Energy: the price of generation
Wednesday 17 July 2013
STOR just got more interesting and, if you have nothing to do, here is a short report (a mere 110 pages) from the National Grid. Look at page 22.
Richard North 17/07/2013 |
Police: Fraud? What fraud?
Wednesday 17 July 2013
 If we had scripted it from the outset we wouldn't have been far wrong. We have seen the typicalfraudulent behaviour by bailiffs, wilful refusal by the council to investigate and total police indifference. We are not giving up and the fight goes on. COMMENT THREAD Peter North 17/07/2013 |
EU politics: that "Brexit" competition
Wednesday 17 July 2013
 To get us started, I have produced this discussion draft. We can add to this, change and refine it, in response to forum comments and, if preferred, to e-mails. If you make your suggestions, I will look at them and build them into the scripts, ending up with a completed work of about 2,000 words. In so doing, I have looked at the IEA brief, which actually creates a number of conceptual problem. Specifically in terms of it setting the scene, with a referendum delivering an "out" vote, triggering an Article 50, we note that the IEA wants to know what measures the UK needs to take in the following two years, domestically (within the UK), vis-a-vis the remaining EU and internationally, in order to promote a free and prosperous economy. The first of our problems is that any referendum would not have taken place in a vacuum. Thus, while economics may have featured prominently in any campaign, there is a distinct possibility that the "out" sentiment will have been driven not by economic issues, but by political considerations – such as, for example, the reduction of immigration. Another driver of an "out" victory may well be the fundamental issue of governance – the question of who governs Britain and whether we can reintroduce some form of democracy into our system. Arguably, therefore, a referendum may not be won primarily, or at all, on economic issues. Simply, in order to win, "out" campaigners will have had to assure voters that economic interests have been protected and any potential damage limited. Under those circumstances, the primary objective of Article 50 negotiations will not necessarily be to promote "a free and prosperous economy". Rather, it will be to promote – insofar as far as is possible – a free and self-governing country. To achieve that, it may be necessary, at least in the short-term, to make some economic sacrifices. Therefore, to elevate the pursuit of "a free and prosperous economy" could well conflict with the primary aim of negotiations, which could simply be the expeditious exit from the EU. In that context, the economic aim is simply to protect our position, the best outcome possibly being that the transition from EU member state to the new status – whatever that might be – is economically neutral. The second problem is that, within the framework of Article 50 negotiations – whether they last two years, or take a longer or shorter period to conclude – the complexities of our current membership of the EU are that we would have great difficulty in defining – much less agreeing – an economically advantageous outcome. Apart from anything else, there are too many unknown unknowns, but the more important problem is the sheer longevity of any talks which would be required to conclude any agreements. Here, if we look at the Swiss model of bilateral agreements, the problem is well illustrated. Negotiations between the Swiss government and the EU started in 1994 but it took until 2010 for around 210 trade treaties to be finalised – with many issues still to be agreed. If these talks have stretched over a period of 16 years, agreements covering the more complex and larger economy of the United Kingdom might require many more years. Potentially Article 50 negotiations could extend to two decades or more, before an exit plan was agreed. All that time, our membership and financial contributions would continue. For that reason, we suggest that no attempt should be made to secure a definitive agreement under the aegis of Article 50. Extended negotiations would not be politically acceptable. Instead, we should seek an interim solution, such as seeking EFTA membership and, through that, continued membership of the EEA, with provision for renegotiation of that arrangement at five or ten year intervals. This again points to the economic outcome of any Article 50 negotiations being neutral, with no steps taken to secure better or different mechanisms for promoting a free and prosperous economy. With that, we can now confront a third problem, where the increasing globalisation of trade and other regulation is blurring the distinction between membership of the EU and participating on international standards-setting bodies within the WTO framework. For instance, if we take EU financial regulation, which many regard as highly damaging, much of what is coming through the system is the implementation of the Basel III – which was agreed at international level by the British government. Even out of the EU, therefore, we would most likely find ourselves adopting similar regulation or, within the EEA, still implementing EU regulations. On that basis, the end point of our withdrawal from the EU could in some respects be very little different from our position as a Member State. Over time, that position might vary, if we chose not to adopt measures at international level, which were adopted by the EU, but generally speaking we would probably tend to keep in line with the EU. The combined effects of these three problems suggest that the best outcome of Article 50 negotiations is to minimise any impact on the economy – for good or bad. The objective will be to separate political and economic aspects of the negotiations, and deal with them differently. An economic settlement requires a measured, slow approach. The political imperative of an exit from the EU requires speed. Thus, when it comes to defining "the legal and constitutional processes necessary for the UK to leave the EU and set up, if desired, alternative international relationships", as far as is possible, the economic aspects should be "parked". Priority should be given to settling the political issues.
This would accord with the view expressed in a recent House of Commons library research paper, that the full impact of a UK withdrawal is impossible to predict.
The safest option, therefore, is a minimum change scenario on economic issues, then allowing for a cautious, measured series of changes over an extended period. The final shape of a post-exit Britain should emerge from a series of organic changes, rather than from a "big bang" leap into the dark. The immediate emphasis of any Article 50 negotiations would thus be the search for stable interim solutions. In terms of trade, one option could be to seek membership of EFTA and, given that the existing EFTA states accept our membership, we could seek continuation of the EEA agreement. This would ensures continuity of Single Market issues, although we would then need new domestic legislation to enact EEA agreements in the same way that the European Communities Act enacts EU treaty provisions. It should be stressed that EFTA/EEA membership would be seen as an interim option, a short-term solution that does not prejudice later bilateral agreements with the EU, on the lines of the Swiss option, or other developments. One imaginative idea is to expanding the EFTA to become a free trade agreement covering all EEA members, taking over the management of the Single Market and giving all members a direct stake in rule-making. Such a stratagem would leave the EU (less the UK and any other Member States which decided to leave) free to pursue political integration, without the drag of countries such as the UK which have no enthusiasm for the process. As to the formal ending of our membership of the EU, in accordance with the Article 50 procedure a new treaty between the UK and the remaining EU Member States would be the final outcome of the process. Following that, the UK would repeal the European Communities Act – via the medium of a repealing Act. As to the acquis communautaire as it applied to the UK, the abrogation of the treaties would not affect any EU legislation already transposed into UK law, whether a primary Act or Statutory Instrument. The repeal of an enabling Act does not affect the validity of SIs previously made thereunder. On the other hand, European Regulations have direct effect and gain their authority from the ECA, without having been transposed into UK law. With the repeal of the ECA, these cease to have effect. It is asserted by Minford that, when we leave the EU, only our exporters will have to continue to observe EU regulations but, for everyone else (over 90% of GDP) EU regulations will cease to be relevant. In many instances, though, EU regulation has replaced domestic law, a process often accompanied by modernisation. Removal of the EU regulations would leave whole areas of economic activity unregulated, while reversion to previous law would not be practical. The entire corpus of food hygiene regulation is one example. Statutory requirements for food premises - ranging from abattoirs to restaurants - are set out in EU regulation. Repealing EU regulation remove enforceable controls over domestic food hygiene standards. There are no longer any regulations of UK origin. Similarly, much of the fisheries (CFP) and agricultural (CAP) regulation is implemented by EU regulation, with their repeal leaving large gaps in important policy areas of considerable economic significance to those affected. It would, however, be difficult and time consuming both to identify and then replace the entire body of EU regulation. The best option, prior to final abrogation of the treaties, would be to re-enact the entire body of law, converting it, en bloc into British law (by a device similar to the ECA). This process of repatriation would then allow selective repeal and amendment at leisure, to bring the regulation into line with specific UK requirements, if thought desirable. That would mean re-enacting policies such as the CFP and CAP, until such time as replacement policies could be devised and enacted. It should be noted that the technical complexities involved in devising such policies de novo would doubtless take many years. A further complication arises with unilateral treaties made by the EU with third countries, of which there are just short of 800 registered on the EU treaty data base. Some of these are merely memoranda of understanding, and others are time-expired, but many are substantial agreements, from which the UK gains advantages, but only by virtue of membership of the EU. On the face of it, each of these treaties will have to be examined and, where necessary, the provisions reframed as bilateral treaties between the UK and the relevant third countries, negotiated with those countries, agreed and ratified before the UK withdraws from the EU. Doubtless, the need to carry out so many negotiations in a relatively short time would stretch diplomatic resources. That now brings us to about 1,800 words, and we are just warming up, so we will have to précis what we have before making much more progress. To add, amongst many other things, are considerations of joint and co-operative enterprises, such as defence, where we may want to continue a relationship, as in the European Defence Agency, but outside the EU treaty framework. I will leave it there for the moment, and recommence later today. COMMENT THREAD Richard North 17/07/2013 |
EU politics: a fog of incomprehension
Tuesday 16 July 2013
Possibly, Andrea Leadsom has done us an invaluable service in demonstrating the depth of incomprehension about the EU which afflicts certain segments of the Conservative Party.
This woman has inherited a view that comes straight out of an alternate universe, demonstrating unequivocally that there are groups of people – MPs amongst them – who do not have the first idea of what democracy really is. If we were not already aware of the phenomenon, the depth of ignorance would be quite alarming. In fact, all further exposure does is reinforce the view that there is no mileage in any dialogue with people who cannot grasp the basics. A fog of incomprehension that thick is impenetrable. You don't argue with it. Like the Maginot Line, you go round it. COMMENT THREAD Richard North 16/07/2013 |
Wednesday, 17 July 2013
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