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Security and Defense: Israel goes ballistic

Sep. 10, 2009
Yaakov Katz , THE JERUSALEM POST

An Arrow 2 missile test.

On Sunday, the USS Higgins hauled up its anchor and sailed out of Haifa Port where it had docked for a short visit.

An Arleigh Burke class destroyer - one of the largest and most powerful naval vessels built in the United States - the Higgins is one of 18 American ships with an Aegis interceptor system, capable of destroying enemy ballistic missiles above the atmosphere.

 

In just a few weeks, additional Aegis vessels will arrive here to participate in the biennial Juniper Cobra missile defense exercise that the IDF has been holding with the US European Command (EUCOM) and Missile Defense Agency since 2001.

 

This year's drill, scheduled for mid-October, is being described as the largest joint exercise ever held by the countries. During it they will jointly test four ballistic missile defense systems.

In addition to the Aegis, the MDA and EUCOM are sending THAAD and Patriot 3 missile defense systems - America's most-advanced - for the first time.

While the Higgins has not yet needed to use its Aegis system to intercept missiles fired into Israel, its crew is intimately familiar with the country's various security issues, particularly along the northern border.

The ship is named for US Marine Col. William R. Higgins, who was kidnapped by Hizbullah in southern Lebanon in 1988, while serving as a commander of a UN peacekeeping mission. In August 1989, a cell linked to Hizbullah murdered him in response to the IDF kidnapping of Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, a senior cleric and leader of the guerrilla group who was involved in the kidnapping. His body was dumped, over a year later, on a Beirut side street.

 

Israel had planned to use Obeid to obtain information regarding the fate of IAF navigator Ron Arad. Obeid was released in 2004 in exchange for the bodies of three soldiers - kidnapped in October 2000 - as well as shady businessman Elhanan Tannenbaum, in a large prisoner swap with Hizbullah.

 

The cooperation between Israel and the US on missile defense dates back to the mid-1980s when they began to jointly develop the Arrow missile defense system. Since then, the US government has spent close to $3 billion on the Arrow, which is manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries and Boeing. Earlier this year, Congress approved additional funding for the development of the Arrow 3, a larger version with greater range and the capability of intercepting missiles at higher altitudes.

 

The cooperation peaked ahead of the 1991 Gulf War when the first Bush administration sent Patriot missile batteries to help defend the country against Saddam Hussein's Scud missile attacks.

Last October, the Bush administration gave Israel a farewell gift in the form of the X-Band radar, which is deployed in the Negev and is capable of detecting targets thousands of miles away, providing five to seven minutes of warning before an Iranian missile strikes. This is in contrast to the 10 seconds the residents of Sderot have when a Kassam rocket is launched from the Gaza Strip.

 

Juniper Cobra, senior defense officials said this week, is aimed at creating infrastructure in case Israel is attacked and the US decides to send the Aegis or THAAD to bolster the Arrow. The exercise spans several days and involves hundreds of Israeli and American soldiers, mostly from the air force.

 

The primary focus of the Juniper Cobra exercise held in 2007, for example, was integrating the lower-altitude US Patriot missile systems with the higher-altitude Arrow-2. This year, the integration will focus on improving the interoperability between the Arrow, THAAD and Aegis.

 

Officials said that the exercise may include live fire by the systems - most likely the Patriot - but the teams will mainly conduct computerized simulations of various threat scenarios launched from fictitious countries. The threats are then tracked and engaged by the various systems and the teams jointly write doctrine and staff procedures.

 

For Israel, the exercise could not have come at a more important time. Since the beginning of the year, Iran has made some impressive leaps with its ballistic missile development, culminating with the February launch of its first homemade satellite - called Omid - as well as the successful launch in May of a new missile, the Sajil, that has a range of more than 2,000 kilometers, easily reaching most of Eastern Europe.

 

This is impressive considering that just 10 years ago, the Iranians only had Scud B and C missiles. Today, they have their own production line of Shihabs and Sajils, for which they are building underground silos. In addition, Israeli assessments are that the Iranians will soon be capable of independently manufacturing their own version of the BM25 missile which they received from North Korea and has a range of more than 3,000 km.

According to the assessments, the launch of the Omid demonstrates that Iranian scientists have also made breakthroughs in guidance technology which has also likely been applied to its ballistic missiles.

 

According to Uzi Rubin, founder of the Arrow missile and a former head of the Homa Missile Defense Agency, Iran can also take unguided rockets like the Zelzal - which are also in Hizbullah's hands - and turn them into guided rockets with ranges topping 220 km.

 

"This is an original Iranian project; we don't see it anywhere else," Rubin noted in a recent briefing at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

The second major breakthrough is in the propulsion systems, which Iran has succeeded in upgrading from liquid to solid fuel. The main difference is that a missile that operates on liquid fuel needs to be fueled very close to launch, making it easier to discover with surveillance satellites or hovering aircraft. Solid-fuel missiles have a significantly longer shelf life and can be stored in underground silos for a long time, allowing the Iranians to just lift their cover and launch.

 

It is not an easy task though to assess Iran's progress in missile development.

On May 19, the EastWest Institute, a New York-based think tank that monitors global security, issued a report claiming that there was "no reliable information" on Iran's success in developing a solid fuel rocket. The next day, on May 20, Iran test fired the Sajil, proving without a doubt that it had independently mastered the capability.

 

These developments indicate as possible reversal in roles between Iran and North Korea. If Teheran bought technology from Pyongyang two decades ago, today the flow of technology is believed to have reversed.

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Terrorism: Hamas seeks new doctrine after Gaza War failures

[Freeman Note: Hamas lost militarily, but then defeated Israel on the diplomatic and propagana front. This ponts to a need for an agressive Foreign Ministry with an active communication staff. I have written about this for years, yet the Israel Foreign Ministry continued to be a negative in advancing Israeli interests. Maybe Liberman will be a new beginning.]

Sep. 10, 2009
jonathan spyer , THE JERUSALEM POST

Hamas has undertaken a major process of examination and investigation into its deeply flawed performance in the course of Operation Cast Lead, sources say. The review process is aimed at developing a new doctrine for Hamas to enable it to achieve its ambition of rivaling Hizbullah in its abilities. It remains to be seen if the reforms will deliver an improved result in renewed future hostilities with Israel or whether, as with Operation Cast Lead, Israel will once again display an ability to frustrate and set Hamas back on the tactical level.

 

Hamas carried out the first review of its performance immediately following the conclusion of hostilities. This was followed by a second major investigation in the spring, amid harsh criticism of the group's performance from its Iranian and Syrian sponsors. Izzadin al-Kassam Brigades leader Ahmed al-Ja'abari, and northern brigade commander Ahmed al-Ghandour were particularly singled out for criticism.

 

The cull of senior Hamas operatives in the course of Operation Cast Lead was heavy. Politburo members Nizar Rayyan and Said Siyam were killed. Senior commanders of the Executive Force, like Salah Abu Shareh (who headed the EF's security apparatus) and Mahmoud Watfah (head of its military wing), also lost their lives. Around 50 explosives experts are reported to have died. Operatives at this level are not easily replaced. But more fundamentally, the defensive doctrines developed by Hamas prior to Cast Lead comprehensively failed the test.

 

All of its strategically important attempts to kidnap IDF soldiers in the course of the fighting were unsuccessful (at least three close calls were reported). Its failure to score any success against the IDF's heavy armor was particularly noted. This was in stark contrast to the Second Lebanon War in 2006, in which Hizbullah's relative success in damaging a large number of tanks formed an important part of its claim of "divine victory."

The Hamas investigation, according to sources, was particularly focused on probing the failure to repel the IDF's push into Tel al-Hawa - Israel's deepest incursion into Gaza City. The investigation discovered widespread desertion by members of the Kassam Brigades in the face of the IDF advance. It found that many fighters, who had received instructions to withdraw if they feared being overrun, took a liberal interpretation of this, disappearing well in advance of the IDF's arrival. A Gaza rumor has it that 100 gunmen from the Zeitoun area were stripped of their membership in the organization following Cast Lead.

 

The extent of the Hamas failure can be summed up if one considers the official figures given by the organization on the ordnance fired in the course of Operation Cast Lead. According to Kassam Brigades spokesman Abu Obeideh, Hamas fired 558 rockets, of which 345 were Kassams and 213 were Grads, and 422 mortar shells; 53 sniper attacks were carried out and 79 bombs were detonated. Nineteen pitched battles with IDF forces took place.

 

The result was the death of six IDF soldiers. If one compares this with the statistics of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 - in which 23 IDF soldiers were killed in a single battle in the Jenin refugee camp - the extent of the failure becomes apparent.

 

Hamas managed throughout the course of the Gaza war to maintain constant rocket fire on Israel. This was a significant symbolic achievement, but not a great deal more. It constitutes the sole military success of any kind for which Hamas is able to take credit.

 

Clearly, something went awry for the rulers of Gaza in the fighting. Their patrons in Teheran and Damascus were angry and concerned. The image of success, of having finally found a way to deny the IDF victory and cause Israel setbacks, is an important element in the psychological warfare of the Iran-led regional bloc. This image has taken a series of blows so far this year. The Gaza events rank high among them.

 

Hamas has therefore engaged in extensive internal discussions intended to lead to the formulation of a new doctrine. According to sources, two distinct orientations emerged from this, corresponding broadly with the growing political divide in Hamas between the veteran leadership of the movement and elements committed to a more extreme al-Qaida style approach. The latter favored the acceptance of a much higher casualty rate of Hamas fighters, through the resumption of direct attacks on Israeli forces, and the reinstatement of attacks on Israel and in the West Bank. This adventurous and probably suicidal approach, however, has not been accepted.

Rather Hamas has adopted a more modest series of reforms. These center on overhauling the movement's tactical doctrine, adopting a new and intensified, externally-supported training program for Kassam Brigades fighters, increased smuggling and upgrading of arms, the building of a new, underground tunnel structure and an attempt to tighten internal security.

Regarding the first issue, Hamas over the summer has been carrying out intensified military training at its various training camps and military academy in the Nuseirat refugee camp. The academy, ironically, is named after the Palestinian ideological godfather of al-Qaida, Dr. Abdallah Azzam. In contrast to the pre-2009 period, when Hamas took great pride in parading its military capabilities, the nature of this training has not been publicized.

 

The new approach is thought to be more offensive, and is intended to hit at the rear bases of an incoming IDF force. Hizbullah is thought to be deeply involved in the new training program. (This is not a new development. Elements who had trained with Hizbullah in the Bekaa Valley were also involved in the fighting earlier this year.)

 

On the issue of smuggling, Egyptian efforts at cracking down on weapons smuggling into Rafah have increased in recent months. In addition, as reported in the media, there have been the attacks on arms convoys in Sudan which were on their way to Gaza, and the revelation of a Hizbullah-led arms smuggling network in the spring; 49 operatives, led by Hizbullah member Sami Shihab (Muhammad Yousef Mansour) are now on trial in Egypt for organizing this network.

 

The Egyptians, however, are making no efforts to curb commercial smuggling into Gaza, which now forms a major source of income for the Hamas regime. As a result, Hamas is mixing the bringing in of arms with the import of commercial goods. Part of the levy placed on commercial owners of tunnels is thought to include requiring them at short notice to be ready to bring in arms for Hamas. Extensive redigging of tunnels destroyed in the bombing of the Philadelphi corridor began already in January.

In addition to the extensive tunnel network, seaborne smuggling is also continuing. Hamas claims as a result of these efforts to now have a more extensive array of weaponry than before the war.

 

Hamas lost a very large amount of weaponry in the course of Operation Cast Lead. Key storage facilities under mosques and public buildings were discovered. The movement blames the presence of Fatah "informers" for its failures in this regard. Hamas believes that Fatah members at street level provided real-time information to IDF forces. The movement settled accounts with a series of executions of Fatah men after Cast Lead.

 

Improving internal security is now a major task facing the rulers of Gaza.

The picture of Hamas in Gaza that emerges in the post-Cast Lead period is a complex one. On the one hand, its rule survived the operation intact. No concerted Israeli effort to bring Hamas down was undertaken, and Hamas swiftly reasserted its authority after emerging from the rubble, despite the heavy blows it had taken.

 

On the other hand, the many failures in the movement's performance have tarnished its reputation and accentuated internal divisions. The most important of these splits is between the movement's traditional leadership which wants to continue its current path, and the growing number of Salafi militants concentrated in the Kassam Brigades, who would like to see greater Islamic observance in society and a return to a collision course with Israel.

 

Operation Cast Lead represented a significant tactical defeat for Hamas and hence, an important though far from decisive setback for the regional alliance which it is part of. The movement has picked up the pieces and engaged in a rethink of the methods that failed it. Of course, Israel too will have sought to learn its lessons from the experience of the Gaza War. As to who drew the better conclusions - this will be answered only in the next round of fighting between these two seemingly irreconcilable foes.

 

The writer is a senior researcher at the Global Research in International Affairs Center, IDC, Herzliya.

This article can also be read at http://www.jpost.com /servlet/Satellite?cid=1251804542247&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull