Saturday, 5 September 2009

"I want to take head on the arguments that suggest our strategy in Afghanistan is wrong and to answer those who question whether we should be in Afghanistan at all."

So said 
Gordon Brown yesterday, in a widely trailed speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, under the general heading of "Afghanistan - National Security and Regional Stability."

More on 
Defence of the Realm.


final extract

And that is the core of the strategy. There are more bits that Brown adds on, but we have essentially, more responsibility devolved to the Afghans, a stronger civilian-military partnership, strengthening local and district governance, and swapping opium for wheat. Thus does the man say, as in the Cold War, achieving our objective depends not just on armies and treaties. It depends on winning hearts and minds.

Getting to grips with this is like trying to bottle smoke. We cannot even say it sounds good. Not one element or "prong" answers the question of how the British forces intend to achieve the security that the Army argues is the necessary precursor to any and all of this activity.

Certainly, even at the first hurdle, the strategy falls as no one but the wildest optimist would assert that the Afghan security forces will be able to take the load for many years to come – if, indeed, in the foreseeable future. The question that must be answered, therefore, is that essential element – the nature of the military strategy for clawing back the land from the control of the Taleban.

On that, Brown is utterly silent – as is the military. We seem no further forward than when we started.