Bottom, left to right: MGI Advisory Group Member Salim Ahmed Salim, Former Secretary-General of
the Organization of African Unity; MGI Co-Directors (from left), Stephen Stedman, Senior Fellow, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director,
Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution; Bruce Jones, Director and Senior Fellow, Center on International
Cooperation, New York University.
The MGI project has consulted with field leaders and
policymakers from around the globe and across party
lines to generate discussion and debate, as well as build
consensus among diverse perspectives.
6
Executive Summary
The 21st century will be defined by
security threats unconstrained by
borders—from climate change, nuclear
proliferation, and terrorism to conflict,
poverty, disease, and economic instability.
The greatest test of global leadership
will be building partnerships and
institutions for cooperation that can
meet the challenge. Although all states
have a stake in solutions, responsibility
for a peaceful and prosperous world
will fall disproportionately to the
traditional and rising powers. The
United States most of all must provide
leadership for a global era.
U.S. domestic and international opinions
are converging around the urgent
need to build an international security
system for the 21st century. Global
leaders increasingly recognize that
alone they are unable to protect their
interests and their citizens—national
security has become interdependent
with global security.
Just as the founders of the United
Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
after World War II began with a vision
for international cooperation based
on a shared assessment of threat and
a shared notion of sovereignty, today’s
global powers must chart a new course
for today’s greatest challenges and
opportunities. International cooperation
today must be built on the principle
of responsible sovereignty, or the notion
that sovereignty entails obligations and
duties toward other states as well as to
one’s own citizens.
The US Presidential election provides
a moment of opportunity to renew
American leadership, galvanize action
against major threats, and refashion
key institutions to reflect the need for
partnership and legitimacy. Delays will
be tempting in the face of complex
threats. The siren song of unilateral action
will remain—both for the United
States and the other major powers.
To build a cooperative international
order based on responsible sovereignty,
global leaders must act across four
different tracks.
Trac k 1. U.S. Engagement: Restoring
Credible American Leadership
No other state has the diplomatic,
economic and military capacity necessary
to rejuvenate international
cooperation. But to lead, the United
States must first re-establish itself
as a good-faith partner.
Unilateral U.S. action in Iraq,
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture,
rendition, and the rhetorical association
of the Iraq war with democracy
promotion have damaged American
credibility internationally. The United
States must demonstrate its commitment
to a rule-based international
system that rejects unilateralism and
looks beyond military might. In turn,
major states will be more willing to
AGENDA FOR ACTION
VISION
An international order founded on
responsible sovereignty that delivers
global peace and prosperity for the
next 50 years.
OBJECTIVE
The next U.S. President, in partnership
with other major and emerging
powers, launches a campaign in
2009 to revitalize international
cooperation for a changed world.
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
TRACK 1
Revitalizing International
Institutions
TRACK 2
Tackling Shared Threats
TRACK 3
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
TRACK 4
7
affect their security and prosperity.
Traditional powers cannot achieve
sustainable solutions on issues from
economic stability to climate change
without the emerging powers at the negotiating
table. Global leaders should:
• Create a new Group of 16 (G16) to
foster cooperation between the G8
and Brazil, China, India, South
Africa, Mexico (the Outreach 5) and
the nations of Indonesia, Turkey,
Egypt or Nigeria. Replacing the
outdated G8, the G16 would serve
as a pre-negotiating forum to forge
preliminary agreements on major
global challenges;
• Initiate voluntary veto reform at the
UN Security Council (UNSC) as a
confidence building measure toward
UNSC reform;
• End the monopoly of the U.S.
and Europe on leadership at the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank, and refocus the
IMF’s mandate to exercise surveillance
over exchange rate polices and
to facilitate the smooth unraveling of
global imbalances; and
• Strengthen regional organizations,
including a 10-year capacity building
effort for the African Union and support
for a regional security mechanism
for the Middle East.
Expansion of the UNSC would be the
most dramatic signal of commitment to
share the helm of the international system.
However, the conditions for this
are unlikely to be propitious in 2009,
and a mishandled effort could undermine
progress on other fronts. Decisive
expansion of the G8 in 2009 would lay
a credible foundation for action on
UNSC expansion within the first term
of the new U.S. President.
share the burden in resources and
expend political capital to manage
global threats. A new American
President should:
• Send his top cabinet officials for
early consultations on international
priorities with allies and the rising
powers alike;
• Deliver consistent and strong messages
on international cooperation
domestically and internationally—
including in speeches in the lead-up
to the Group of 8 (G8) and the UN
General Assembly meetings in 2009,
laying out a vision for a 21st century
security system; and
• Close the Guantanamo Detention
facility and initiate efforts toward a
more sustainable U.S. detainee
policy; and declare U.S. commitment
to uphold the Geneva Conventions,
the Convention Against Torture and
other laws of war.
Over time, the United States will also
need to dramatically upgrade its civilian
foreign policy corps, including doubling
the size of the foreign service in 10
years and re-writing the Foreign Assistance
Act to elevate development priorities
and improve aid effectiveness.
TRACK 2. Power and Legitimacy:
Revitalizing International Institutions
The legitimacy and effectiveness
of key international institutions are
enhanced by increasing representation
of emerging powers and
re-focusing mandates toward 21st
century challenges.
The leadership and mandates of key
international institutions—from the
G8 to the UN Security Council—have
not kept pace with the new powerholders
and dynamic threats of a changed
world. Emerging powers are excluded
from decision-making processes that
The aim of the MGI project is
ambitious and urgent: to
launch a new reform effort for
the global security system in
2009 … for the global system
is in serious trouble. It is simply
not capable of solving the
challenges of today. You all
know the list: terrorism,
nuclear proliferation, climate
change, pandemics, failing
states … None can be solved
by a single government alone.
— Javier Solana
High Representative for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy, European Union;
MGI Advisory Group Member
8
trac k 3. Strategy and Capacity:
Tackling Shared Threats
Enhanced international cooperation
and international institutions are utilized
to manage key global threats.
The global agenda—the 2009 conference
of the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the
2010 review conference on the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and global
trade pressures—demands action. In
the case of climate change, continuation
of current trends in the use of fossil
fuels would constitute a new form of
“mutually assured destruction.” There
is no doubt of the catastrophic effects
if nuclear weapons are used or fall into
the wrong hands. Global leaders should:
• Negotiate a climate change agreement
under UNFCCC auspices that
includes emission targets for 2020
and 2050 and investments in technology,
rain forests and mitigation;
• Revitalize the core bargain of the
non-proliferation regime by nuclear
weapons states, particularly the
United States and Russia, reducing
their arsenals, and by all states
endorsing the Additional Protocol
and working to develop an international
fuel bank; and
• Initiate G16 “pre-negotiations”
on an open and inclusive trade
regime to conclude a World Trade
Organization (WTO) round that
benefits poor countries.
Progress must also be made across other
key global challenges—deadly infectious
disease, the abuse of biotechnology,
regional and civil conflict, and global
terrorism. Global leaders should:
• Build local public health capacity to
achieve full implementation of the
International Health Regulations
(2005) and develop an intergovernmental
panel on biotechnology to
forge scientific consensus on the dangers
and benefits of biotechnology;
• Increase international investment in
conflict management with a goal of
50,000 international peacekeeping
reserves and two billion in funding
for peacebuilding; and
• Establish a UN High Commissioner for
Counter Terrorism Capacity Building
to focus international efforts to build
counter-terrorism norms and capacity.
trac k 4. Internationalizing Crisis
Response: Focus on the Broader
Middle East
Internationalize crisis response in
the broader Middle East to address
regional conflict and transnational
threats.
Global leaders must have confidence
that a 21st century international security
system will produce better outcomes
on the crises at the top of their national
security agendas. The Middle East is
the most unstable region in the world,
and a vortex of transnational threats.
The G16, in cooperation with leading
regional actors, can help to identify
shared interests in regional stability and
catalyze more focused international
support. Global leaders should:
• Move the Annapolis process forward
to support an Israeli-Palestinian
peace settlement;
• Commit adequate forces and civilian
capacity for a stable peace in
Afghanistan;
• Focus U.S. and international efforts
on a political settlement and civilian
surge for Iraq;
• Sustain regional and international
diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear program;
and
• Initiate efforts toward a regional
security arrangement for the Middle
East that could, as existing crises
eased, provide a mechanism to guarantee
borders and promote stability.
We are witnessing the early
stages of a shift of the center
of gravity of international relations
from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. A simple expansion
of the G8 is not enough—
new great powers must share
responsibility as equal partners
for setting the agenda. For its
part, China increasingly sees
that its security is closely tied
to global security. Particularly
in the area of climate change
and energy security, there is
vast scope for cooperation.
— Wu Jianmin
President, China Foreign Affairs University;
MGI Advisory Group Member
9
International Cooperation for a
Changed World
American and global leaders face a
choice: they can either use this moment
to help shape an international,
rule-based order that will protect their
global interests, or resign themselves to
an ad hoc international system where
they are increasingly powerless to
shape the course of international
affairs. The agenda for action will not
be completed in two years or ten. Yet,
we cannot wait to start. The longer
the delay in new approaches and new
cooperation against today’s threats,
the more difficult the challenges will
become. Global leaders must chart
a shared path forward that marries
power and responsibility to achieve
together what cannot be achieved
apart: peace and security in a transnational
world.
A new American President
will have to re-start a global
conversation with the world’s
traditional and emerging powers
that moves from monologue
to dialogue. Partnership and
cooperation must be the
centerpiece of successful
American leadership in
confronting 21st century
threats, where protecting U.S.
security is intimately linked
with promoting global stability.
— Thomas Pickering
Vice Chairman, Hills & Company;
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations;
MGI Advisory Group Member
10
International Cooperation in an
Era of Transnational Threats
The greatest test of global leadership
in the 21st century will be how
nations perform in the face of threats
that defy borders—from nuclear proliferation,
conflict, and climate change to
terrorism, threats to biological security,
and global poverty. Ours is now a world
where national security is interdependent
with global security.
Globalization has resulted in unprecedented
opportunities. The ability to
tap into global markets for capital,
technology and labor has allowed the
private sector to amass wealth unfathomable
50 years ago: it has helped lift
hundreds of millions out of poverty in
emerging economies. For China, integration
into the global economy has
been the driver of one of the most remarkable
stories of national progress
in human history—500 million people
have been raised out of poverty in just
thirty years.1
Yet, the forces of globalization that
have stitched the world together
and driven prosperity can also tear
it apart. In the face of new transnational
threats and profound security
interdependence, even the strongest
nations depend on the cooperation of
others to protect their own national
security. No country, including the
United States, is capable of successfully
meeting the challenges, or capitalizing
on the opportunities, of this
changed world alone. It is a world for
which we are unprepared, a world that
poses a challenge to leaders and citizens
alike to redefine their interests
and re-examine their responsibilities.
While that is true of every country,
it is especially true of the most powerful—
which must exercise the most
responsibility.
U.S. foreign policy has lagged behind
these realities. A new approach is
needed to revitalize the alliances, diplomacy,
and international institutions
central to the inseparable relationship
between national and global security.
U.S. leadership is indispensable if the
world as a whole is to be successful in
managing today’s threats. But American
leadership must be re-focused toward
partnership—continuing partnership
with allies in Europe, Asia and Latin
America, and cultivating new partnerships
with rising powers such as China,
India, Brazil and South Africa. The
policies, attitudes, and actions of major
states will have disproportionate influence
on whether the next 50 years tend
to international order or entropy. The
actions of a new U.S. President, working
with the leaders of the traditional and
rising powers, will profoundly influence
the shape of international security and
prosperity for a global age.
A Foundation of Responsible
Sovereignty
Unprecedented interdependence does
not make international cooperation
inevitable. Rather, shared interests
must be translated into a common
vision for a revitalized international
security system that benefits all.
The most pressing challenges
of this century are not constrained
by borders. Achieving
security and prosperity in
today’s interconnected world
requires greater cooperation
amongst the world’s leading
powers. The recommendations
of the Managing Global
Insecurity project provide a
vital step toward the necessary
reform of the international
security order.
— James Wolfensohn
Chairman and CEO, Wolfensohn and Company;
Former World Bank President;
MGI Advisory Group Member
11
Foresight, imagination, pragmatism
and political commitment, fueled by
effective American leadership, created
a new international era after World
War II. Institutions such as the United
Nations, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now
the World Trade Organization) contributed
to extraordinary economic
growth and helped to prevent majorpower
war. Innovation and political
engagement on the same scale are
needed to achieve security and prosperity
in the years ahead.
However, the vision necessary for a 21st
century international security system
is clouded by a mismatch between
existing post-World War II multilateral
institutions premised on traditional
sovereignty—a belief that borders are
sacrosanct and an insistence on noninterference
in domestic affairs—and
the realities of a now transnational
world where capital, technology, labor,
disease, pollution and non-state actors
traverse boundaries irrespective of the
desires of sovereign states.
The domestic burdens inflicted by
transnational threats such as poverty,
civil war, disease and environmental
degradation point in one direction:
toward cooperation with global partners
and a strengthening of international
institutions. Entering agreements or
accepting assistance is not a weakening
of sovereignty; it is the exercise of sovereignty
in order to protect it.
The MGI Project’s consultations have
informed and validated the view that
a new era of international cooperation
should be built on the principle of
responsible sovereignty: the idea that states
must take responsibility for the external
effects of their domestic actions—
that sovereignty entails obligations and
duties towards other sovereign states
as well as to one’s own citizens.2 To protect
national security, even to protect
sovereignty, states must negotiate rules
and norms to guide actions that reverberate
beyond national boundaries.
Responsible sovereignty also implies a
positive interest on the part of powerful
states to provide weaker states with the
capacity to exercise their sovereignty
responsibly—a responsibility to build.
MGI emphasizes sovereignty because
states are still the primary units of the
international system. As much as globalization
has diminished the power of
states, there is simply no alternative to
the legally defined state as the primary
actor in international affairs nor is
there any substitute for state legitimacy
in the use of force, the provision of
justice, and the regulation of public
spheres and private action.
MGI emphasizes responsibility because,
in an era of globalization, adherence
to traditional sovereignty, and deference
to individual state solutions, have failed
to produce peace and prosperity. In
a transnational world, international
cooperation is essential to give states the
means to meet the most fundamental
demands of sovereignty: to protect their
people and advance their interests.
Responsible sovereignty, in sum, is a
guidepost to a better international system.
Just as the founders of the United
Nations and Bretton Woods institutions
began with a vision for international
cooperation based on a shared assessment
of threat and a shared notion of
sovereignty, today’s global powers must
chart a new course for today’s greatest
challenges and opportunities.
Responsible sovereignty—
the idea that states must take
responsibility for external
effects of their actions—is a
brilliant new idea whose time
has come. No village can
accept a home whose actions
endanger the village. Neither
can the global village accept
the behavior of nations which
endanger the globe.
— Kishore Mahbubani
Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Affairs;
Former Ambassador of Singapore to the UN;
MGI Advisory Group Member
12
The Political Moment:U.S. and
International Convergence
A new vision for global security will
only succeed if it is powered by political
commitment and has the support
of diverse regions and influential constituencies.
International politics and
global realities are converging to make
such cooperation possible.
U.S. Interest
In the United States, MGI consultations
with policymakers and recent
polling highlight that American citizens
and American leadership across
party lines are concerned with a declining
U.S. image internationally.
In a 2007 national poll, 81% of
Americans favored a Presidential candidate
who said the United States should
“share the burden” and not be the sole
supplier of resources, finances, military
forces, and diplomacy for peace in
the world. Americans polled rejected
“going it alone,” and believed the
United States should be a global leader
and a “role model” for democracy.3
Presidential candidates have mirrored
this bipartisan public sentiment: both
major candidates have spoken out for
restoring U.S. leadership and moral
standing, viewing this as critical to the
protection of U.S. security.
The next U.S. President has the opportunity
to feature international cooperation
as the centerpiece of a strategy to
restore America’s global leadership.
Americans want their country to be
respected, they want to lead, and they
want to feel more secure as a result of
U.S. engagement.
Just as important, current global realities
leave no alternative to cooperation.
On January 20, 2009, the next
American President will inherit crises
in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North
Korea, Darfur, Pakistan, and the
Middle East. There will be many regional
and national challenges to a viable
foreign policy: the rise of India and
China, an energy-brash Russia, and an
African continent caught between new
economic opportunities and a legacy of
conflict and failed governance. The
international community will demand
action on climate change and the global
food crisis. An American recession will
TABLE 1: SEVEN REALITIES ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
For the United States For the World
In a world of new transnational dangers, the United States cannot defend
itself unilaterally against what threatens it. 1 Major and rising powers benefit from a strong United States that provides
vital global public goods.
To gain sustained cooperation on threats to U.S. security, the United States
must also address the security concerns of other nations. 2 International stability and prosperity in the next 20 years will depend heavily
on U.S. power and leadership.
Mililtary power, used in isolation, can be counterproductive in securing the
cooperation needed to ensure U.S. security. 3 America’s experience with unilateralism should be a salutary warning to
other rising powers tempted to ‘go-it-alone.’
International institutions are much more important to American security goals
than U.S. policy makers admit or the public realizes. 4 The costs of delaying revitalized international cooperation will increase over
time; it is best to engage now.
The international institutions that the United States uses daily to meet its
security needs must be strengthened or reinvented. 5 The United States will only commit itself to international norms and institutions
if it is convinced they protect U.S. interests.
American policies since 9/11 have led other states toward ‘soft balancing’:
resisting reforms of the international system perceived as beneficial to the
United States.
6
The road to a strengthened and more equitable international system requires
the engagement of all major powers, including the concerted engagement of
the United States.
If the United States wants cooperation in strengthening international institutions,
the U.S. must see them as more than tools to be used or ignored to
suit short-term political interests.
7
With greater voice and influence in the global system, new powers must
take on greater responsibility for its upkeep and health.
National sovereignty becomes
responsible sovereignty when
nations pay heed both to the
domestic demands of their
own citizens and to their international
responsibilities. Patriotism
requires internationalism.
— David Miliband
Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, United Kingdom
Excerpt from speech to Peking University, Beijing,
February 29, 2008.
13
The next American President
will have to reintroduce America
to the world in order to
regain its trust in our purpose
as well as our power. ...The
success of [U.S.] policies and
efforts will depend not only on
the extent of our power, the
strength of our purpose and
cohesion of regional alliances,
but also by an appreciation of
great power limits.
— Chuck Hagel
U.S. Senator from Nebraska;
Excerpt from address at MGI speaker series event
at the Brookings Institution, June 26, 2008
focus attention on vulnerabilities in the
global financial system. Key U.S. allies
will seek renewed U.S. commitment to
multilateralism.
The United States cannot retreat from
this agenda any more than it can manage
it alone. America needs global
partners: to combat threats to the
American people, to wield influence
with actors such as North Korea and
Iran, to share the burden on complex
challenges, and to sustain global
systems that allow the United States
access to capital and markets critical to
economic growth in a dismal domestic
budget environment. It is in America’s
self-interest to act now, while its influence
is strong, to model leadership for
the 21st century based on the premise
of partnership and recognition of
interdependence.
Global Interest
MGI consultations in key capitals in diverse
regions—from Beijing and Delhi
to London and Doha—reinforced
that unilateral U.S. action in Iraq, and
across a range of foreign policy issues,
has cast a long shadow on America’s
standing in the world and alienated
even close allies. Key international
stakeholders are eager for strong signals
from a new U.S. administration that
it is willing to re-value global partnerships
and re-commit the United States
to a rules-based international system.
International public opinion polls
reinforce this sentiment. Of more than
24,000 people across 24 countries
surveyed in March and April 2008, a
majority expressed negative views of the
role that the United States is playing in
the world. In 14 of 24 countries, two-thirds
or more of respondents expressed little
or no confidence in President Bush to
do the right thing in world affairs. The
belief that the United States does not
take into account the interests of other
countries in formulating its foreign policy
is extensive even among U.S. allies such
as the UK and Australia and overwhelming
in the Middle East and Asia.4
Yet, internationally, most policymakers
also still recognize that there is no
prospect for international security and
prosperity in the next 20 years that
does not rely heavily on U.S. power and
leadership. The United States has the
world’s largest economy, strongest military
and broadest alliances. The world
needs the United States to use its leadership
and resources for the resolution
of transnational threats. If the United
States blocks international solutions on
issues such as climate change, nuclear
security and financial stability, sustainable
global outcomes are unachievable.
Traditional and emerging powers also
share with the United States a self-interest
in a resilient and effective international
order. Europe is the world’s most
rule-based society, yet erosion of a
rule-based international system means
that Europe is taking on commitments,
such as on carbon emissions and
foreign aid, with increasingly marginal
Crises Geopolitical global
Iraq
Iran
Afghanistan
North Korea
Middle East
Pakistan
Darfur
China
India
Africa
Russia
Latin America
Turkey
Trans-Atlantic
Asia-Pacific
Nuclear
Climate Change
Terrorism
Energy
Peace and Conflict
Poverty and
Financial Instability
On his first day in office, the next U.S. President
will face a daunting agenda — one that will be
impossible to address through unilateral action.
This agenda will contain regional crises, evolving
geopolitical dynamics and broader threats with the
potential to undermine global security. This action
plan demonstrates concrete steps for how an
American administration can leverage international
cooperation to tackle these challenges.
14
impact. Japan has a vital interest in a
stable transition in security arrangements
in Asia and globally. Leaders in
China, India and the emerging economies
recognize that their economic
growth relies on a strong and resilient
international trade and finance system.
To continue to develop its oil and gas
reserves, Russia will need international
technology, and sufficient trust from its
partners to invest in and secure transnational
pipelines. None of the traditional
or rising powers profit from unchecked
United Nations Foundation and Better World Campaign, Public Concern Poll 2008,
“New Consensus Emerging on Value of Forging Global Partnerships to Enhance
Security, Reduce Foreign Oil Dependence, Address Climate Change” http://www.
betterworldcampaign.org/news-room/press-releases/us-reject-go-it-alone.html.
More Respected v. Less Respected:
Compared with the past, would you say the United States is
more respected by other countries…less respected by other
countries…or as respected as it has been in the past?
Major Problem v. Minor Problem:
Do you think less respoect for America by other
countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
There continues to be an American consensus
that we are
less respected by other countries and this is a major problem.
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
More respected Less respected As respected
10%
20%
67%
6%
78%
15%
5%
78%
17%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
Major Problem Minor Problem Not a problem
Major Problem v. Minor Problem: Do you think less respect for
America by other countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
64%
6%
28%
76%
21%
3%
73%
23%
4%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
More respected Less respected As respected
10%
20%
67%
6%
78%
15%
5%
78%
17%
0
20
10
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
July 2004 September 2007 July 2008
Major Problem Minor Problem Not a problem
Major Problem v. Minor Problem: Do you think less respect for
America by other countries is a major problem or a minor problem?
64%
6%
28%
76%
21%
3%
73%
23%
4%
proliferation, or the spread of global
terrorism.
We must capitalize on momentum generated
from a convergence of global
and U.S. domestic interests to build an
international security system for the 21st
century. The case for amplified international
cooperation is not a soft-hearted
appeal to the common good but rather
a realist call to action that is demanded
both domestically and internationally.
Global governance requires simultaneously
dealing with different issues
in different ways while recognizing
and using to good effect the linkages
among them. Just as many of the
threats we face today are mutually
exacerbating, their solutions can be
mutually reinforcing. We are more
likely to make progress on specific
issues if we work on them in the
context of a broader agenda.
— Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution;
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State;
MGI Advisory Group Member
15
An Agenda for Action
During MGI consultations, U.S. and international
experts and policymakers
stressed that only through responsible
international action on transnational
threats can nations create the capacity
to defuse and ideally prevent regional
and global crises. If short-term crises
crowd out lasting reforms, nations and
policymakers will deny themselves the
tools to stem future disasters. If action
languishes, nationalistic opportunism
may provoke unilateral actions that undermine
sustainable solutions. Conflict,
isolationism, and protectionism then
become imminent threats to global
security and prosperity. Climate change
and nuclear proliferation will become
existential challenges to our planet: the
clock is already ticking.
Historically it has taken war or catastrophe
to bring about a redefinition of sovereignty
and a re-building of international order.
Our challenge is to use the urgency of
looming security challenges, and the prospect
for positive results, to drive progress.
International order will require power
to underpin responsibility. Our analysis
identified five pre-requisites: 1) effective
U.S. policy and leadership; 2) institutionalized
cooperation between the United
States and the traditional and emerging
powers; 3) negotiated understandings
of the application of responsible sovereignty
across key threat areas; 4) effective
and legitimate international institutions;
and 5) states capable of carrying out
their responsibilities toward their own
people and internationally.
We have incorporated these prerequisites
into a plan for action with four parallel
tracks: to restore U.S. standing internationally;
to revitalize international institutions;
to respond to transnational threats;
and to manage crises. We start with the
United States because American credibility
is critical for effective leadership. We
make crisis management the fourth track
to underscore that if not addressed in
tandem with the others, ad hoc solutions
will not be sustainable. The institutional
tools in track two are not ends in themselves—
they emerge from the agenda on
transnational threats. We present them
as the second track in order to apply
them in track three. Each track identifies
both opening actions to build political
momentum and a continuing agenda
to sustain the concerted engagement
required to produce results.
AGENDA FOR ACTION
VISION
An international order founded on
responsible sovereignty that delivers
global peace and prosperity for the
next 50 years.
OBJECTIVE
The next U.S. President, in partnership
with other major and emerging
powers, launches a campaign in
2009 to revitalize international
cooperation for a changed world.
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
TRACK 1
Revitalizing International
Institutions
TRACK 2
Tackling Shared Threats
TRACK 3
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
TRACK 4
16
TRACK 1
U.S. Engagement
Restoring Credible
American Leadership
Before investing political energy and
resources, other states will look
first for signs beyond rhetoric that the
United States seeks genuine global
partnerships and is committed to an
agenda for cooperative action.
Since the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. political system has vacillated in
its support for the international rule of
law and international institutions. The
United States has established itself as
sheriff and judge of the international
system but has at times neglected to
abide by the rules itself. In reality, no
country gains more from a strong international
legal regime than the United
States, precisely because the United
States has so many interests to protect.
A rule-based international system
safeguards American citizens, military
forces, and corporations.
While the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan
after 9/11 garnered widespread international
support, U.S. actions in Iraq
generated popular and political anger
against the United States both in the
region and internationally. This sentiment
has diminished the willingness
or ability of other nations to cooperate
with the United States.
The rhetorical association of the Iraq
war with democracy promotion has
further undermined American ideals
once admired globally and squandered
one of the United States’ great assets: its
reputation for protecting and promoting
human rights and the rule of law.
Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, torture, and
rendition have damaged American
credibility on human rights in large
parts of the world, especially in Muslimpopulated
countries.
U.S. engagement and leadership will
be required across many issue areas,
but first the United States must reestablish
its bona fides. The following
acts taken by the United States would
signal a willingness to re-commit to
a rule-based international order, and
look beyond military might as a primary
foreign policy tool.
I strongly believe that many of
the emerging threats the world
now faces, such as nuclear
proliferation, climate change,
and transnational terrorism,
must be met by strong U.S.
leadership and renewed
engagement with the global
community. Restoring U.S.
standing in the world and
encouraging the constructive
use of American power is
central to fostering greater
international cooperation to
counter these threats.
— Howard Berman
Representative from California,
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, United States Congress;
MGI Advisory Group Member
17
TRACK 1
Deliver Consistent and Strong
Messages on International Cooperation
The messages of the United States on the
value of international cooperation and its
commitment to global partnerships must be
consistent and strong. Style, tone and
vocabulary will make a difference. From the
outset of the administration, broad and
intense high-level consultation—by the
Secretaries of State and Defense, the
National Security Advisor, the Administrator
of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and senior ambassadors
or envoys—will signal to the international
community American dedication to
dialogue and cooperative approaches.
These high-level officials should engage
traditional and rising powers early in the
administration to gather insights on the
priorities of key states.
The new U.S. President should commit the
United States to leading efforts to revitalize
the international security system. The
President must deliver a strong message
internationally that the United States is
dedicated to global partnerships and will
uphold the rule of law, and speak to U.S.
audiences on the importance of international
cooperation to U.S. national security.
Following international and Congressional
consultations, the President should lay out
the main elements of a multi-year agenda for
key international agreements and institutions,
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Restoring Credible American Leadership
and call on global and regional leaders to
work together over the course of his term
to make decisive progress on a defined
action plan. This agenda could be set out
in speeches in the lead-up to the 2009
Group of 8 (G8) meeting in Italy, and at the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in
September 2009.
Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-
Based International System
The United States must make clear that
it will uphold the articles of the Geneva
Conventions, the Convention Against
Torture and other laws of war and reiterate
that it has no authority to torture anyone.
The President has an obligation under international
law, and with a view to reciprocity,
to prevent torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment of all prisoners, whatever
their status.
The 44th President should also immediately
announce his intention to close the
Guantanamo Detention facility and charge,
transfer, or release its approximately 270
detainees. Simultaneously, the U.S. administration
should announce an effort to develop
a sustainable detainee policy, not only for
Guantanamo but for U.S. detention facilities
worldwide. The next President must work
with Congress on a new detention framework
to address national security concerns
while providing basic legal protections.5
After years of missed opportunities
and some ill-considered
U.S. initiatives, the next Administration
inherits a complex and
challenging strategic situation.
This is compounded by...the
urgent need to revitalize and
rebuild international institutions
and to rebuild frayed or dysfunctional
relations with key
partners. The MGI project
does a masterful job of identifying
the challenges as well as
the opportunities for American
leadership...creatively weaving
together a series of critical
subject areas to be addressed
on parallel tracks.
— Chester A. Crocker
Professor of Strategic Studies, Georgetown
University; Former U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State, African Affairs;
A Continuing Agenda: Restoring MGI Advisory Group Member
Credible American Leadership
Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for
Cooperative Diplomacy. The United
States needs a stronger civilian foreign
policy capacity to help restore its
international leadership and effectively
counter 21st century security threats.
Strengthened civilian tools for development
and diplomacy are critical to
combat key global challenges such
as climate change, terrorism, global
poverty and conflict. Yet, U.S. spending
on defense dwarfs civilian-side investments.
The Bush Administration’s fiscal
year 2009 budget request included
$38.3 billion to fund the civilian-side
foreign affairs and foreign aid budget.6
In comparison, the President asked
for $515 billion for the Department of
Defense’s core budget, before factoring
in the cost of waging war in Iraq and
18
Afghanistan.7 The United States is also
tied for last out of the 22 donor nations
of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in terms of international aid as a percentage
of gross national income.8
The first priority is to create the civilian
capability to understand and work with
local counterparts to address the drivers
of terrorism, proliferation, poverty,
conflict, and financial instability. This
would involve doubling the size of the
Foreign Service within ten years. U.S.
representatives on the ground, with an
understanding of local politics, culture,
history and language, are best placed
to inform policy choices. Such capacity
and flexibility requires more than the
7,000 Foreign Service officers in the
State Department and 1,000 in the U.S.
Agency for International Development
(USAID).
The very administration of foreign policy
and foreign aid must also be overhauled.
Whereas the private sector has
responded to globalization by decentralizing
operations, personnel shortages
have driven the State Department
and USAID to centralize policy and
programs in Washington while proliferating
the number of actors delivering
foreign aid. In 2008, there are
more than 50 separate units in the U.S.
government involved in aid delivery.9
The result: diminished capacity to act
locally and no systematic means to
ensure that civilian capacities are used
to their best effect to advance national
interests. The Executive Branch and
Congress must work together to conceptualize
anew the administration of
diplomacy, defense and development
to support common national security
goals. A new Foreign Assistance Act
must elevate global development as
a ‘third pillar’ of U.S. foreign policy
along with diplomacy and defense.10
TRACK 1
19
TRACK 2
Power and Legitimacy
Revitalizing International
Institutions
Rebuilding an effective international
security system will require
institutionalized venues for dialogue
and negotiation among the major
and rising powers, as well as mechanisms
to achieve buy-in and legitimacy
from a wider set of states. Neither the
membership nor decision-making
mechanisms of today’s international
institutions facilitate such a dialogue.
By 2050, the four most dynamic economies
in the world, Brazil, Russia, India,
and China, are projected to produce
40% of global output.11 Yet only two of
the four are permanent members of the
UN Security Council (UNSC) and only
Russia is a participant in the G8.
Emerging powers express intense
frustration about their lack of inclusion
in the decision-making processes that
affect their security and prosperity.
Conversely, there are fewer issues that
the G8 alone can resolve without the
participation of emerging powers. While
no individual nation wants to see itself
restrained by international norms, all
nations have an interest in seeing others
abide by a common set of rules.
If the United States and other traditional
powers seek sustainable solutions
on issues from conflict to climate
change and nuclear proliferation, they
will need to make room for these new
powers at the negotiating table. If new
powers are not integrated as partners
in the shaping of a revitalized international
security system, the enterprise has
little chance for success.
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
2005 MER 2050 MER 2005 PPP 2050 PPP
Relative size of G7 and E7 economies
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 16 May 2006
G7 GDP E7 GDP
The seven largest emerging economies, the E7, are China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. The
seven largest industrial economies, the G7, are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the
United Kingdom. Columns labeled as PPP demonstrate the scale of the economies as calculated by Purchasing
Power Parity exchange rates. Those labeled with MER were calculated using Market Exchange Rates.
The Russian incursion into Georgia in
2008, for example, reinforces rather
than diminishes the need for institutional
mechanisms that bring emerging
powers into a framework that intensifies
international checks and balances.
Some argue that the West should isolate
Russia. While there is no question that
the international community must condemn
Russia’s military action, isolation
will only spark Russian nationalism in
the short run, when Russia can afford
its truculence due to high energy prices.
Rather, the goal should be to play to
both the international community and
Russia’s long-term interests. In the long
run, Russia will need technology and
capital to sustain its energy sector and
diversify its economy. It will need access
to international markets. Bringing
Russia into a wider grouping of nations
that demonstrates these possibilities will
better encourage restraint than trying to
isolate Russia at a time when it is strong.
U.S. leadership in driving an expansion
of the UN Security Council would be
the most dramatic and effective signal of
a changed commitment to international
order. However, the conditions for this
are unlikely to be propitious in 2009,
and a mishandled effort at expansion
will do more damage than good. The
new U.S. administration should work
on parallel tracks to improve bilateral
relations with the traditional and rising
powers, including through decisive
expansion of the G8, and lay a credible
pathway towards early expansion of the
Security Council.
20
Create a Group of 16 (G16) to Bridge
Effectiveness and Legitimacy
The creation of a new G16 at the 2009 G8
summit meeting in Italy would be a bold
change to foster dynamic, cooperative
interaction between the United States and
the major and rising powers. Even if formal
inauguration of the G16 is not possible
in 2009, a core group already exists: the
G8 plus Brazil, China, India, South Africa,
and Mexico (called the “Outreach 5”). The
United States and other members of the
G8 should insist on meeting with this full
group routinely, and use this grouping to
forge consensus within the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and other multilateral
fora on transnational issues. As
circumstances allow this G13 should add
Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria to
include voices from diverse regions with
significant populations and economic influence.
By 2012, when the United States
has the G8 Presidency, or preferably earlier,
the G16 should be fully established.
The G16 would represent economic,
political, and military powers from several
regions—incorporating those states whose
positive contributions and blocking powers
make them essential participants in a
wide range of international and transnational
agreements. The G16 would take the
place of the existing and outdated G8. Its
purpose would be to serve as a pre-negotiating
forum, a place where the smallest
possible grouping of necessary stakeholders
could meet to forge preliminary
agreements on responses to major global
challenges. It would be a place to build
knowledge, trust, and patterns of cooperation
among the most powerful states. The
G16 could, depending on the issue, draw on
the insights and energies of a wider range
of nations, large and small, by developing
“groups of responsibility” to tackle specific
problems.
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Revitalizing International Institutions
The G16 would also engage heads of the UN,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Word Bank,
World Trade Organization (WTO), World Health
Organization (WHO), regional organizations
and other international institutions and tap the
private and civic sectors for input. The G16
would not be an alternative to the UN or other
multilateral or regional bodies, but a vehicle to
make them more effective. It would not handle
acute threats, which should be addressed at
the UN Security Council. Informal agreements
within the G16 would be taken to more
representative bodies for discussion and
review. Like the G8, it would schedule and
conduct meetings flexibly—convening at the
Leader’s level annually, at the Foreign Ministers
level more often, and promote interaction
among G16 national security advisors, political
directors, and other officials.
Restrain Use of the Veto on the Path
Toward UN Security Council Reform
The G16 will be a critical part of an international
order based on responsible sovereignty,
but it is not a substitute for an effective and
credible UN Security Council, which must
remain at the core of the international security
system. However, an early initiative on UNSC
membership expansion would risk political
deadlock and detract attention from progress
on other issues. Three steps are needed as
interim measures on a path toward more
comprehensive reform: 1) a commitment by
permanent members to act on membership
reform within a defined time period; 2)
discussion within international forums to build
a shared definition of threat and conditions for
the use of force; and 3) action on procedural
and veto reform at the Security Council.
As a confidence building measure, the
United States should lead on voluntary veto
reform at the Council on the most serious
aspect of the Council’s business—the
authorization of the use of force, sanctions,
or peacekeeping operations. It would
substantially enhance the legitimacy of the
UNSC were the Permanent Five (P5) to
agree—informally—that they would not use
the veto to block action on these issues
unless at least two permanent members
opposed that action. This would allow the
Security Council to avoid an impasse in
responding to conflict and humanitarian
crises even if tensions arise among members.
This double veto agreement would
provide the foundation for future efforts to
improve the Council’s effectiveness and
legitimacy. The veto could still be used to
block non-operational resolutions (condemnatory,
exhortative, etc) of the kind that clog
the Council’s agenda. And in extremis—in
defense of core interests or core allies—the
veto could still be wielded.
TRACK 2
21
A Continuing Agenda: Revitalizing
International Institutions
Reform Representation and Mandate
of the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs). In order to achieve
a global system of economic governance
that reflects changes in capital, power,
and population, efforts to increase the
decision-making authority of emerging
economies in the IMF and the World
Bank must be bolstered. The stability of
the international financial system will
require stronger capacity to detect and
prevent financial crises in countries with
large capital balances that also have limited
financial transparency and experience
in crisis management. To consent
to such scrutiny, emerging markets will
want stronger representation in the IMF
and World Bank. The United States and
Europe should offer a further redistribution
of shares to emerging economies
and cede their monopoly on heading
the World Bank and IMF as part of a
package to strengthen and target the
roles of these institutions.
Forestalling future economic crises will
require the IMF to exercise transparent
and independent surveillance over the
exchange rate policies of the United
States, Europe, Japan, China, and
other systemically significant countries—
powers it has only just begun to
acquire. On financial crises such as the
sub-prime mortgage collapse, the IMF
would ideally play a preventative role,
alerting members to potential weaknesses
in the system before a crisis unfolds.
The IMF has the ability to spark
dialogue, provide in-depth analysis and
independent assessment, and serve as
an “honest broker” to bring together
the G16 and key regional groups to
redress the economic threat posed by
global imbalances.
Mandated to assist poor countries left
behind by the global economy, the
TRACK 2
If the G8 is to continue to play
an important role, it must widen
its membership to become
more representative of today’s
world. If it does not … the G8
will not only have become the
architect of its own decreasing
relevance, but global cooperation
will have lost out once
again to global competition
and the international system
will fall even further behind
the ever evolving reality of the
global landscape…The time to
share power is when you have
it to share, not when others
are in a position to wrest it
from your grip.
—Paul Martin
Former Prime Minister of Canada;
MGI Advisory Group Member
World Bank’s traditional leadership
role in global development has eroded.
Middle-income countries have other
sources of capital; poor countries have
other sources of development and technical
assistance. However, the Bank has
an important role to play in promoting
inclusive and sustainable globalization,
particularly by helping developing countries
link to the global economy, and
in helping emerging economies bridge
the divide between rich and poor within
their own borders. On climate change,
the World Bank has also emerged as a
key international player, as it has with respect
to fragile and post-conflict states:
these areas should be prioritized and
further developed in the Bank’s future
assistance efforts.
Expand the UN Security Council. The
legitimacy of the Security Council is
grounded in the Charter, but depends
as well on perceptions of whether its
decisions truly reflect global opinion.
Expansion to increase the representation
of emerging powers and major
donors is needed to sustain their cooperation
and financing for institutional
investments and for UNSC resolutions.
The United States would send a strong
signal to emerging powers if in 2009 it
announced its commitment to UNSC
reform and articulated a credible pathway
forward. By doing so, it would also
re-assert its leadership at the UN.
Seats in the Security Council should
not simply be a reflection of power,
but should be an inducement towards
responsibility. Linking new seats to contributions
to international peace and
security would send a strong signal.
Expansion should also deal with concerns
about a loss of the Council’s efficiency.
The smallest possible expansion
that can meet the goal of rebalancing
and legitimating the Security Council
must be pursued.
22
First, the P5 should agree to an expansion
from the current base of 15 to 21
seats. The General Assembly would
elect the new members for six to ten
year terms based on criteria including:
financial contributions to the UN and
larger contributions to international
peace and security, including at a regional
level. The criteria for election
could be pre-negotiated by the G16
(or the countries that would constitute
it if its creation lags) and then
debated within the UNSC and General
Assembly. A central feature of a viable
package would be a fixed date set for
when long-term seats are reviewed for
possible transformation into permanent
ones.
Revitalize UN Management of Security
and Development Efforts. The past
four years have seen a debate over
management reform at the UN that
has fluctuated between sterile and
politicized. At the core of the debate
has been the balance between the powers
accorded to the Secretary-General
as chief operating officer of the UN,
and the powers accorded to member
states as ‘board members.’ Of particular
concern has been the consensus
system (ironically, initiated by the
United States) by which the General
Assembly’s budget committees authorize
the UN’s budget and manage its
spending. This has degenerated into
a one-state, one-veto tool for micromanagement.
The debate needs to be refocused on
the UN’s operational roles both in
security and development. This is where
the UN most directly affects human
lives, where the UN makes the largest
investments, and where current
management reform efforts are most
lacking. While there are substantial
inefficiencies in UN headquarters, its
net budget of just over $2 billion pales
in comparison to the more than $15
billion spent in 2007 on peacekeeping
and by the UN’s development and
humanitarian agencies.12
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently
proposed an ‘accountability
initiative’ that would focus on modernizing
management performance
Some have proposed creating a League or
Concert of Democracies as a new institution
designed to strengthen security cooperation
among the world’s liberal democracies.
If the United Nations cannot be reformed,
the Concert would “provide an alternative forum
for liberal democracies to authorize collective
action, including the use of force.”14
In addition, many have argued that such a
Concert or League would create a mechanism
to mobilize support for emerging
democracies.
In MGI’s consultations across diverse regions,
we found few takers on the idea among any
states, democratic or not, whether in Europe,
Undermining U.S. and International Convergence: The Risks of a Concert/League of Democracies
Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America.
The Concert, no matter its official mandate,
would alienate China, whose cooperation is
essential for progress across other areas of
shared interest, such as climate change, terrorism
and nonproliferation. Instead of building
on international convergence, MGI interlocutors
in China said such a concept could form the
basis for a second Cold War. Policymakers in
India argued that such a club would heighten,
not reduce, international insecurity by creating
divisions rather than unifying nations, while officials
from other key states allied with the United
States privately underscored that such an institution
would be counter-productive, especially
by isolating China. Others noted that the idea
wrongly assumes that democracies would
agree on the use of force, which was clearly
refuted in the case of Iraq.
If the purpose of the Concert is to support
emerging democracies, others queried how
the Concert would differ from the existing
Community of Democracies. Among all regions
we heard that if the goal of the Concert
is even broader than authorizing the use
of force and promoting democracy, then
it would assure its irrelevance by excluding
countries (e.g., China, Egypt) crucial to solving
global threats.
We currently have multilateralism
a la carte where nations
choose among the forums that
best pursue their interests. We
need instead to restore the
legitimacy of the United Nations
and pursue UN Security
Council reform. We cannot
allow efficiency to trump
legitimacy in international
institutions—or permit the
reverse to be true.
— Lalit Mansingh
Former Foreign Secretary of India;
MGI Advisory Group Member
23
within the UN Secretariat and improve
transparency and accountability of
the Secretariat to the member states.
It would also helpfully focus on the
accountability of member states to the
Organization—whether member states
live up to their commitments and back
mandates with resources.
The UN Ambassadors of the G16,
along with others, could commit to
supporting this initiative and extending
it to incorporate the rest of the
ten largest UN spending activities
where not already covered by the
Secretary-General’s initiative.13 The
goals should be increased effectiveness,
efficiency, and transparency in
the UN’s oversight and coordination
of dozens of complex peacekeeping
and development response efforts
worldwide. Early movement on such
reforms would help a new American
President argue with confidence for a
stronger UN role in the areas of peace
and security, and would bolster international
arguments for an expansion
of the UN’s role in development.
Strengthen Regional Organizations.
Regional organizations have played a
pioneering role in re-defining sovereignty,
developing cooperative norms
across states, serving as first-responders
to regional crises, and jointly addressing
transnational threats. Beyond the
G-16 and the United Nations, regional
organizations will play increasingly
important roles in managing and
implementing security arrangements.
Regional organizations can also make
use of their core comparative advantage—
proximity, in both physical and
political terms—to rapidly respond to
breaking crises.
Effective regional arrangements (formal
or informal) are also vital for ensuring
state compliance. Global institutions
are regulatory and normative devices,
but the diplomatic suasion and pressure
that is often required, especially in
managing escalating crises, resides
equally if not more so at the regional
level. While many threats have global
sources or causality, they are also felt
primarily at a regional level. This is
especially so for developmental and
environmental issues, as geographic
regions are frequently bound together in
common environmental or climate
systems. But it is also true of security
issues such as terrorism. Even global
phenomena like pandemics have
regional concentrations. The G16 and
the U.S. should focus concerted
attention on strengthening regional
fora as key elements of a revitalized
international security system.
The development and functions of regional
organizations around the world
vary. The Bush Administration recently
shifted towards a policy of recognizing
European security architecture as a positive
contribution to both regional and
global security—a policy that should continue.
Efforts to encourage the European
Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization(NATO) to develop
modalities for civilian-military cooperation
should also be supported. In Africa,
the United States and the G16 should
support a ten-year capacity building
program for the African Union (AU),
particularly in the area of peace and security.
This will require multi-year legislative
commitments of financial resources
and sustained policy attention. As part of
a wider engagement strategy with Asia,
the next American President must also
focus policy attention and resources on
Asian regional security arrangements
such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN
Regional Forum, and the Six-Party Talks
to strengthen the infrastructure for cooperation
among Asian powers. The U.S.
and G16 should also support the development
of a regional architecture for the
Middle East (see track 4)—where despite
a proliferation of transnational threats
and conflict, a robust regional structure
does not exist.
The notion that the United
States and other powerful
nations understand what is
in the best interest of those
across the developing world,
or act based on these interests,
has vanished completely.
As a result, international institutions
dominated by these
nations face a serious legitimacy
gap in the eyes of the
broader global community.
— Ayo Obe
Chair of the World Movement for Democracy;
MGI Advisory Group Member
24
TRACK 3
Strategy and Capacity
Tackling Shared Threats
The central task for a 21st century
international security system is
creating cooperative arrangements to
counter the rise of threats that defy
borders and challenge sovereignty and,
at times, survival.
MGI has focused on six global challenges—
climate change, nuclear proliferation,
threats to biological security,
terrorism, conflict, and poverty and
economic instability. Each requires
near-term attention and a sustained
strategy. Different countries and regions
will prioritize different threats. In an
interdependent world, action is necessary
across this full agenda in order to
get reciprocal cooperation on any one
nation’s top priorities. In other words:
you have to cooperate with others if
you want them to cooperate with you.
The global agenda—the UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) meeting in
December 2009 to forge a new international
agreement on climate change,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) review conference in 2010, and
the combination of a global food crisis
and the failure of the latest Doha
Round meeting —put climate change,
nuclear proliferation, and global
poverty and economic instability at the
forefront of the debate.
In all these issues, both powerful and
vulnerable states are affected. In the
case of climate change, continuation
of current trends in the use of fossil
fuels would constitute a new form of
“mutually assured destruction.” There
is no doubt of the catastrophic effects
if nuclear weapons are used or fall
into the wrong hands.
This agenda must also centrally
involve actors beyond national governments.
The private sector holds
the capital and technology to solve
problems ranging from climate
change to catastrophic disease. Local
governments are leading innovators
on energy security and efforts to
combat global warming. Labor views
will be crucial to design means to
ease transitions in a global economy.
Non-governmental organizations play a
central role in advocacy and action on
key threats. Schools, universities and
centers of excellence remain leaders
in generating ideas. In today’s world,
public-private dialogue and action will
be an essential part of an international
security system for the 21st century.
The cities, power plants and
factories we build in the next
seven years will shape our
climate in mid-century. We
have to act now to price
carbon and create incentives
to change the way we use energy
and spread technology—
and thereby avert nothing less
than an existential threat to
civilization.
— Rajendra K. Pachauri
Director-General, The Energy and Resources
Institute (TERI), Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2007,
Excerpt from keynote address at MGI Advisory
Group Meeting, Berlin, July 15–16th, 2008.
25
Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on
Climate Change Under UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Auspices
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change has estimated that the world has
seven years to begin the reduction of
annual greenhouse gas emissions to avoid
global temperature changes by mid-century
that would have devastating human,
environmental, and economic impacts.
Every major emitter must be party to the
agreement for it to be effective. Developed
and developing countries must partner to
design imaginative solutions to sustain
growth without the reliance on fossil fuels
that characterized the industrial revolution.
Getting there is a massive challenge given
diverse political interests: the European
Union (EU) and Japan favor binding carbon
emission targets, the United States does
not, China and India are focused on economic
growth, energy-exporting states care
about their markets, and poor developing
countries want both protection against the
impacts of climate change and investment
in modern infrastructure.
The goal must be a new agreement to
arrest global warming under the auspices of
the UNFCCC. An agreement must include
two tracks; 1) an ‘abatement track’ that
captures commitments on emissions
control; and 2) an ‘investment track’
covering conservation, technology,
rainforests and adaptation to the effects of
climate change. Ideally both tracks of such
an agreement will come together by the
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in
Copenhagen in December 2009. An
agreement on investment is within reach
and will gain support from developed and
developing countries alike who desire
access to technology, resources, and other
incentives to control emissions. Success on
the ‘abatement track’ will be far more
O P E N I N G ActI O N s :
Tackling Shared Threats
difficult: key states remain far apart on the
politics of the challenge.
Negotiations on the ‘abatement track’ could
be extended through a G16 Climate Group
(a ‘group of responsibility’ that included members
of the G16 plus other states central to
the emissions debate) that allowed for the
necessary negotiation between the major
emitters. The G16 Climate Group should be
established as a formal “Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technical Advice”—within
the UNFCCC—closing the gap between the
major emitters process and the UN process.
The Group would negotiate a global target
for 2015–2020 and commitments to pass
binding national laws to implement this target.
The G16 could accept the principle of pricing
carbon to promote conservation, spur innovation
and adopt common standards for reporting
carbon emissions. They would bring the
results of their negotiations to the UNFCCC
for wider discussion and buy-in, with the aim
of a binding agreement on emissions by 2012
or sooner as a companion to the international
agreement on investment.
Revitalize the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Regime
We have entered a second nuclear age where
proliferation is no longer only a problem of
states. Terrorists have sought nuclear weapons
and fissile material, while non-state actors have
created proliferation rings, selling nuclear weapons
technology and know-how. At the same
time, a combination of environmental concerns
related to global warming and the volatility of
international oil and gas markets is resurrecting
the demand for nuclear power, creating tensions
between energy needs and proliferation
concerns. In the Middle East and North Africa,
14 states either have or have declared they will
pursue some form of nuclear program.
Although the NPT has been a cornerstone of
collective security for more than 40 years, its
foundations have eroded. Without strong en-
TRACK 3
gagement with the NPT and other disarmament
treaties, the international community
does not have the moral authority to deter
states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.
Because the United States and Russia hold
the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, they
play a critical role in setting the framework
for nuclear security. A coalition of former
cabinet secretaries, Shultz, Perry, and
Kissinger, and Senator Nunn has revived
U.S. bipartisan support for arms control.
Unless (nuclear weapon
states) make a serious effort
to reduce their nuclear
armaments, with concrete
measures including a CTBT,
a drastic cut in the existing
arsenal, and a fissile material
cut-off, we will not have
the moral authority to go
after those who are trying to
develop nuclear weapons…
—Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Excerpt from remarks
at MGI Advisory Group Meeting, Berlin, July
15–16th, 2008.
continued...
26
Even so, nuclear reductions have become
all the more difficult after the tense standoff
between Russia and the West after the
crisis in Georgia. Yet these tensions only reinforce
the need for the U.S. and Russia to
use arms control as a means to normalize
relations, just as in 1983 President Reagan
decided to launch the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty, START, negotiations after
the Soviets downed a Korean Airlines passenger
jet.
Russia and the United States should stand
down the alert status of nuclear forces,
pledge no-first use, negotiate strategic
arms reductions, and extend immediately
the inspection and verification provisions
to the START, which expires in December
2009. They must engage at multiple
levels on missile defense—at a minimum
bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia
Council—and thus build on the precept
of regulated missile defense established
under the now defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. To establish its credibility on disarmament,
the U.S. must also ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).15
A consensus had also begun to emerge
among nuclear experts that the United
States should declare a dramatic unilateral
reduction of nuclear weapons not needed
for deterrence or offensive purposes. While
the Russia-Georgia conflict has made a
unilateral reduction politically difficult, the
O P E N I N G ActI O N s :
Tackling Shared Threats (continued)
fundamental reality has not changed that the
United States can reduce its nuclear arsenal,
still deter against nuclear attacks, and better
advance it nonproliferation goals.
These opening steps need to be met with
equal purpose from non-nuclear weapons
states, who should endorse making the
Additional Protocol mandatory, and work with
the nuclear weapons states to develop an
international fuel bank under the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This bank would
assure nations access to nuclear fuel as long
as they observe the NPT’s provisions, and
would create a means to centralize the control
and storage of spent nuclear fuel.
Sustain Commitment to a Global Trade
Agreement
Global systems of finance and trade have created
unprecedented prosperity, yet the borderless
nature of international markets can spread
instability across countries and continents,
threatening rich and poor. The world’s most
powerful countries need resiliency in global
financial and trade systems to sustain prosperity.
The poorest countries in the world need
access to global markets to combat poverty.
The shock that emanated from Doha’s collapse
and the efforts made to avoid its failure reflect
a latent under-standing of the need to bring
poor countries into the global trade regime.
Some will argue that key players such as the
United States and Brazil should refocus
attention on regional and bilateral agreements.
However, the proliferation of bilateral
deals has made trade agreements harder
to negotiate and enforce. Moreover, the
very transnational problems on agricultural
subsides and industrial protection that have
thwarted a global agreement will continue
to prevail bilaterally and regionally.
The progress made in the 2008 negotiations
should not be lost. Pascal Lamy,
Director General of the WTO, should publish
the 18 (out of 20) agreed trade areas
from the negotiations. Even if they have
no formal legal standing, these 18 points
should be the starting point for new negotiations
rather than retreading old ground.
The principle trading partners—starting with
a G16 subgroup of trade ministers from
the United States, the European Union,
India, Brazil and China—must make clear
that they expect new trade negotiations by
2010 and not leave room for speculation.
These countries will shape the nature of the
trading regime. They must pre-negotiate on
the most contentious points, and commission
research on complex issues that have
blocked consensus. This research and
pre-negotiation on the margins of the G16
would form the basis for WTO convened
revival talks on the Doha round in late 2010
(following elections in the United States and
for the European Commission).
TRACK 3
A Continuing Agenda: Foundations
for Stability and Security
Create a Center of Excellence for
Economic Prosperity. Experience has
shown that a range of strategies—
from official development assistance
to stable financial markets to open
trade—are required to promote economic
prosperity tailored to the diverse
conditions facing the world’s poor.
Yet, no focal point exists to coordinate
analysis and measure impact. Many different
international institutions—from
the World Bank and the IMF to the UN
Development Program (UNDP)—hold
a piece of the puzzle.
The 2010 summit on the Millennium
Goals should be used as a target for
action. Well in advance, the UN
Secretary General and President of the
World Bank should propose and create
a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity
with members appointed by the heads
of the World Bank, IMF, WTO, OECD,
and the UN Development Group.
Networks should be created with top
research institutions globally to draw
on their expertise. The UN Secretary
General and the President of the World
27
Bank would appoint a prominent
international figure to head the Center,
supported by a secretariat seconded
from participating institutions.
The Center would present points of
consensus; identify causal trends on
poverty eradication; assess interrelationships
among trade, finance and development
measures in specific countries;
investigate pressures and remedies for
protectionism; and consolidate indicators
of both donor and recipient
performance. The Center would also
consolidate the vast array of existing
performance reports on MDGs and
financing into a poverty clock, a tool to
show how overall poverty rates change
over time within individual countries
and regions.16
The Center’s work would be debated
at the annual meetings of the IMF and
World Bank. G16 leaders would also
charge their development, finance
and trade ministers with completing a
comprehensive picture of progress and
problems. Findings would form the
basis of the Millenium + 10 (2010) and
Millenium + 15 (2015) Summits.
Address the Security Challenges of
the Biological Century. While we are
entering a second nuclear age, we are
at the beginning of what some are already
calling the “Biological Century.”
Discoveries in the life sciences have
the potential to reshape the worlds of
health, food production, energy, and
climate change, leading to new fuels,
heat and drought resistant food crops,
and eradication of deadly diseases. But
biotechnology’s discoveries also have a
dark side—potential immense harm
through accidental or intentional release
of designer pathogens.
We also face myriad natural biological
threats. Fifteen million people die each
year from deadly infectious diseases,
and every year new ones emerge, such
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Avian Flu. In a world of
700 million international air passengers
yearly, and almost all on flights
shorter than the incubation times of
infectious diseases, national health is
only as good as global health.
The challenge for biological security is
two-fold. First, developed and developing
countries alike benefit from a
strong global public health regime that
controls disease outbreaks and builds
local capacity to sustain the health of
citizens. Effective public health is also
crucial against the threat of bioterrorism.
Given the global diffusion of
dangerous techniques and substances,
prevention will be difficult and therefore
defenses—global and local public
health systems—must be robust.
The World Heath Organization’s
International Health Regulations
(2005) lay out state responsibilities to
strengthen national and global disease
surveillance and response. What
is needed now is full implementation
of the regulations and building local
health capacity in the developing
world. A G16 initiative, in conjunction
with key leaders from the private sector,
can ensure that when deadly infectious
disease occurs, global reaction is
swift and supports local capability. This
is a win-win opportunity for development
and security.
Second, there is the need to promote
the bright side of biotechnology and
protect against its dark side. In the
long run, a new regime for biotechnology
safety and security needs to be
created. The existing international
regime to stop biological weapons,
the Biological and Toxic Weapons
Convention, is too slow and state-
The recent food crisis is an
urgent reminder of how deeply
interrelated issues like energy,
climate change, and poverty
are. We need a robust international
architecture to effectively
tackle these threats to our
shared security and prosperity.
The MGI Project’s Plan for
Action puts forward important
and necessary steps for
strengthening the capacity of
our international frameworks
and institutions to produce
results in today’s complex
world.
— Sylvia Mathews Burwell
President, Global Development Program,
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation;
MGI Advisory Group Member
TRACK 3
28
centric to address the dark-side uses
of biotechnology. With individuals
working in tens of thousands of
industry, research, and university labs
in every part of the world, such a
regime must engage industry, science,
and the public. Intermediate steps
can help create scientific consensus
and international trust in order to spur
collective action. An Intergovernmental
Panel on Safety of Biotechnology,
akin to the body that generated
international scientific consensus
around climate change (the IPCC),
could bring scientists from around
the world to forge consensus about
the trajectory of biotechnology risks.
Increase International Investments in
Conflict Management. Fragile and conflict-
ridden states that cannot maintain
rule of law or provide for the well-being
of their citizens undermine international
order and magnify the risk
of other transnational threats such as
terrorism and deadly infectious disease.
Civil violence often crosses borders and
draws regional and international actors
into its vortex.
With a rise in attention to internal conflict
in the post Cold War period, the
international architecture for conflict
prevention and management grew by
leaps and bounds, with international
institutions such as the UN, regional
organizations such as the European
Union and African Union, and individual
states, including the United States,
UK, Canada, and India developing
capabilities for conflict response. Nearly
200,000 international peacekeepers
are deployed around the world, about
100,000 of these under the United
Nations. However, the performance
of international institutions has been
mixed and capabilities still fall short of
the challenge. If the U.S. military had
comparable limitations in resources,
support, unified doctrine and training
as UN-designated peacekeepers,
the United States would never deploy
its forces. If existing responsibilities are
to be fulfilled and new crises to be met
with adequate response, national and
multilateral capabilities will have to be
streamlined and strengthened.
A low-cost first step is investing in
capacities for mediation and preventive
diplomacy at the UN and regional
organizations to help forestall crises or
respond rapidly to them. But diplomatic
methods will frequently lead to
demand for new peacekeeping operations,
and capacity there must be
expanded. As a critical step, each G16
member could designate a part of its
armed forces and police force for international
peacekeeping, which could
be made available directly to the UN
or through regional organizations. The
goal would be 50,000 reserves supplemented
by 20,000 police. The UN
would be responsible for designating
performance standards and qualifying
training programs.
In parallel, steps must be taken to
strengthen international peacebuilding.
Peacebuilding is a complicated
endeavor that requires the integration
of traditional military peacekeeping
with civilian initiatives to address
humanitarian need, increase local
capacity to administer the rule of law,
promote reconciliation, and re-build
state functions. The G16 should support
an initiative to develop a civilian reserve
at the UN of at least 1,000 specialists
to undertake key peacebuilding tasks,
rather than relying on ad hoc deployment
through contracts and multiple
agencies and departments. The G16
and additional states with interest and
funds to devote to peacebuilding should
also commit two billion in replenishable
funds for peacebuilding to support
rapid start-up of operations. Finally, the
UN Peacebuilding Commission role
in coordinating strategic plans and the
contributions of diverse donors should
be strengthened. Between headquarters
staff of the Peacebuilding Support
Office, and in-country strategy teams in
up to five concurrent missions, this will
require approximately 150 full-time staff
members.
Establish a UN High-Commission for
Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building.
The deep unpopularity of the war in
Iraq, which was inappropriately connected
to the campaign against Al
Qaeda, has created a political context
in many countries where combating
terrorism is equated with supporting
While considerable progress
has been made in efforts
at conflict resolution, much
more has to be done to deal
with this scourge which has
caused and continues to
cause death, destruction, and
human misery as evidenced in
the tragic situations in Darfur
and Somalia.
— Salim Ahmed Salim
Former Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity;
MGI Advisory Group Member
TRACK 3
29
unpopular U.S. goals. Although many
governments continue to cooperate
with the United States on counterterrorism
objectives, they frequently
encounter significant domestic opposition.
Yet, all nations share an interest
in preventing terrorist attacks on
their own soil and internationally. The
world’s leading economies would bear
the burden if a major terrorist attack
disrupted international trade or destabilized
key financial markets.
Having been the victim of the largest
terrorist attack in history and because
of its global reach, the United States
should be the natural leader in
cooperative efforts to combat terrorism.
But to re-claim a credible lead,
the United States must shift strategy
and rhetoric away from a general ‘War
Against Terror’ and toward a specific
war against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
This will involve continuing offensive
operations in Afghanistan, including
devoting the necessary resources and
attention to that operation, as well as
sanctioning individuals and states that
support al Qaeda elsewhere.
Since 9/11, the international community
has mobilized to establish new
standards and principles for combating
terrorism, notably through the
UN Security Council, the OECD, and
Interpol. Yet, despite widespread recognition
in principle that states remain
the front line of any counter-terrorism
strategy, there is no dedicated international
capacity to help weaker states
build the capacity to combat terrorism.
A new G16 should play a catalytic
role in designing and generating
support for a UN High-Commission
for Counter-Terrorism Capacity
Building, modeled on the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
that would fill a critical gap in counterterrorism
efforts.
Following the UNHCR model, the
Commission’s board would be politically
and regionally diverse, and treaty
based. States seeking membership on
the board of the High Commission
would have to be in compliance with
UN counter-terrorism treaties and law,
creating an important lobby for continued
improvement in the counterterrorism
regime. As a UN body, its
policies and capacities could command
substantial legitimacy, especially within
states uncomfortable with the legacy of
U.S.-backed strategies.
Clockwise from top left: UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon; MGI Advisory Group Member Jan Eliasson,
Former Special Envoy to the UN Secretary-General on
Darfur; MGI Advisory Group Members Javier Solana,
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, European Union and Igor Ivanov, Former Russian
Foreign Minister; At MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin,
July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Member Wolfgang
Ischinger, Chairman, Munich Conference on Security Policy.
TRACK 3
30
TRACK 4
Internationalizing
Crisis Response
Focus on the Broader
Middle East
Global leaders must have confidence
that a 21st century international
security system will produce better
outcomes on the crises at the top of
their national security agendas.
Otherwise, they will not invest the
necessary resources and political effort
to cultivate global partnerships and
effective international institutions.
The broader Middle East is the most
unstable region in the world, and a
vortex of transnational threats and
interlocking crises from Lebanon to
Iran and Afghanistan. Unless crisis
response in the region is internationalized,
regional stability, global energy
supplies, and key security arrangements
such as the NPT are threatened.
The United States is neither solely
responsible for, nor solely capable of,
managing or resolving the several interlocking
crises in the broader Middle
East. Many states point to the U.S. role
in stoking regional instability, civil war
within Iraq, rising anti-Western sentiment,
and volatility of international
energy markets. However, each of the
G16 countries and much of the world
share an overriding interest in a stable
Middle East. All will be worse off if
crises in the Middle East escalate, if
terrorism spreads further, if energy
prices swing out of control, if Iraq falls
into permanent chaos, or if tensions
between the Muslim world and the
West fester or escalate. The complexity
of the challenge will require a truly
international response.
A unilateral U.S. approach has been
inadequate in the face of the region’s
complexities. Meanwhile, international
tools such as UN peacekeeping and the
IAEA’s inspections system have played
important roles in containing the region’s
crises. However, even the most
ambitious agenda for international
institutions would recognize serious
limits in this hardest of hard cases.
Neither U.S. unilateral policy nor multilateralism
as usual will suffice. The
Middle East illustrates the need to combine
U.S. leadership, the engagement
of the traditional and rising powers,
and effective institutions if crises are to
be overcome.
A peaceful, prosperous and
more stable Middle East requires
both reforming national
governance, and resolving the
Arab Israeli conflict. Ending
Israeli occupation of Palestinian
and Arab territories and establishing
a sovereign Palestinian
state, should enable sustainable
Arab Israeli reconciliation.
Reform based on an overall
strategic vision articulated by
Arabs themselves should move
their societies towards more
inclusive systems based on
respect for human rights and
the rule of law. But for peace
and reform to succeed, regional
efforts must be reinforced
with strong and even-handed
US involvement, international
partnerships, and effective
global institutions.
— Rima Khalaf Hunaidi
Chief Executive Officer, Mohammed bin Rashid
Al Maktoum Foundation; Former Assistant
Secretary-General and Director, Regional Bureau
for Arab States, UN Development Program;
MGI Advisory Group Member
31
TRACK 4
Convene a Friends Group and Plan for
an International Peacebuilding Mission
to Support the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process
The Bush Administration’s decision in
November 2007 to convene
a wider range of
interested and influential parties in Annapolis,
helped breathe life into a moribund Middle
East peace process. Keeping the process
moving forward, against the constant
temptation to move away from diplomacy in
the face of renewed violence, will be critical to
stabilizing the region.
All parties recognize that U.S. leadership
of the Middle East peace process is
necessary, but U.S. actions alone will not
suffice. The United States should establish
a “Friends Group” on the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that broadens the existing Quartet
to include key members of the G16, including
Turkey. The Friends Group could help
bring Middle East peace closer by providing
encouragement, support, and occasional
pressure to move forward the peace process.
Arab and Muslim majority members
of a Friends Group could help to ensure
that Hamas accepts, or does not obstruct,
the negotiations on an agreement.
Forward movement on an Israeli-Palestinian
agreement will take place in the context of
a drastically weakened governing capacity
on the Palestinian side and likely spoilers
from both sides. The potential exists for a
credible, international, transitional administrative
and peacekeeping operation, mandated
(though not necessarily commanded)
by the United Nations, to be deployed to
help implement a peace agreement. The
Friends Group, perhaps under a joint U.S.-
Turkish lead, could begin fostering operational
plans for such a presence. The group
could help ensure the necessary political
authorization from the United Nations, as
well as the support of the League of Arab
States, and galvanize the necessary commitments
of troops and financial resources.
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Internationalizing Crisis Response in the Broader Middle East
Improve International Strategy and
Increase Investments for Afghanistan
With implications for counter-terrorism efforts,
regional stability, and the viability of international
peacebuilding support efforts, the global
stakes in the success of Afghanistan’s recovery
are enormous. For the Afghan people, this is a
moment to rebuild after almost thirty years of
war. Failure would signal that the international
community does not have the capacity to help a
fledgling democracy overcome a legacy of poverty
and terror. It would recreate a haven for the
Taliban and Al Qaeda, further erode stability in
Pakistan, and generate a massive crisis in confidence
in core international security instruments.
As of mid-2008, a stronger and more effective
international force and civilian presence
are needed in Afghanistan to break a cycle of
continued conflict and instability in the south
and east. A first prerequisite will be a combination
of adequate forces to give reconstruction
a chance, and a commitment to sustain those
forces until local capacity is stronger. After multiple
appeals, NATO countries are not likely to
increase forces further. The U.S. may be able
to redeploy some troops from Iraq. Several
European and Asian nations have participated
at low levels and are not likely to contribute
more. Moreover, many NATO and non-NATO
contributors to ISAF—with notable exceptions
like the UK and Canada—have placed
serious restrictions on the deployment of their
troops–damaging NATO’s credibility as a fighting
force. Nations will need to reconsider these
“caveats.” NATO should also pursue unprecedented
cooperation with China, perhaps first
in the area of police training, to add depth both
in numbers and in political relationships in the
sub-region. Success there could lead to wider
Chinese deployments in Afghanistan, which
could potentially free up NATO troops to redeploy
to more insecure parts of the country.
The United Nations, with unequivocal backing
from the United States and the major
European and Asian donors, must also
continued...
engage Afghan leaders on corruption. The
UN and NATO Secretaries General could
together appoint an “eminent persons
group” staffed by national and international
security, governance, and development
experts to recommend a shared Afghaninternational
framework to tackle corruption
and narcotics, while addressing the
need for alternative livelihoods.
Civilian capacity also needs to be radically
increased. The dearth of capacity in Afghan
structures requires skilled international
civilians deployed municipally to train and
support local Afghans. It means that governments
will have to hire and deploy more
civilians. The UN Special Representative
of the Secretary General could convene a
national planning exercise in Kabul with key
Afghan stakeholders and donors. Donors
will need to fund a civilian planning team
comparable to what they would expect for
a military operation.
A Political Settlement and Civilian
Surge for Iraq
Most nations want nothing to do with U.S.
policy in Iraq. They see it as an American
quagmire. Yet the entire Middle East and
much of the world would live with the consequences
of a meltdown in Iraq that would
spark a wider Sunni-Shi’a struggle, entrench
Iraq as a failed state and recruiting ground
for terrorism, exacerbate the displacement
of 4.5 million people, and further destabilize
energy markets. The meeting point between
American and international concern is regional
stability, and here there is scope for
cooperation.
The decline in violence in Iraq in 2008
creates a critical opportunity for political
stability. A starting point is endorsing
a “diplomatic surge,” undertaken through
cooperation between the United Nations
and the United States and with backing
from the G16, to reach a political settlement
32
TRACK 4
in Iraq. President Bush made evident in
his final State of the Union speech that the
United States will likely retain 130,000 to
150,000 troops in Iraq by the end of 2008.
Remove the U.S. force presence and the
chances for a conflagration are high. Keep
forces there without a political settlement
and the chances for greater resentment
and backlash against the United States are
high. The emerging lesson for the United
States has been documented repeatedly in
other conflicts: eventually there must be a
political agreement to end internal conflicts
and provide a foundation for sustainable
peace.
The G16 and other key states could exert
their influence with Iraq’s neighbors to support,
or at least not disrupt, the search for
a negotiated settlement. The United States
would need to coordinate its bilateral
military and diplomatic strategy to support
a wider peace agenda. If, by exploring a
deal among Iraqis, the UN were to call for
a peace conference such as the Bonn negotiations
for Afghanistan, the G16 states
would need to commit to provide tangible
support for a settlement. If the G16 states
O P E N I N G AC T I O N S :
Internationalizing Crisis Response in the Broader Middle East
signal that a settlement in Iraq is a matter
of international concern, this will create a
better climate for compromise.
Regional and International Diplomacy
on Iran’s Nuclear Program
G16 states’ support to regional diplomacy
on Iraq would have an additional benefit of
engaging Iran, which could create a more
productive framework for negotiations over
its nuclear program. Although it is evident
that resolution of the current stand-off
between Iran and the Security Council
will require increased U.S. engagement in
negotiations, G16 states’ backing for a proposal
to Iran that includes civilian nuclear
power, fuel guarantees, and reprocessing
of spent fuel would underscore that such
an alternative is credible, not just a Western
ploy to deny Iran an enrichment capacity.
If Iran should continue to prove recalcitrant
in the face of UN Security Council and G16
efforts, the exercise of having worked diplomatically
through those mechanisms would
help to ensure a broad-based effort to contain
Iranian ambitions and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
A Continuing Agenda:
Internationalizing Crisis Response
Building Momentum Toward a
Regional Architecture for the Middle
East. The Annapolis Process and
Friends Group convened for the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process could serve
as the foundation for a future regional
security mechanism for the Middle East
that would provide a venue to create
patterns of cooperation among states,
reinforce borders, manage crises and
transnational threats and eventually
promote regional norms on political
reform and economic development.
Those G16 members that are part of
the Annapolis process could, with
concerted U.S. engagement, support
the diplomacy required to move forward
a regional structure. Its mandate and
structure could be based on the
Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE), which focused on
three categories of issues relevant to
the broader Middle East: border stability,
economic cooperation, and human
rights and political reform. In addition
to tackling contemporary crises, the
organization could help address broader
tensions that have arisen between the
West and the Muslim World.17
Progress towards a regional security
mechanism would depend on prior
progress on the Israeli-Palestinian,
Iraqi and Iranian crises—but prenegotiations
towards that mechanism
could constitute a significant inducement
towards settlement on these
fronts, aiding crisis-specific diplomacy.
To be effective, the effort would need
to be supported by the UN Security
Council, which could also task the
Secretary General with supporting a
regional mechanism, either through
an envoy or a regional diplomatic office.
Economic incentives from the
leading Gulf economies, Japan and
The international community
has simply been unable to
address failed states effectively.
Afghanistan exemplifies
the lack of political will
and sufficient capacity to
deal with areas of conflict …
There is little question that
building a more peaceful
Afghanistan is crucial to
global security—the only
doubt is whether the international
community can
surmount political obstacles
and summon the resources
to take on this daunting
task.
— Ashraf Ghani
Chairman of the Institute for State
Effectiveness; Former Minister of Finance for
Afghanistan; MGI Advisory Group Member
33
the European Union would add to the
prospect of success.
Improve Relations Between Islam
and the West. Misunderstanding and
distrust between Muslims and non-
Muslims have already created a divide
along religious and ethnic lines that
could dangerously split parts of the
world that desperately need to cooperate
on issues ranging from economic
stability to counterterrorism. Yet a legacy
of authoritarianism in the Middle
East, and the success of Islamist parties
in competing with the state to provide
social services, makes it likely that
competitive politics will bring Islamists
TRACK 4
to power in the short run. Conversely,
American abuses of human rights at
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, along
with phrases such as Islamic terrorism,
have created a perception that the
United States is hostile to Islam and
sees Islam as a driver of terrorism.
Consultations in the Middle East underscored
that there is a potential for
a new U.S. President to build bridges.
Muslim-majority states increasingly see
that they have an interest in a rulebased
international order. Western
leaders understand they must cooperate
with the Muslim majority states to
achieve their goals on counterterrorism
and regional security. Even with
the U.S. military surge in Iraq, success
has depended on the cooperation of
local leaders. In some cases simple
vocabulary will make a difference—
for example avoiding phrases such as
Islamic terrorism—but policy changes
are also needed, including actions MGI
has highlighted: promoting peace in
the Middle East, demonstrating respect
for international law, and avoiding double
standards on democratic principles.
Clockwise from top left: At MGI Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008:
MGI Advisory Group Members Chester Crocker, Professor of Strategic Studies,
Georgetown University, and Vincent Maphai, Chairman, BHP Billiton, South Africa;
Top right: Francis Deng, UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide;
Middle Right: MGI Advisory Group and European Policymaker meeting at Ditchley
Park, February, 2008: from left, Jeff Gutman, Vice President and Head of Network,
Operations Policy and Country Service, The World Bank; Brett House, Senior
Macroeconomist, Earth Institute, Columbia University; MGI Advisory Group Member
Igor Ivanov, Former Russian Foreign Minister; James Kariuki, Head of Policy Planning
Staff, Foreign Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom; John McArthur, Deputy
Director, UN Millennium Project, Earth Institute, Columbia University; Bottom: MGI
Advisory Group Meeting in Berlin, July 15–16, 2008: MGI Advisory Group Member
Sylvia Mathews Burwell, President, Global Development Program, The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation; Middle Left: MGI Consultations in Beijing, China: from
left, Chu Shurong, China Foreign Affairs University; MGI Co-Director Carlos Pascual;
MGI Advisory Group member Wu Jianmin, President, China Foreign Affairs University;
MGI Co-Director Stephen Stedman.
34
Management: Sequencing
and Targets of Opportunity
This agenda for action is sweeping
but unavoidable. It will require
immediate and sustained attention,
political momentum, and parallel
action to achieve results across the
diverse issues and pending crises
facing global powers.
The international community will look
first for signs that the United States
seeks genuine global partnerships.
Thus, Track 1 must begin in earnest
immediately following the election of
the new American President. Restored
American standing in the world is the
foundation for successful revitalization
of the international security system.
The rest of the world will not support
U.S. leadership on a reform agenda if
the United States does not commit to
international cooperation.
The G16’s convening power, the collective
weight of its economies and
diplomatic and military capacities, and
its combined populations would create
an unparalleled platform to catalyze
and mobilize effective international
action: a steering mechanism to navigate
the turbulence of diffuse power,
transnational threats, and the changing
distribution of power among key states.
The formation of a G16 in 2009 would
support progress on other aspects of
this action agenda such as revitalizing
other international institutions (Track
2), combating transnational threats
(Track 3), and internationalizing crisis
response (Track 4). G8 leaders must
make a concerted diplomatic push with
2009 host Italy to shape the agenda of
the 2009 meeting toward the goal of
G16 formation.
If the G16 is not formally created in 2009,
the United States and other traditional
powers should act as if the body exists and
use informal groupings to gain comparable
effects. That will put a strain on
American diplomatic capacity, but it will
pay dividends in making the U.S. diplomatic
efforts more effective.
The international agenda will also
impose a schedule of action on transnational
threats. This includes the 2009
Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate
Change and 2010 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty review conference.
These events offer a venue to make
concrete progress on the climate change
and nuclear proliferation agendas.
Actions in the next two years will also
determine whether the Doha round of
the WTO or a successor arrangement
can be concluded. An agreement is
needed to produce a framework for
international trade that brings poor
countries into global supply chains, or
else undermines the WTO’s credibility
as a rule-setting global institution.
Finally, crises will continue. They will
remain at the top of domestic foreign
policy priorities and therefore require
immediate attention. Yet, powerful
states such as the United States will be
much more likely to achieve a political
settlement in Iraq, address the nuclear
threat in Iran, and promote stability in
Afghanistan, working with global partners
and through effective international
institutions. Progress on a wider agenda
to revitalize the international security
system and engage rising powers in cooperative
arrangements must occur in
parallel. Success on this global agenda
will not only deliver on today’s crises, it
will prevent tomorrow’s disasters.
The attached timeline represents the
global agenda for 2009 to 2012, the
first term for the next U.S. President.
These events present opportunities for
global leaders to move toward a revitalized
international order for the 21st
century. The agenda the MGI Project
has presented will continue much
farther into the future. The process of
building international capabilities to
manage transnational threats must be
dynamic—just as we would never expect
our national governments to stop
improving their governance capacities.
Yet, we cannot wait to start. The longer
the delay in new approaches and new
cooperation against mounting threats,
the harder the challenges will become
and the more trust will erode. We must
chart a shared path forward now to
manage the threats and capitalize on
the opportunities of a changed world.
TIMELINE GLOBAL AGENDA 2009–2010
TRACK 1
American Leadership
TRACK 2
International
Institutions
TRACK 3
Shared Threats
TRACK 4
Broader Middle
East
Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan Mar May July Sept Nov
2009 2010
Inauguration
State of
the Union
State of
the Union
Midterm
elections
President’s
budget due
Delayed
Iraqi Provincial
Elections
Iraqi National
Elections
NATO 60th
Anniversary
Summit
NATO Summit
Iranian
Presidential
Elections
Conference of the
Parties 15 (COP15)
UN Framework
Convention on
Climate Change
Review of the UN
Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy,
64th session of the
General Assembly
Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty
Review Conference
5 Year Review of the
United Nations Peace
Building Commission
G8+
Summit
Canada
G8+
Summit
Italy
United Nations
General Assembly
Millennium
Development
Summit + 10
WB/IMF
Meeting
UN General
Assembly
WB/IMF
Meeting
President’s
budget due
Afghanistan
Presidential
Elections
Afghanistan
Parliamentary
Elections
35
TIMELINE GLOBAL AGENDA 2011–2012 2012 Targets
• U.S. leadership restored on international
cooperation
• U.S. upholds commitments under
international law
• Expanded U.S. civilian toolbox for
cooperative diplomacy
• G16 to bridge effectiveness and legitimacy
• Reformed representation and mandate
of the IFIs
• Expanded and more effective UN Security
Council
• Accountability reforms in major UN bodies
• Strengthened regional organizations:
Africa and Middle East
• New climate change agreement under
UNFCCC auspices
• Revitalized nuclear non-proliferation regime
• New agreement on inclusive global trade
• Intergovernmental Panel on Biotechnology
• Increased international capacity for
sustaining peace
• UN High Commissioner for Counter
Terrorism Capacity Building
• Friends Group and international
peacebuilding effort for the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process
• A stable and sustainable peace in Afghanistan
• A political settlement in Iraq
• Diplomatic resolution to the Iranian
nuclear program
• Plans underway for Middle East regional
security mechanism
Jan Mar May July Sept Nov Jan Mar May July Sept Nov
2011 2012
State of
the Union
State of
the Union
10 year
anniversary
of 9/11
Proposed Iraqi timetable
for withdrawal
of U.S. combat troops
NATO
Summit
NATO
Summit
Review Conference of
the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC)
G8+
Summit
France
G8+
Summit
U.S.
G8+
Summit
U.S.
UNGA
UN General
Assembly
WB/IMF
Meeting
WB/IMF
Meeting
President’s
budget due
President’s
budget due
36
TRACK 1
TRACK 1 GOAL: America restores its standing internationally—a necessary foundation for credible U.S. leadership across this action agenda
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Deliver Consistent and Strong Messages on International Cooperation
• High-level consultations conducted to promote global dialogue
• Presidential speeches in the lead-up to the G8, UNGA, and in strategic international capitals;
message delivered on U.S. leadership to build a 21st century international security system
• U.S. shifts rhetoric away from a general GWOT and towards a specific war against
Al Qaeda and its affiliates
Demonstrate Respect for a Rules-Based System
• U.S. upholds Geneva Conventions, Convention Against Torture and other laws of war
• U.S. President closes Guantanamo and works with Congress on a
sustainable detainee policy
Upgrade the U.S. Toolbox for Cooperative Diplomacy
• U.S. President commits to double the size of the foreign service within ten years
• U.S. administration works with Congress to re-write the Foreign Assistance Act to elevate development
priorities and increase the effectiveness of foreign aid delivery
TRACK 2
TRACK 2 GOAL: The legitimacy and effectiveness of key international institutions are enhanced by increasing representation of
emerging powers and re-focusing mandates toward 21st century challenges
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Create a Group of 16
• Create a new G16 to foster cooperation among the major and emerging powers; serve as
a pre-negotiating forum to forge preliminary agreements on global challenges
• Membership: G8 plus the Outreach 5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Mexico), plus Indonesia,
Turkey, Egypt or Nigeria
Restrain Use of the Veto as a Path Toward UN Security Council Reform
• As a confidence building measure, U.S. leads on voluntary veto reform at the Council on the most serious
aspect of UNSC business—authorization of the use of force, sanctions or peacekeeping operations
Reform Representation and Mandate of the International Financial Institutions
• The U.S. and Europe offer a further redistribution of shares to emerging economies and cede their
monopoly on choosing heads of the WB and IMF
• In exchange, the IMF exercises greater surveillance over the exchange rate policies of systematically
significant countries, including emerging economies; IMF leads on international negotiations to redress
global imbalances
• WB role focused to address inequality within emerging economies, climate change, and fragile and
conflict-ridden states
Expand the UN Security Council
• P5 agree to expand current base of 15 to 21 seats; General Assembly elects new members
for six to ten-year terms
• Fixed date set for when long-term seats are reviewed for possible transformation into permanent ones
Strengthen Regional Organizations
• G16 support for a 10-year capacity building program for the AU
• U.S. President invests in Asian regional security arrangements
• G16 support regional security mechanism for the Middle East
• U.S. continues concerted engagement with EU security arrangements, including promoting
EU/NATO cooperation
37
TRACK 3
TRACK 3 GOAL: Utilize enhanced international cooperation and international institutions to tackle key global threats
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Negotiate Two-Track Agreement on Climate Change Under UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) auspices
• Track 1 is emissions abatement: major emitters agree on global 2020 and 2050 emissions targets,
price carbon, and legislate/coordinate national measures
• Track 2 is investment: investment in technology, adaptation, and rainforests to manage the impacts
of climate change on the developing world
• Negotiations led through a G16 climate group under UNFCCC auspices
Revitalize the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
• Nuclear states re-pledge commitment to disarmament: initiate a joint study of reducing their nuclear
weapons to zero
• Russia and the U.S. stand down the alert status of nuclear forces, pledge no-first use, extend inspection
and verification provisions to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), negotiate arms reductions
• U.S. President begins efforts toward U.S. ratification of CTBT
• Non-nuclear states endorse making the Additional Protocol mandatory
• All states work toward an international fuel bank under the International Atomic Energy Agency
Sustain Commitment to Global Trade
• Director of the WTO publishes the 18 (out of 20) trade agreements from the latest round of Doha
negotiations as a foundation for future efforts
• The principle WTO trading partners—starting with G16 trade ministers—conclude a trade round
focused on developing countries
Create a Center of Excellence for Economic Prosperity
• UN Secretary General and President of the World Bank create a Center of Excellence for Economic
Prosperity with members appointed by heads of relevant international institutions; networks created
with top research institutions globally
• Center consolidates existing performance reports on MDGs and financing into a poverty clock to show
how overall poverty rates change across countries/regions. Center’s work is debated at the annual meetings
of the IMF and WB; Finding form the basis of the Millennium + 10 (2010) and + 15 (2015) Summits
Strengthen Response to Biological Threats
• Initiate an effort to build local public health capacity to achieve full implementation of the International
Health Regulations (2005)
• Develop an intergovernmental panel on biotechnology to forge scientific consensus on the dangers and
benefits of biotechnology
Increase International Investments in Conflict Management
• Member states increase investments in UN capacities for mediation and preventive diplomacy at the
UN and regional organizations
• G16 designate a part of their armed forces for international peacekeeping with a goal of 50,000 reserves.
This should be supplemented by 20,000 police and rule-of-law specialists
• G16 plus key states with an interest/funds commit two billion in funding for peacebuilding to support
rapid start-up at the UN; UN Peacebuilding Commission strengthened to develop strategic plans and
coordinate operations
Establish a UN High Commissioner for Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building
• G16 plays a catalytic role in designing and generating support for a new High Commission for Counter-
Terrorism Capacity Building to focus international efforts to build counter-terrorism norms and capacity
TRACK 4
TRACK 4 GOAL: Internationalize crisis response in the broader Middle East to address regional conflict and transnational threats
Opening Actions Continuing Agenda
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Continue the Annapolis Process
• U.S. promotes a “Friends Group” that broadens the Quartet to include key G16 members that can
exert leverage to reach agreement
• Parties and Friends Group plan for a credible, international peacekeeping operation to be deployed
to implement a future agreement
Improve International Strategy and Increase Investments for Afghanistan
• Seek further troop commitments to secure volatile regions
• UN and NATO Secretaries General appoint an eminent persons group to initiate an Afghan-international
framework to tackle corruption
• UN Special Representative of the Secretary General convenes a national planning exercise to build
civilian capacity
Support for a Political Settlement and Civilian Surge for Iraq
• UN and U.S. cooperate on a diplomatic surge for Iraq to reach a political settlement, including
investments in diplomatic and development personnel
• G16 support political settlement by exerting influence on Iraq’s neighbors and providing political
impetus for a peace agreement
Sustain Regional and International Diplomacy on Iran’s Nuclear Program
• G16 backing for a proposal to Iran that includes civilian nuclear power, fuel guarantees, and
reprocessing of spent fuel in exchange for negotiations on its nuclear program
Build Momentum Toward a Regional Architecture for the Middle East
• Friends Group convened for Israeli-Palestinian conflict serves as the foundation for a future regional
security mechanism for the Middle East
• Middle East regional mechanism provides a venue to encourage cooperation, reinforce borders,
manage crisis and transnational threats, and eventually promote regional norms on political reform
and development
• Regional organization development is supported by a UN envoy or regional diplomatic office and
economic incentives from Gulf countries, Japan, and the European Union
Improve Relations Between Islam and the West
• West focuses on messages that build bridges rather than alienate, including avoiding phrases such
as Islamic terrorism
• U.S. focuses on respect for international law, and avoiding double standards on democratic principles
in the Muslim world
38
39
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
GWOT Global War on Terror
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations
G8 Group of Eight: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
GEF Global Environment Facility
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFI International Financial Institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
MDG Millennium Development Goal
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC U.S. National Security Council
Outreach 5 Five developing nations invited by the G8
participate in selected portions of the G8 meetings: Brazil,
China, India, Mexico South Africa. Also known as G8+5.
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
United Nations
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
P5 Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council
RDB Regional Development Bank
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN United Nations
UNDESA The United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping
Operations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary General
US DOS United States Department of State
US DOE United States Department of Energy
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank, or World Bank Group (WBG)
WFP World Food Program, United Nations
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
Appendix:
Acronym List
40
Appendix:
End Notes
1. David Dollar, “Poverty, Inequality
and Social Disparities During China’s
Economic Reform,” World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 4253,
World Bank, June 2007.
2. Francis Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro,
Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild,
and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty
as Responsibility (The Brookings
Institution, Washington D.C., 1996).
Deng, an African statesman, first enunciated
the concept of sovereignty as
responsibility in 1993 in the context of
protection of civilians during humanitarian
emergency and in fragile and
conflict-ridden states.
3. “New Consensus Emerging on Value
of Forging Global Partnerships to
Enhance Security, Reduce Foreign Oil
Dependence, Address Climate Change”
United Nations Foundation and Better
World Campaign, Public Concern Poll
2008, http://www.betterworldcampaign.
org/news-room/press-releases/us-reject-
go-it-alone.html
4. Pew Research Center Global Attitudes
Poll 2008 “More See America’s Loss
of Global Respect as Major Problem”
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_
detail.aspx?id=298
5. One option that has been proposed
by legal experts is a National Security
Court whose architecture incorporates
a fair and robust due process system
thereby garnering broader legitimacy
than our current patchwork system.
Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War
(The Penguin Press, New York, 2008),
164–166.
6. Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2009 http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2009/
7. Steven Kosiak, “FY 2009 Request
Would Bring DoD Budget to Record
(Or Near-Record) Levels,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Update, February 4, 2008. http://
www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/U.20080204.FY_2009_
Request/U.20080204.FY_2009_Request.
pdf.
8. “Total Net ODA in 2007, USD million,
preliminary estimates”, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and
Development, http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/27/34/40381949.xls.
9. Brookings–CSIS Taskforce, Transforming
Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century,
Executive Recommendations, p. 4, (June
22, 2006).
10. The Modernizing Foreign Assistance
Network, New Day, New Way: U.S.
Foreign Assistance for the 21st Century,
June 1, 2008; Craig Cohen and Noam
Unger, “Surveying the Civilian Reform
Landscape,” The Stanley Foundation
Project Brief, 2008.
11. Wayne M. Morrison and Michael
F. Martin, “How Large is China’s
Economy? Does it Matter?” CRS Report
for Congress, February 13 (2008).
12. United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, “Financing
of United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations”, UN documents
A/C.5/61/18 and A/C.5/62/23 (July
2007) http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/contributors/financing.html;
World Food Programme: “Resource,
Financial and Budgetary Matters”,
(February 2008), http://www.wfp.org/
eb/docs/2008/wfp147420~1.pdf
13. This would then cover the UN’s
peacekeeping operations, field-based
political missions, humanitarian coordination
operations—each managed from
the Secretariat—and the work of the
World Food Program, the UN
Development Program, the UN
Children’s Fund, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, the UN
Relief and Works Agency, the UN Food
and Agricultural Organization, and the
UN Environment Program—
collectively, responsible for the majority
of the UN’s field-oriented spending.
14. The Princeton Project on National
Security, “Forging a World of Liberty
Under the Law,” September 27, 2006.
15. Michael O’Hanlon, “Resurrecting
the Test Ban Treaty,” Survival 50 (1),
February–March 2008, p. 119–132.
16. The idea of a poverty clock was first
put forward by our colleague Homi
Kharas, Senior Fellow in the Global
Development Program at the Brookings
Institution.
17. Here our proposals echo similar calls
made by the Princeton Project on
National Security and a forthcoming
report by the Brookings/Council on
Foreign Relations joint Task Force on
the Middle East (November 2008).
The Princeton Project on National
Security, ibid.
Managing Global Insecurity (MGI)
Partner Institutions
The Brookings Institution
Foreign Policy
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel (202) 741-6560
Fax (202) 797-6003
www.brookings.edu/projects/mgi.aspx
New York University
Center on International
Cooperation
418 Lafayette Street, Suite 543
New York, New York 10003
Tel (212) 998-3680
Fax (212) 995-4706
Stanford University
Center for International
Security and Cooperation
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Tel (650) 723-2300
Fax (650) 723-0089
The Brookings Institution
Foreign Policy
New York University
Center on International
Cooperation
Stanford University
Center for International
Security and Cooperation
2009 2010 2011 2012New York University
Center on International
Cooperation
Stanford University
Center for International
Security
and Cooperation
2009 2010 2011 2012Security and Cooperation
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Tel (650) 723-2300
Fax (650) 723-0089
The Brookings Institution
Foreign Policy
New York University
Center on International
Cooperation
Stanford University
Center for International
Security and Cooperation
2009 2010 2011 2012