Uncast lead
By Israel Harel - Haaretz 18 February 2010
It has been just over a year since Operation Cast Lead, and the Gaza Strip
is armed to the teeth and plotting. Hamas' long-range missiles are aimed at
Tel Aviv and Ben-Gurion International Airport. Hamas, whose ranks have more
than doubled since the mission ended ("we have achieved our goals," the
Israel Defense Forces announced after the cease-fire), are ready and waiting
to fight Israel if we are forced to embark on another operation. What then
did Cast Lead achieve? The Goldstone report?
Ehud Olmert, the prime minister of the operation, is writing a book in which
he accuses Defense Minister Ehud Barak and the army of halting the mission
before it attained its goal - crushing Hamas and bringing down its
government. Olmert says this aim could have been achieved in a reasonable
amount of time and with few losses. Why then did the IDF not seek to attain
the operation's objective, which would have restored quiet to the western
Negev, stopped the manufacture of weapons in the Strip and restored
Palestinian Authority rule? His answer: Security officials showed him false
evaluations on the expected losses and the time it would take to achieve the
objectives.
And how did Olmert know that the numbers provided by the defense minister,
the man "who manipulated him," were wrong? Olmert's people checked with
Southern Command, he relates, and found out that those who were actually
bearing the brunt of combat believed that the evaluations by the defense
minister and the general staff were very exaggerated and stemmed from a lack
of motivation to finish the job.
That manipulative man (about whom leaders other than Olmert air similar
complaints), who thwarted completion of the Gaza operation, is the one
leading the preparations for Israel's war of survival against Iran.
When he was prime minister and defense minister, Barak oversaw the shameful
and perfidious flight from Lebanon - as those loyal to Israel in the land of
the cedars saw it. The flight seriously impaired Israel's deterrence,
increased Hezbollah's prestige in Lebanon and deepened Iran's hold on the
region. Yasser Arafat, who foresaw Barak's weakness, then embarked on a war
of terror in which more than 1,000 Israelis were killed and life in Israel
was made unbearable.
The radical elements among Israeli Arabs also believed that this was the
time to begin an uprising. The traumas from the bloody events of October
2000 Wadi Ara, the lower Galilee and the Negev roil below the surface to
this day. Only Operation Defensive Shield, which was made possible after
Barak was defeated in the elections, extracted Israel from the unbearable
situation into which he had thrust it.
In his criticism of Operation Cast Lead, Olmert says the chief of staff as
well as the defense minister did not really want to take decisive action in
Gaza. The army understood that after three years of ceaseless rocket fire on
the south there was no choice but to take comprehensive action. But when
that action began (as Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland attests), it became clear that
the army had no clear strategic goals at all. That is how ambivalent the
general staff was.
Questions are inevitable on the eve of fateful decisions. Why did we fail in
Lebanon? Who was responsible for the delay in suppressing terror? Who did
not achieve the goals of Operation Cast Lead? Quite a few of those
responsible are still important defense officials, and one, Barak, holds a
crucial post.
To meet the tests of survival that await us, perhaps even soon, we need
leaders and military chiefs who are determined and ready for struggle and
sacrifice. Olmert says we have no one like that at the wheel. Woe to us if
he is right.
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