Keeping a secret

Sunday, July 19, 2009

http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/

Keeping a secret

There is a report today of another Russian helicopter going in, an Mi-8 – this one at Kandahar, sadly with at least 16 deaths. Enemy action is not suspected.

The operator was the Russian air company Vertical-T, another of those dodgy Skylink "partners”, although there is no information yet as to whether this was running a Nato or British contract. It could have been, but it could also have been ferrying for an NGO or other outfit in the region.

Meanwhile, in a lazy, ill-informed article by Christopher Leake in the Mail on Sunday, we see the paper wake up to part of the story about civilian contractors supplying helicopter lift to the MoD in Afghanistan.

Under a plainly wrong headline, which declares: "Now we are borrowing Russian helicopters to fight the Taliban", we this get Leake proclaim that "British frontline troops in Afghanistan are so short of helicopters and transport planes that they are being bailed out by the Russians."

Actually, we may be using "Russian" helicopters (although the new models are not built in Russia) but there is no direct Russian involvement in the helicopter supply. As we know, the contract is held by the Canadian firm, Skylink, which then subs out to all manner of operations.

In typical Mail style, pompous and self-important, however, we get this piece of information dressed up as "The Mail on Sunday has established that the Ministry of Defence is using civilian Russian-built Mi-8 and Mi-26 transport helicopters ... ".

All the key information here, and much more of which the Mail is evidently unaware, has actually been announced in Parliament or tabled as responses to Parliamentary written questions, starting with an oral statement by Des Bowne on 20 May 2008, with a question from Dr Fox on 2 June 2008, followed by two questions from Ann Winterton, on 25 March 2009 and 20 April 2009respectively.

And, for all Leake's hyperventilation, he completely misses the main storyabout the Mi-26 going in, fact that it was shot down and the very shady history of the operators. All Leake can manage is, "The pilots are freelance Russians and Ukrainians." No doubt, he calls this journalism.

And the thing is, in missing the real story, Leake is making drama out of a non-story. It makes absolute sense to augment lift with suitably qualified and reputable civilian operators. It is cheap and highly flexible. The MoD should be commended for saving taxpayers' money - it took them long enough.

But then, Leake even makes a big deal out of the fact that we are hiring "massive commercial Russian Antonov aircraft to fly vehicles and heavy equipment from RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire to Afghanistan." And the point is? Everybody uses these aircraft, even the Americans. They are simply the biggest in town ... chartered from perfectly reputable operators, including several based in the UK. And if he looks at some of the MoD press hanndouts, he will see pics of Antonovs, going way back, with military kit being loaded on them.

For his "scoop of the week", however, Leake has picked up bits of information about the use of Mi-8 MTVs by Special Forces. But, he tells us, they are being used "because of a desperate lack of UK aircraft." Er ... nah! They are being used because they are the best aircraft for the job – and very successful they have been.

Then Leake tells us they are "on loan" from an unspecified "Third World nation". Er ... nah! The RAF bought six of them in 2007 (or could be a bit earlier) – there are five left. We may occasionally "borrow" others, but then that is normal in the theatre. The Yanks operate them as well – anonymous machines, camouflage-painted and no markings, just like ours.

To add to the mystery, Leake embellishes what little detail he has with the legend that they are flown by an elite team of UK Army Air Corps pilots, trained at a secret special forces base in Afghanistan. Er ... nah! In the main, they are flown by serving RAF officers. And they train in Boscombe Down, where two machines are kept for "evaluation" purposes. For sure, the pilots do theatre-specific training when they get there ... as do all operational pilots.

To Leake, though, this is a "humiliation" and he gets some talking heads – anonymous, of course – to say they are "dismayed" about being forced to borrow helicopters.

At times, you can understand the MoD's reluctance to tell the hacks anything. They will only get it wrong, or "spin" it. Clearly though, the best way for the MoD to keep things secret is to get the defence secretary to announce them in Parliament. Hansard, websites and Google are clearly beyond the reach of Mr Leake.

COMMENT THREAD

Take your pick ...

Will Pike and Patrick Little, two relatively junior former Army officers (Majors both), write in The Independent on the Afghani war. Amongst other things, they write:

Many senior officers and civil servants in the MoD have failed to support and deliver a winning strategy. They are distracted by wrangling over the defence budget, with its expensive equipment programmes; none of which will benefit the front line anytime soon.

Do I hear FRES, Future Lynx, Watchkeeper ...? And then they go on:

Projects conceived decades before 9/11 must not be allowed to wreck the prospects of success in what the Government claims is a war of critical national importance. They need to focus on the current battle and deliver blunt and objective advice to their political masters. If that advice is not being taken, they should resign and tell the public why. Equally, the political masters must assess carefully the advice they receive and test it against their political objectives. Politicians should be fully engaged in what is going on in Afghanistan, and not be afraid to meddle where appropriate. What is being done – militarily, diplomatically or developmentally – is being done for a political end. 

Some reform in the Army is under way. In inception parts of it is fairly radical, but none of it is funded and therefore fragile. It needs to go much further to address the longer term issues responsible for its ponderousness in learning and adapting. The Army needs a campaign of institutional renewal, facing up to its failings, and embracing critical debate. It needs to be prepared to overhaul any aspect of its organisation. Moreover it needs to prove that it now listens to its highly experienced middle-ranking officers. All the evidence suggests that they have not, in contrast to the bottom-up impetus that so transformed the US Army's performance in Iraq in 2007. 

The military task force in 2006 was deployed beyond its remit, and thus over extended itself. This resulted in a bloody summer and widely dispersed dispositions that subsequent units had to inherit but were not resourced for. Thus the military arm extended beyond their political direction. Where was the national chain of command? Three years later nothing has changed – it is just a bigger force, with equally confused ends, ways, and means. The effort remains woefully resourced and poorly directed.

Then we get the journos' "take" on it: "The defence cuts bleeding our forces dry" write Jonathan Owen and Brian Brady. They cite a report from "experts" from the UK National Defence Association (UKNDA) – prop. Charles Guthrie, ex CDS and now non-executive director of Colt Defense LLC, one of the largest arms manufacturers in the world.

And the UKNDA conclusion? "Defence provision must be increased steadily over the next three years to 3 to 3.5 percent."

Is it any wonder the defence "debate" never gets out the front door. The idle hacks are stuck in a groove, unable even to read their own newspapers, too busy pushing their pre-ordained narratives actually to be able to engage their brain cells. And they get paid for it!

COMMENT THREAD

The truth begins to emerge

Now it is the Observer's turn to pick up on the details that we've been running on this blog and DOTR for months, most recently here, here andhere. I suppose I shouldn't keep saying, "you read it here first," but you bloody well did.

More on Defence of the Realm.

On Booker ...

Raedwald has said it for me. Read, inwardly digest and then pop along to theTelegraph website to make your comment.

And why are we fighting the Taleban in Afghanistan? They are already here.

Military sources

I wonder where this came from?

Military sources claimed Sir Richard initially opposed the £30million purchase of 100 US-built Mastiff armoured patrol vehicles which have increased troops' protection against roadside bombs since replacing the heavily criticised Snatch Land Rovers.

The Mail on Sunday has been told Sir Richard preferred the ambitious FRES programme - Future Rapid Effects System - involving 3,500 medium-weight armoured vehicles. That project was quietly dropped last month amid fears over its cost and effectiveness.

You do love the pomposity of "The Mail on Sunday has been told" ... We read it here and then got the detail from Ministry of Defeat would have been more honest. But then, this is the MSM we're talking about. Can't reveal our sources, old boy!

A book lives or dies from the media exposure it gets. They are stealing bread from my mouth.

COMMENT THREAD

Clear military advice

Such is the overwhelming fog of impenetrable distortion that, at times one is tempted to walk away from the Afghan War issue, perhaps to write an earnest piece about wind farms and energy policy – or a careful analysis of Booker's column, which indeed I must do later today, if only to express my horror at the eventshe reports today.

What impels one to continue – I suppose, because I don't really know why I invest so much time, energy and emotional capital into this, when I have more pressing things to do - is perhaps because of an overpowering sense of injustice, and an equally powerful sense of a story that must be told, for good or bad.

This is particularly provoked by a piece in The Sunday Telegraph today, headed: "Labour at war over Afghanistan." It makes the highly tendentious claim that, "Labour is bitterly divided over defence spending as the Government's Afghanistan policy suffers a series of fresh setbacks."

One point must be addressed immediately – the rest later in this post. Labour is not at "war" over Afghanistan, not in any sense that this mischievous headline implies. It is basing its assertion on a single strand, comments by former defence secretary John Hutton who, for reasons of his own, has chosen to write "exclusively" about Afghanistan for The Sunday Telegraph, calling for more troops and helicopters.

One should also note, that Hutton – whatever arrangement he might have had with The Sunday Telegraph - Hutton has also allowed himself to be interviewed by The Sunday Times where he "breaks silence to fight for the generals".

With this, there is clearly an element of calculation, which fits ill with Mr Hutton. If he cared so deeply, then he might perhaps have stayed in his post instead of quitting after a mere nine months, and fought from the inside. Instead, he walked out at a critical juncture, a decision he had made well before the current controversy reared its head.

Mr Hutton's current pitch, though, is that, "When it comes to the numbers and the equipment it is absolutely essential politicians listen to advice from the military. Politicians must not become armchair generals. They must make decisions based on clear military advice."

Matthew Parris put this in context yesterday, warning us that the politicians should not defer automatically to the generals. Furthermore, Charles Moore reinforced this theme, writing in his column:

And do remember that our top brass, patriotic though they undoubtedly are, are also engaged in inter-service rivalry. It does not hurt the Army, losing money to the Navy's carriers, to protest that it does not have enough for Afghanistan. Just because you don't believe a minister, don't automatically believe a general. Ministers have to adjudicate between competing claims: it is not easy.

So doth Hutton say that politicians should listen to advice from the military. Indeed they should. But that does not mean to say they should take it, or that they should not listen to other opinions, and modify their decisions accordingly.

It also does not mean that they should not take into account the broader political issues that are outside the remit of the generals – and to which they are not always privy – or that they should not take account of the views of allies and, in this case, that of the host nation.

Hutton also says that politicians must "make decisions based on clear military advice." And indeed, subject to the above caveats they must. It would be very nice to be able to do so. But, as this campaign has progressed, it has been clear that the military itself is divided as to the best or correct course of action, that there are different agendas and schools of opinion within the military, and that "clear" advice is not always the right advice.

Politicians, also, must not become armchair generals, says Hutton – not least, one assumes, because the current generation of ministers have no military experience.

However, from their successive statements in Parliament and elsewhere, it is highly evident that ministers – and politicians generally – are extremely deferential to the military, perhaps too much so.

If, for instance, military advice had been slavishly followed in June 2006, Mastiff protected vehicles would not have been ordered in August and rushed into service. Instead, yet another batch of Pinzgauer Vectors would have been purchased. That was the "clear military advice" at the time, which also counselled to keep the Snatch Land Rover in service as it was "mission critical".

In fact, of the many problems affecting the Afghani campaign, one is most definitely that too much "clear military advice" has been taken. It was such advice from the RAF that deterred ministers from ordering large numbers of Mi-17s in early 2007 – even though the RAF had purchased this machine for duties with the Special Forces.

Even though this would have resolved the helicopter lift problem, ministers instead took the RAF advice to buy the six Danish Merlins – at a cumulative cost of over £186 million – advice which – as we record in the previous post, has yet to deliver a single extra airframe to theatre.

Other attempts were made by ministers to bring extra lift into theatre, but ministers were also required to balance their budgets. How they do that is a political decision – it is not for the military to make. The deal was to delay or even scrap the Future Lynx project in order to divert the funding to meet the more pressing need. This aircraft was not due to deliver to operations until 2014-15 – at the earliest – so it had no impact on immediate requirements.

But each time, the "word" came back that the Army did not support any such arrangement. And, although you will not find his fingerprints on any document, that attitude went right up to Dannatt. His concern – as Colonel Commandant of the Army Air Corps – was to protect the Corps. The Future Lynx would ensure its survival. Support helicopters would go to the RAF.

Ministers could have pressed the point but, such has been the ferocity of the pork-barrel campaign to keep the order – with the full and very active support of the Tory front bench – that discretion ruled. The last thing wanted was an open spat with the Army and its serried ranks of supporters.

Yet other options were considered, as The Sunday Telegraph excitably reports, telling us that "the Government" turned down the chance to buy 12 "cut-price" SA 330 Puma transport helicopters from the United Arab Emirates (example pictured), at a cost – we are told - of about £6 million each.

This, as it turns out, was only one of many possibilities considered, and a very tentative one at that. Prices were never discussed and, since they had just been refurbished at £10 million each, the £6 million is a tad on the low side.

Anyhow, the idea was turned down on "clear military advice" from the RAF and MoD. Ministers are the first to acknowledge that they are not technically competent to make detailed appraisals as to the suitability of second-hand helicopters for service in the RAF – and they are not in a position to over-ride the advice they have been given. Thus, they took the "clear military advice" that it was more cost-effective to upgrade the existing RAF fleet of Pumas.

And then we come to the "boots on the ground" issue. Actually, there never has been any "clear military advice" that an extra 2,000 troops should be committed to theatre – as Dannatt has now acknowledged. And the "clear military advice " from the likes of US General John Craddock is that the priority is the provision of transport (particularly helicopters and mine-protected vehicles), intelligence and medical capabilities.

"Too often," he said, "the forces there now are relatively fixed, because we don't have adequate tactical mobility to move them around to be able to do the jobs we need them to do." Without that "tactical mobility", additional troops are either ineffective or, worse still, become additional targets.

Given that this is also a coalition operation, and that General McCrystal, on behalf of the coalition command has yet to complete his review of force requirements, and that the whole issue was marked down for an ongoing review after the August election, it is a tad premature to be discussing enhancements of British force levels.

But, says The Sunday Telegraph leader, "Troops are more important than political points." The paper is wrong. Troops levels are an intensely political issue and, in a parliamentary democracy, the civilian politicians make the political decisions.

It is surely right for the generals to warn of the consequences of any such decisions, but it is then for the generals to dispose the forces allocated accordingly. We are not a military dictatorship and, however much this current government might be detested and mistrusted, ministers – not the generals – are constitutionally accountable.

Advice is one thing – and not all of it is either clear or good. Demands are another.

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